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Abstract	
  
The field of management has built a wealth of literature on turnaround management as
well as the effect unethical actions have upon organizations. However, there has been less
study on the application of these topics to turnarounds specifically in small, regional,
public institutions of higher education. It is important that an institution of higher
education that has been affected by an ethical failure execute a turnaround to restore trust
and faith in the organization, internally and externally.
A small, regional, public institution of higher education in the upper Midwest
recently encountered a series of organizational difficulties that negatively influenced its
reputation. An organizational course change was necessary. The research titled “The
Management of a Turnaround after an Ethical Breech in a Public Institution of Higher
Education” applies the differing, yet related, theories of turnaround management and the
restoration of trust to a small, public institution of higher education. The research
investigated whether or not the university employees (faculty, staff, and administrators)
believed that the organization and its leadership had demonstrated a process/path
illustrative of a turnaround. Ultimately, the research investigated the theory that
institutions of higher education can be restored through an ethical turnaround (Hofer,
1980; Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010; Puffer & McCarthy, 2008).
Keywords: ethics, higher education, trust, turnaround, university
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Chapter 1: Introduction	
  

	
  
Background and Overview	
  
Publius Syrus, a former slave from the 1st century BC, penned the poignant
statement asking “what is left when honor is lost?” (as cited in Lyman, 1856, p. 31).
Providing that “he who has forfeited his honor can lose nothing more” (as cited in
Lyman, 1856, p. 31), Syrus commented upon the fact that honor, integrity, and ethics are
all vital elements of character. Once honor and integrity have been tarnished, it is
extraordinarily difficult to rebuild trust, faith, or belief in an individual or an
organization. As human beings inevitably make mistakes that negatively influence the
organizations in which they operate, it is imperative that the management profession
study how to correct these faults and blunders in organizations. To rescue an institution
from its member’s failings, managers and leaders must effectively “steer” or “turn” an
organization in a different direction.
Practitioners in management can partner with the Academy to understand the
most successful techniques and strategies to turn an organization around with ethics and
integrity while restoring the broken trust and faith of its stakeholders. Academics have
the opportunity to assess the progress of organizations to change their future and restore
themselves after their failings while practitioners can put the research into action. Though

the relationship between management and academics is often challenging and fraught
with trust issues, this research provides the opportunity for practitioners and academics to
work together to study an intentional turnaround in an organization that was shattered by
an ethical breach with a dramatically diminished customer base, a loss of trust and faith
by the wider community, and in danger of losing its permission to operate and issue
degrees as an educational institution.

	
  
Statement of Research Problem	
  
Organizations and individuals have the potential to create an environment with
“the presence of chaos, change, poor management, and bullying in an organization”
(Boddy, 2011, p. 376) that is difficult for its employees and stakeholders. Whether the
leader has committed an ethical infraction or simply made a poor decision, perhaps even
a series of poor decisions, the organization may lose its credibility with its stakeholders,
even its legitimacy as an upright entity possessed of integrity, and the public faith (Puffer
& McCarthy, 2008). Organizations that violate social, moral, or legal codes; commit
fraud of any sort; engage in asset misappropriation, pollution, or environmental damage;
discriminate against individuals; breach contracts, or leave obligations unfulfilled must
correct their actions as quickly and honestly as possible to restore the faith and trust of
the employees, customers, and other stakeholders (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008). Without
correction, organizations run the risk of losing customers, employees, and financial
support. Because organizational strife and chaos from individuals or the environment can
significantly impact productivity, engagement, and workplace success, the entity’s
efficiency, output, and service to customers will ultimately suffer (Boddy, 2011;

“Remember Employee Engagement,” 2009). Employees that are constantly pressured by
chaos and a tumultuous work environment with constant change, upheaval, and discord
cannot perform at sufficient levels, negatively impacting output (Boddy, 2011;
“Remember Employee Engagement,” 2009).
Hofer’s (1980) focus on turnaround management supports the perspective that
managers and leaders can correct an organization’s direction from its past mistakes
through a change in the organization’s patterns of behavior and a transformation of
perspectives. Entities such as Adelphia Communications, Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco,
Siemens International, Waste Management Systems, WorldCom, and others have all
committed a number of serious ethical infractions resulting in billions upon billions of
dollars lost, livelihoods destroyed, and markets corrupted. However, only those
organizations that changed their behavior and ethical focus were able to save their
operations. Hofer (1980) stated, “no matter what the state of the economy, no company is
immune from internal hard times” (p. 19) whether stagnation of operations, declining
performance, financial difficulties, economic change, or ethical infractions. For any
organization, a turnaround is necessary to redirect the entity in a more positive, upright,
and focused direction.
The field of management, specifically in strategy, has built a wealth of literature
on turnaround management, as well as the effect unethical actions have upon
organizations. Corporations and for-profit entities have already utilized many of these
turnaround tactics to effect change, and anecdotal examples of turnaround management
strategies have been documented in governmental organizations (Beeri, 2012). In
addition, the label of turnaround has been used to describe improvement in student

performance in public school systems as part of a comprehensive plan to reform
education (Department of Education, 2012). However, there has been little to no study of
the application of these topics to turnarounds after an ethical breach specifically in small,
regional, public institutions of higher education. It is important that an institution of
higher education affected by an ethical failure execute a turnaround to restore trust and
faith in the organization, both internally and externally.
A small, regional, public institution of higher education in the upper Midwest
recently encountered a series of organizational difficulties that negatively influenced its
reputation. An audit of its special, short-term international programs determined that the
majority of special programs failed traditional degree standards (The Associated Press,
2012; Donovan, 2012a; Donovan, 2012b). Specifically, the students that participated in
the university’s short-term international programs often lacked legitimate, verified
transcripts, language proficiency scores, general education requirements, and university
degree requirements (Redden, 2012). Auditors determined that of the 594 degrees
awarded, 10 were actually earned according to university standards (Redden, 2012). The
2011-2012 academic year included the termination of the former president for enrollment
inflation (and subsequent lawsuit of the former president for wrongful termination), a
compliance and policy audit (improper degrees, human resources, and internal controls),
and a financial audit that revealed additional ethical and procedural problems in the
university (Finneman, 2012).
The university and some of its employees took a series of actions and made
decisions that negatively influenced the organization’s reputation and the value of its
degrees. The entity and its members were accused of enrollment inflation/fraud, improper

awarding of degrees without documentation, misuse of public funds, and inappropriate
scholarship allocations. Because of these actions, the university’s reputation was
negatively impacted, employee turnover increased, student enrollment decreased,
donations and revenue diminished, and the former dean took his own life. An
organizational course change was necessary.
Redden (2012) provided that this case was “a cautionary tale” (para. 8). The
director of the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admission Officers’
International Education Services, Dale Gough, agreed that this example was “not a
singular case” (Redden, 2012, para. 8). As institutions of higher education pursue
revenues from international students, illegitimate records, falsified documents, and
overseas agents that do not adhere to strict university standards become more prevalent
(Redden, 2012). Though this example was one case at a single institution of ignoring
proper standards of operation in favor of revenues, anecdotal evidence of fraud and
problems in university programs are more widespread (Kelley & Chang, 2007; Lieb,
1998; Redden, 2012; Wright & Jefferson, 1998). The research titled “The Management of
a Turnaround after an Ethical Breach in a Public Institution of Higher Education” applies
the theory of turnaround management to a small, public institution of higher education. In
addition, the research investigates the theory that institutions of higher education can be
restored through an ethical turnaround (Hofer, 1980; Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010; Puffer &
McCarthy, 2008). As fraud, problems, or simply failures in higher education leadership
and operations are not confined to this single example, all institutions of higher education
should take notice of this research to make organizational course corrections after a

breakdown. While the specifics of the case that created the need for an organizational
turnaround are unique to this university, the concepts of a turnaround are not.
Research Question and Hypotheses	
  
Did current university faculty, staff, and administrative members perceive that the
organizational entity and its leadership have demonstrated a process/path illustrative of a
turnaround as measured by responses to Beeri’s (2009) Turnaround Management
Strategies in Local Authorities
● H1. A positive correlation existed between a perception of turnaround
in reorganization activities and all faculty, staff, and administrative
employees.
● H2. A positive correlation existed between a perception of stronger
financial controls and faculty, staff, and administrative employees.
● H3. A positive correlation existed between a perception of extending
new marketing efforts to new consumers and faculty, staff, and
administrative employees.
● H4. A positive correlation existed between a perception of improving
the local authority’s internal and external image and all faculty, staff,
and administrative employees.
● H5. There was a moderate correlation between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholder trust in the local authority and those employees
considered mostly staff or mostly faculty.

● H6. There was a moderate correlation between a perception of
reshaping and improving the organizational culture and climate and
faculty and staff employees.
● H7. There was a positive correlation between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the level of
participation in extracurricular activities on campus.
● H8. There was a positive correlation between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the number of
hours per week employees spend on campus executing their specific
job duties.
● H9. There was a positive correlation between a perception of
redefining the core mission and all faculty, staff, and administrative
employees.
● H10. There was a positive correlation between defining a common
vision of the local authority and the levels of management.

	
  
Definition of Terms and Constructs	
  
The essence of a turnaround was defined by Pandit (2000) as merely “the
recovery of a firm’s economic performance following an existence-threatening decline”
(p. 32). This is true regardless of whether the organizational decline occurred over a short
or long period of time, or if the decline occurred very quickly because of an event or
series of events that placed an entity in jeopardy (Pandit, 2000). A turnaround can also be
thought of as a reversal in the direction or course of an activity or action, transforming or

altering the entity, its allegiances, policies, roles, or trends (Hofer, 1980). Paul (2005)
viewed a turnaround as “the reversal of performance from decline and failure to recovery
and success” (p. 123). A turnaround is a recovery, often couched in financial terms such
as net income, return on investment, return on assets, or other accounting ratios,
performance improvement, or sustained positive performance (Pandit, 2000; Schendel &
Patton, 1975, 1976, 1978; Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1974, 1976).
As these standards are mostly financial metrics, Beeri (2009), following the work
of Boyne (2004; 2006), commented upon the need to measure turnaround through
retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization as entities outside of the for-profit sector
may not be able to quantify turnaround or change merely in accounting terms. Beeri
(2009) defined retrenchment as “reduction in the scope or size of the organization aimed
at releasing resources from unproductive sections that can be reinvested in more
productive ones” (p. 131) in terms of efficiency and stability. The category of
repositioning as addressed by Beeri (2009) specifically focuses upon effectiveness,
growth, innovation, and redefining the mission, vision, and goals of the entity to current
or new customers. In addition, “any internal organizational change, including changes
within leadership personnel” (Beeri, 2009, p. 132) is considered reorganization, and
works in conjunction with strategies to retrench or reposition to turn the organization in a
new direction.
Public institution of higher education was defined and delimited in this case to a
small, regional, public institution of higher education that provides degrees in various
fields and is funded via public monies. The educational institution was classified as an
entity that was created and operated with the intent of fulfilling an educational purpose or

need in society that is exempt from federal income tax to benefit its stakeholders or
society as a whole (Tolbert, Moore, & Wood, 2010). Because the population of the study
was a single small, regional, public institution of higher education, stakeholders are
usually defined as employees (faculty, staff, administrators, and management), students,
and the public. The public included the community external to the institution of higher
education in which the institution resides and included the business community, town,
and surrounding area that work with the institution. However, this research was limited to
those employed by the university as a current faculty (annual contract, tenure-track, or
tenured), staff, manager, or administrative member.

	
  
Assumptions, Delimitations, and Limitations	
  
As this research was undertaken in a single small, regional, public university, the
researcher made the initial assumption that the respondents would understand the
questions asked, as well as provide honest and accurate responses. While this research
was strictly anonymous, the researcher also assumes that respondents believed that it was
anonymous and would answer questions truthfully, valuing the intent and its purpose.
The first delimitation of this research was the intentional narrowing of the scope
of the population to those currently employed at the single university. As these issues
were unique to the organization at a specific time, the setting and time of the study were
narrowly focused in both categories. While the researcher worked to gather as much data
as possible through publicized documentation and survey results, the final outcome of the
organization’s turnaround will likely take a number of years beyond the study to
complete. Therefore, this study was a snapshot of a moment in time at the institution.

The limitations of this study included general weaknesses in the survey
methodology. Though the researcher has taken care to use established instruments that
are found to be reliable and valid, findings may not be generalizable outside of the chosen
population. As the surveys were substantial in nature, requiring approximately 15-30
minutes to complete, there is a risk of survey fatigue. To mitigate this risk and encourage
the most important questions on the instruments were answered, the demographic
questions were placed after the major instrument. Low response rates and incomplete
responses are also inherent weaknesses of the survey methodology. The researcher
attempted to mitigate this limitation by garnering public support from the organization’s
Office of Academic Affairs to encourage participation (see “Procedure” below).
Another limitation of this research is the fact that participants were those
individuals currently employed at the university, likely skewing the research data. As a
number of individuals left the university between the time of the ethical breach and the
time of this research, the responses were skewed as to the opinions and perceptions of
those currently employed. Because of the nature of the major research question, asking
whether current faculty, staff, and members of administration (who may or may not be
considered “managers”) perceived that the entity and leadership had demonstrated a
process/path illustrative of a turnaround, this research did not investigate the perspectives
of those individuals that left the organization. Therefore, this issue certainly limits the
responses to individuals that may be location-bound, could not find an alternative
position elsewhere, or those that might be especially dedicated to improving the
organization. In addition, members of the university that have arrived since the breach
may not view the turnaround in the same light as those employees that have been at the

institution for a longer period, however, due to the potential ethical risks involved,
employment length at the university was not investigated.
The potential ethical risk of discomfort to the respondents also existed. To
mitigate, the researcher received approvals from both the George Fox University and
organizational Institutional Research Boards. In addition, because the issues at the entity
were so personal and poignant to the respondents, there was the potential for both
discomfort and inconvenience to the respondents. The survey instrument was designed to
look at the improvements at the university, but could have brought up unpleasant
memories of the university’s downturn as well as created feelings of organizational
pressure, biasing the responses. Because the past issues may have resulted in feelings of
uncertainty about the future, it was necessary to protect respondents’ identities and
confidentiality. The respondents were also given an ‘out’ if they do not want to complete
the survey, protecting the respondents. In addition, certain questions such as “when did
you start working for the university,” “are you tenured,” and various other potentially
identifiable demographic questions were not asked as they were prohibited by the
organization’s Institutional Research Board (A. Stark, personal communication).
In addition, there existed an inherent risk of researcher bias as the researcher is
employed at the organization under study (see Role of the Researcher below). Because of
the imperative need to mitigate and guard against researcher bias, the researcher chose to
engage in a quantitative study with established instruments. The identities and positions
of all respondents were obscured to all users, including the primary researcher, and the
data was provided in a statistical/numerical form. There were no personal connections or

assessments with the respondents. In addition, all results were assessed and vetted by the
Chair of the researcher’s dissertation committee, the committee, and an external reviewer.
Given that the study focused on a single population, bounded by unique
experiences, generalization may not be appropriate. Instead, it is up to the reader of the
research to determine how much or which elements of this study are generalizable to
other situations. The specific market and issues were unique to the organization at that
point in time, though the potential exists for other universities and colleges in the future
to find themselves in similar situations. While the existing research substantiates and
supports the theories of ethical turnarounds and organizational course change, the
concepts may not be applicable to all institutions of higher education. Therefore, the
results may not be replicable in other cases or to the populations of other educational
institutions.

	
  
Significance of the Study	
  
The intention of this study is to add to the body of knowledge regarding
turnaround management as applied to public institutions of higher education after an
organizational difficulty or ethical breach. While Hofer (1980) and a number of others
focused upon turnaround management and its various strategies and tactics in the
corporate setting, Beeri’s (2009) research focused on the same strategies in local
governments. Because there had been comparatively little research on these concepts in
higher education, this study serves the academy to broaden the application of the areas of
research to small, regional, public institutions of higher education. However, with a more
specific application, this research assessed whether this particular small, regional, public

institution had effectively started a process or path of turnaround based on the
perspectives of its faculty, staff, and administration, providing helpful data to the
organization’s management and leadership (practitioners) to execute necessary course
corrections to improve the university’s progress.
By adding to the body of knowledge through exploring and understanding ethical
turnarounds in higher education, the main literature that remains fixed in the corporate
world can be applied to the different area of higher education. The research may help
educational leaders by demonstrating one example of how ethical turnarounds can be
applied in colleges and universities. By informing other colleges and universities about
options to turn an organization around, other institutions can be helped by demonstrating
how to change and revitalize their potential. Because of the issues surrounding the
population under study, the research has the potential to positively influence policies of
other institutions of higher education before they engage in the same behaviors or how to
execute a turnaround after an ethical breach. The study provided ongoing information and
data over time to develop an understanding of how institutions of higher education can
execute an ethical turnabout.

	
  
Researcher’s Perspective	
  
The role of the researcher was a challenging element of this research, creating
strategic, ethical, and personal issues. It is important to note that the researcher in this
study was not only involved in the research, but was employed by the organization during
the research. As an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the organization, the researcher
began her employment with the organization in the fall of 2009, two academic years prior

to the 2011-2012 academic year when many of the issues came to light. The researcher
was reasonably acquainted with the issues that inspired the organizational change;
however, the challenge was to mitigate researcher bias (see “Instrument Reliability and
Validity” and “Limitations and Delimitations” below).

	
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review	
  

	
  
Turnaround Management	
  
Managers and leaders have the capacity to create an environment with “the
presence of chaos, change, poor management, and bullying in an organization” (Boddy,
2011, p. 376) that is detrimental to its employees and stakeholders. History, society, and
the business world have all learned the hard lesson that “there are unethical and even
toxic [individuals] who exploit the loopholes in management systems and seek to fulfill
their personal desires at the expense of their organizations and its employees” (Toor &
Ofori, 2009, p. 533). These unethical and destructive individuals have been guilty of
fraud, theft, questionable earnings management choices and manipulations, creating
deceptive financial statements and publications, and eroding trust from those very
organizations they serve. The unethical actions from improper leaders damage all parties
related to the organization, especially employees and stakeholders.
Whether this detriment is in the form of poor financial returns, unethical
behaviors, lackluster performance, or general organizational malaise, a substantial
alteration in culture and operations is usually necessary. Whether the leader has
committed an ethical infraction or simply made a poor decision, the organization has lost
its credibility with its stakeholders and employees, its legitimacy as an upright entity with
integrity, and the public faith (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008). Organizations that are

discovered violating social, moral, or legal codes; committing accounting or financial
fraud; engaging in asset misappropriation, pollution, or environmental damage;
discriminating against individuals; or breaching contracts and leaving obligations
unfulfilled, must correct their actions as quickly and honestly as possible to restore the
faith of the employees, customers, and other stakeholders (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008).
Hofer (1980) stated, “no matter what the state of the economy, no company is immune
from internal hard times” (p. 19) whether from stagnation of operations, declining
performance, financial difficulties, economic change, or ethical infractions. Therefore, a
turnaround is often necessary to redirect the entity in a more positive, upright, and
sustainable direction.
Historical development of turnaround management.	
  
Every industry and organization faces trials and difficulties while operating in a
complex environment, inevitably shifting and adapting. Organizations, governments,
businesses, and institutions have all made drastic changes in their intended direction for
various reasons. This behavior of making drastic changes to save an entity was not
codified or studied in management theory until the relatively recent past. Considered an
element of strategic management, the concepts of managing an organizational turnaround
have actually been a part of organizational and individual thinking far longer, both in
business and government.
An ancient example of turnaround management occurred when Pharaoh hired
Joseph to manage Egypt, effectively changing leadership (Genesis 41-43, English
Standard Version). This appointment turned Egypt’s focus from the short to the longterm to strategically managing food resources for an extended famine (Genesis 41-43,

ESV). A more contemporary individual’s turnaround that had an immense impact was
that of Thomas Jefferson. President Jefferson was a staunch Anti-Federalist that initially
supported very limited federal government and stronger states’ rights (Jefferson, 1751).
However, Jefferson completed a major philosophical turnaround that violated his own
beliefs to complete the Louisiana Purchase, altering the future of the young United States
of America (Jefferson, 1802). In recent years, the Roman Catholic Church has been
undergoing its own organizational turnaround. After decades of hiding sexual abuse and
crimes committed against children by members of the clergy, the Church executed a
turnaround with the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People that
publicly promised to investigate any allegations against priests or deacons (USCCB,
2002/2011). If the accused is found guilty through an institutional investigation, the
offending priest is removed from active ministry and instructed to comply with relevant
civil and state law (USCCB, 2002/2011).
While governments, leaders, and organizations have all utilized the general
concepts of turnarounds in the recent and distant past, the fields of business and
management have incorporated turnaround management as an important element of
strategic management in its repertoire (Hofer, 1980). A number of examples of
turnarounds exist in management theory such as General Motors (GM) bringing in Alfred
Sloan to turnaround GM, Lee Iacocca leaving Ford to help change Chrysler, and DuPont
expanding and reformatting its business strategy and mission to become one of the most
important businesses in American industry (Castrogiovanni, Baliga, & Kidwell, 1992;
Schendel & Patton, 1976). No matter the rationale behind the turnaround, Hofer (1980)

provided that if the organization is to be saved when performance has declined, there is
“almost always a major effort to ‘turn the company around’” (p. 20).
The concepts of changing direction to improve profits and efficiency have always
been elements of individual and organizational thinking, but there were a number of
circumstances that spurred its development to become a formalized element of strategic
management. Turnaround management was born out of a business climate of corporate
stagnation and declining performance beginning in the 1970s (Schendel & Patton, 1976).
The 1970s were a complicated and difficult time for American industry. The economy
was plagued by stagflation, massive competition from international manufacturing
imports, an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, stock
market disruption, permanent departure from the gold standard, high interest rates, and
general economic malaise (Magdoff & Sweezy, 1977). The American economic giant
that had powered the world since the end of World War II faced significant competition
that was beginning to outpace America with improved quality and quantity (Magdoff &
Sweezy, 1977). An unfavorable balance of trade coupled with the devaluing of the United
States dollar and heavy growth of large-scale banking with large debt loads created an
economic climate that could not continue to rely on previous business success (Magdoff
& Sweezy, 1977; Wren & Bedeian, 2009). Deming (1985) summed up the problems of
American industry as a “lack of constancy of purpose” (p. 7) to plan, a focus on shortterm profits instead of long-term success, improper evaluation of individual employees,
managers moving from job to job, a focus on concrete figures without regard to
unknowns, high medical costs, and high costs of litigation and liability.

The culmination of these factors and the struggles and decline of the American
economy after the post-World War II boom left American businesses and industry,
especially manufacturing, besieged and stagnated. The time was ripe for turnaround
management. Profits were down, American industry was inefficient and overburdened,
and consumers were no longer content to purchase simply what American manufacturers
provided. To save American industry, “diversification and divestment, acquisition,
management reorganization, financial reorganization, vertical integration, and other
strategies, and combinations of these” (Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1974, p. 4) became
tools of organizational turnarounds. Over time, the academy linked these tools of
organizational turnarounds to various industries across the corporate world, government,
and higher education.
A number of individuals have studied and embraced turnaround management;
however, Dan E. Schendel (leading Richard Patton and James Riggs) and Charles Hoffer
were the major codifiers of turnaround management. Schendel et al. (1974) began their
initial focus on turnaround management within a narrowly defined set of parameters finance. Schendel et al.’s (1974) first foray into turnaround management examined “a
sample of firms who [had] reversed serious declining performance trends and [identified]
characteristics of the strategies used to turn performance around” (p. 4). The first
question the researchers aimed to address was why some organizations were able to pull
themselves out of decline and while others spiraled further into destruction (Schendel &
Patton, 1974). The initial studies focused upon financial measures, income, and profits,
ascertaining turnaround through successful financial performance, sound investment, and
logical expansion to generate sales (Schendel & Patton, 1974). Schendel and Patton

(1976) completed a second study investigating both the qualitative and quantitative
aspects of turnarounds, but still focused exclusively on the financial indicators of a
turnaround. The most important conclusion from the research was that a “stagnating or
declining company seems to first need a deepened threat or shock to spur it to action”
(Schendel & Patton, 1976, p. 240). Asserting that substantial change is required to
achieve a turnaround in an organization, the previous lackluster performance that was
allowed before the crisis must be eradicated (Schendel & Patton, 1976). In addition, any
inefficiency in productivity, working capital, or operations must be corrected
immediately (Schendel & Patton, 1976).
Schendel and Patton (1978) next looked beyond profitability as a single
performance goal in strategic turnarounds. Cooper and Schendel (1971) viewed strategy
as the general goals and intentions of a business in how it chooses its markets, its policies
for operation, and spends and utilizes its resources. Schendel and Patton (1978) utilized
these concepts of strategy to expand their model to a mathematical construct that would
recognize the “multiple, independent performance goals” (p. 1613) of profitability,
market share, and efficiency. The model asserts that beyond increasing sales and
adequately performing in the company’s chosen market, a key element of turnarounds is
production efficiency and holding down costs (Schendel & Patton, 1978). The
researchers worked to create an elegant model of improved performance that
encapsulated more dimensions of strategic turnarounds. In addition, Schendel, Patton,
and Riggs (1976) determined through their study of 54 companies that the general
strategic causes of decline were higher wages, lack of supply for raw materials, higher
competition, difficulties with management, and smaller profit margins. The strategic

solutions to these problems included diversification, divestment, changing upper
management, and vertical integration of operations (Schendel et al., 1976). Schendel et
al. (1976) also found that the operating causes of organization decline were economic
recessions, strikes, labor issues, excess production capacity, and decreased price. The
operating responses to these problems were to improve efficiency, focus on a specific
area of business, and/or execute plant expenditures (Schendel et al., 1976). The
summation of Schendel and his team’s contributions to turnaround management was that
an organization’s stagnation and/or decline was a strategic decision problem that could be
solved through a turnaround (Schendel & Patton, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978; Schendel et
al., 1974).
The next researcher to concentrate on organizational turnarounds and turnaround
management was Charles Hofer. Building on Schendel et al.’s (1976) work on patterns of
decline and turnaround, Hofer (1980) furthered turnaround management by creating a
framework of turnaround strategies with a more operational focus. First, Hofer (1980)
made the important distinction of questioning the “why” of a turnaround before the
“how.” He demanded that a business answer three important questions before designing
and instituting a turnaround:
● Is the business worth saving, or is it better to liquidate it now?
● If the business is worth saving, what is its current operating health?
● What is the business’ current strategic health? (Hofer, 2008, p. 24)
If the board of directors and management determine that the organization is worth
saving, it is important to decide that the change is fiscally possible before expending the
substantial effort and funds necessary to change direction (Hofer, 1980). Once the

organization’s management determines that it is fiscally responsible and operationally
logical to turn the organization around, Hofer (1980) demanded a current assessment of
the entity’s financial condition, market and technological positions, production
capabilities, strategic health, and product/market matrix before selecting a turnaround
strategy. Financial condition is reasonably simple to determine with traditional financial
and accounting measures and ratios. Market position is assessed through investigating
current product and market segments, cost accounting break-even points, as well as
determining the maximum sales possible for the organization’s capacity (Hofer, 1980).
The organization should also study its technological position, taking into account the
quality of the entity’s goods or services as well as its capacity for innovation (Hofer,
1980). For companies that produce goods or services, the entity must evaluate whether it
possesses sufficient capability to increase production for more sales or to improve the
efficiency of its current capacity (Hofer, 1980). In regards to a company’s strategic
health, Hofer (1980) suggested that entities intending to turn themselves in a new
direction carefully assess their strategic possibilities from all directions and perspectives.
Hofer (1980) did not neglect the need to assess where in the product/market matrix the
organization and its products should reside – penetration, development (product or
market), or diversification. Once an organization and its management has investigated all
of the elements of its capabilities and finds that there is hope for a turnaround, it is time
to execute the change.
Continuing with Schendel’s (1976) division of operating and strategic turnaround
strategies, Hofer (1980) codified whether entities should focus on strategic or operational
turnarounds based on their current strategic and operating health. The stronger the

strategic health, the more likely the firm is to use an operating strategy (Hofer, 1980). For
entities with stronger operating health, an operating strategy is also appropriate (Hofer,
1980). However, the imperative first step of a turnaround for any entity is the dismissal of
current upper management that caused the problem or allowed the infraction to occur
through act or omission (Hofer, 1980). Whatever the type of turnaround, the beliefs and
conduct of current leadership must be entirely removed to make room for positive change
(Hofer, 1980). Institutional philosophy socializes employees and stakeholders to the
entity’s ethics, codes, and norms (Sims, 2000). Therefore, it is only by removing all
remaining vestiges of the prior leadership that the underperforming and/or unethical
culture can be eradicated (Sims, 2000). Sims (2000) commented that because there is a
natural human desire to maintain the status quo, change is often extremely difficult for
institutions and entities. Individuals subconsciously work to conserve and protect the
current institutional ethos (Sims, 2000). Because change is difficult to undertake, a
culture of inefficient and/or unethical comportment tends to feed on itself and support
additional unfortunate conduct (Sims, 2000). Leadership must alter the mindset and
psychological associations of the organizational culture for any real, permanent change
(Schneider, Brief, & Guzzo, 1996). To correct and improve the organization, its culture,
and its performance, the beliefs and conduct of current leadership must be removed for
positive transformation (Hofer, 1980).
After upper management is replaced and members of the entity assess the firm
from every side and angle, it is time to change the organization’s direction. Hofer (1980)
codified four general operational strategies – revenue-increasing, cost-cutting, asset
reduction, and combination strategies. Revenue producing strategies such as increasing

sales, producing and marketing new products, cutting prices, and improved marketing
campaigns all have the potential to improve short and long-term revenues (Hofer, 1980).
Cost-cutting strategies through decreasing the cost of production or administration are
also a solution, but often require more permanent measures to be effective (Hofer, 1980).
A more extreme strategy is to reduce an organization’s assets. By selling off or reducing
assets that are inefficient or unnecessary, the organization can obtain a short-term
infusion of cash (Hofer, 1980). However, this strategy creates a risk that the entity sells
the very assets that will be needed in the future after the turnaround (Hofer, 1980). Any
one or a combination of these strategies can be used to revitalize an organization after
prior top management is removed, but the appropriate strategy for the entity is dependent
on its goals for its short and long-term solutions (Hofer, 1980). Hofer’s (1980) major
overall contribution to the field of turnaround management was to convert Schendel et
al.’s (1974; 1976; 1978) research into operationally useful tactics for organizations.
A number of researchers took Schendel et al.’s (1974, 1976, 1978) and Hofer’s
(1980) work and continued their efforts to search for constructive solutions to correct
organizational decline. Dozens of individuals took hold of turnaround management and
built a genre of management through studies, models, and strategies. The general stages
of a turnaround became changing upper management, completing an in-depth, exhaustive
analysis of the organization’s situation, implementing a plan, restructuring the entity and
its culture, then returning to normal operations to assess the success or failure of the
change (Turnaround Management Association, 2012). Because forty years of research
created turnaround management, only the major highlights are presented below.

Carrington and Aurelio (1976) contributed a case study that encouraged planning
and communication with all stakeholders in an organization during a turnaround while
allowing flexibility to change. Castrogiovanni, Baliga, and Kidwell (1992) reminded
organizations interested in completing a turnaround to concentrate on how upper
management is changed, focusing on hiring CEOs from successful industry competitors.
In “Turnaround: Retrenchment and Recovery,” Robbins and Pearce (1992) discussed the
tactics of retrenchment and recovery in turnarounds. Robbins and Pearce (1992) also
added a focus upon internal and external factors, situation severity, stability, recovery,
cost reduction, asset reduction, and entrepreneurial expansion to the turnaround models.
Barker and Mone (1994) published their work in opposition of Robbins and Pearce
(1992). Barker and Mone’s (1994) study of the same firms found that retrenchment was
not necessarily the best solution, but the right strategy depended on the specifics of the
organization.
Chowdhury and Lang (1993) also maintained a turnaround management focus on
narrow operating turnarounds in “Crisis, Decline, and Turnaround: A Test of Competing
Hypotheses for Short-Term Performance Improvement in Small Firms.” Dolan (1993)
added a company’s bankruptcy score, diagnostic studies, and monitoring plans to the
toolkit of turnaround management in a four-stage rescue plan approach for a turnaround.
Arogyaswamy, Barker, and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) added a two-stage contingency model
to turnaround management with recovery strategies aimed to slow or halt any
organizational decline. Chowdhury and Lang (1996) collaborated again to research
turnarounds in smaller organizations and efficiency strategies. Barker and Duhaime
(1997) continued to research strategic change while Barker and Mone (1998) added

strategic reorientation to management theory. Harker and Harker’s (1998) research
looked to strategic selling and marketing during a turnaround.
Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) continued the research on turnaround management,
providing a focus on operational, managerial, asset, and financial restructuring. Lohrke,
Bedeian, and Palmer (2004) then built upon previous research to offer a three-phrase
turnaround process. Lohrke et al. (2004) stipulated that the turnaround process was first a
decline (stage one) that initiated a response (stage two), then elicited a transition or
outcome (stage three). The research by Sheppard and Chowdhury (2005) took a different
turn by studying Eaton Corporation, failing in its turnaround in a fiercely competitive
market. Smith and Graves (2005) separated turnarounds into distinct phases – the decline
and the recovery. Entities that are working to change their direction must carefully take
into account the severity of the organization’s financial, asset, and capacity problems to
stop the decline and stabilize, as well as the retrenchment potential to improve cash flows
and efficiencies (Smith & Graves, 2005).
The interrelated contributions to the field of turnaround management were
constructed at times in tandem and in competition by these researchers. Combining a
number of possible strategies, assessment tools, and directions for an organization,
turnaround management is a complex and varied field that investigates organizational
change via operations, strategy, finance, accounting, marketing, and production,
depending on the needs of the entity. Researchers and practitioners have utilized the
above findings as well as other research in strategy to change public and private entities,
governments, large and small businesses, for-profits and not-for-profits (Boyne, 2006;
Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Ruiz-Navarro, 1998; Walshe, Harvey, Hyde, & Pandit,

2004). The importance of turnaround management cannot be understated to help
organizations correct themselves, their reputations, and/or their strategy in order to solve
their organizational problems and turn their focus on a more positive future while
focusing on efficiency, effectiveness, and growth.
Turnaround management arose when organizations were failing, struggling, and
declining in performance and value because of economic factors, internal inefficiencies,
and poor performance. Risk factors for troubled organizations include:
● Ineffective management style,
● Troubled finances (excessive debt, inadequate cash flows, poor efficiency ratios),
● Over-diversification of products or services,
● Poor relationships with creditors,
● Lack of proper controls,
● Inability to compete effectively in the market,
● Unpredictable growth,
● Reliance on too few customers,
● Lack of a business plan (Turnaround Management Association, 2012).
However, these issues are not unique to a specific time period or isolated incident,
but are ongoing, continuous problems in business. These factors that regularly occur in
any number of organizations, coupled with the most recent series of economic problems
from the Great Recession, demonstrate the continuing challenges for organizations from
the internal and external environment.
The Great Recession of 2008-2009 began with the collapse of the sub-prime
mortgage market that infected the rest of the financial systems throughout the United

States (Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). The mortgage failures tightened the bond and
credit markets, turning highly liquid investment markets sluggish and unwieldy. Lehman
Brothers and American International Group collapsed (among others), weakening other
banks and financial institutions and spreading to every financial market across the globe
(Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). At this point, the stock market began to plummet
(Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). Investors lost confidence and investments declined,
threatening businesses (Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). Consumers cut spending,
decreasing sales of already flagging businesses, and these entities were forced to lay off
employees (Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). Unemployment rose, individuals and
families stopped spending and lost their homes, and the economic downturn snowballed
(Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). The Great Recession did not turn into another Great
Depression because of low interest rates, massive budget deficits of governments across
the world, and focused global monetary policy, but it clearly demonstrates that the global
economy is deeply interconnected and reliant upon a delicate balance of financial
relationships (Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). Though the financial and economic
conditions were different in the Great Recession and the 1970s recession, the underlying
need for businesses to change directions, retrench, diversify, and become more
entrepreneurial to survive is even more relevant than before.
Companies have already used turnaround management after the Great Recession.
For example, the Ford Motor Company has had a long history of success, changing
directions, and pulling itself out of financial difficulty. The Great Recession was a very
arduous time for automobile manufacturers including Ford, with several only able to
survive through government bailouts for billions of dollars. However, Ford Motor

Company leadership chose not to utilize taxpayer funds to save itself and instead elected
to execute a turnaround (Hehir, 2010). Prior to the recession, Ford’s management made
the mistake of purchasing organizations that operated as relatively autonomous entities
that were simply joined by brand (Hehir, 2010). Leaders decided to turn around and “do
more with less” (Hehir, 2010, p. 15), improved its cash flows, divested of unnecessary
lines of business, and accepted the reality of fierce competition. However, Ford’s longterm success will not be decided simply by cutting product lines, focusing on quality, and
reducing the complexity of the organization’s administration (Hehir, 2010). The true test
of the turnaround will be whether Ford can achieve the right “leadership [and] culture,
using a strategy that is realistic and practical, held together by [a] whole systems
approach – [knowing that] there really are no short cuts” (Hehir, 2010, p. 15). Hehir
(2010) provided that for Ford to be successful in permanent change, the board of
directors must ensure CEO accountability, competence, commitment, a strong connection
between management and the board, independence, and well-defined areas of duty. As
evidenced by Ford Motor Company’s turnaround - their retrenchment, cutting back
product lines and expenses, divestment of nonperforming segments, and reorganization of
administration - turnaround management is a vital element of strategic management
theory with continuous relevance to all organizations in trouble.
There are diverting and differing theories within the field of turnaround
management. However, the most pressing issues surrounding turnaround management are
not necessarily the theories, but the hard realities of the business and economic climates.
In fact, “today’s increased competition, cyclical and volatile financial markets, and
economic trends have created a climate in which no business can take stability for

granted” (Turnaround Management Association, 2012). The economy demands that
turnaround managers and organizations be extremely fluid, adaptive, and creative, no
matter the industries and/or entities in which they operate. The increased federal and state
regulations make lending, financing, and obtaining credit more convoluted and
specialized (Turnaround Management Association, 2012). In addition, because
bankruptcy provisions no longer permit banks and lenders to become directly involved in
the turnaround, organizational course change becomes more complicated as bank
participation becomes a form of equity action (Turnaround Management Association,
2012). These pressing operating environment issues demand more assistance from
turnaround management. Increasing pressures upon these managers, entities, and
stakeholders will make turnaround management more valuable and more difficult.
Turnaround strategies.	
  
An organization “turning around a company ethically, financially, and
strategically [first] requires a compelling vision to motivate executives and employees”
(Puffer & McCarthy, 2008, p. 305). The institution must address the various problems
identified by the numerous stakeholders, including employees, management, customers,
clients, creditors, regulatory agencies, and stakeholders as a whole. Only with a clear and
coherent vision focused upon organizational direction and an effort to change the
perceptions (both internally and externally) of the entity can it correct its failures. Hofer
(1980) provides three important questions to answer before designing and instituting a
turnaround strategy in a business:
● Is the business worth saving, or is it better to liquidate it now?
● If the business is worth saving, what is its current operating health?

● What is the business’ current strategic health? (p. 24)
If the board of directors and management determine that the organization is worth
saving (and salvageable), it is important to decide that the change is fiscally possible
before going through with the substantial effort and funds usually demanded to change
direction (Hofer, 1980). Unfortunately, some organizations are so sullied that no amount
of money can solve its problems. Enron and WorldCom, for example, both had so much
financial fraud and corruption that the companies were irredeemable in terms of their
corporate reputation, stakeholder trust, and financial status, making bankruptcy and
divestiture the only option to recuperate any remaining worth (Putter & McCarthy, 2008).
In addition, unethical leadership and behavior may be so insidious and destructive
that it spreads to other entities and organizational partners. Enron, a multi-billion dollar
energy trading entity, due to its aggressive, illegal, and unethical business practices,
destroyed itself. However, Enron’s unethical behaviors were so pervasive that it also
devastated its colluding auditor, Arthur Andersen, one of the five most powerful public
accounting firms in the world (Yuhao, 2010). The corruption, fraud, and unethical
behavior were so widespread that Enron could not be redeemed, and to attempt a course
correction at the time the accounting scandals broke would have been financially
impossible. Therefore, once management and leadership have determined that it is
fiscally possible to revive the organization, Puffer and McCarthy’s (2008) requirement of
a “compelling vision” (p. 305) demands that the organization change. This course
adjustment is often achieved through new leadership, hiring a Chief Ethics and
Compliance Officer (CECO), restructuring the entity, including policies and procedures,

removing and changing the reward structure, and demoting and/or firing the “old guard,”
all in an effort to restore trust and faith in the organization.
	
  

	
  

Removal of former management.	
  

In all of examples of successful ethical turnarounds provided above, the first
turnaround strategy was to remove the president or CEO of the organization. The
imperative first step of an ethical turnaround for any entity is the dismissal of current
upper management that either perpetrated the infraction or allowed it to occur through act
or omission (Hofer, 1980). To correct the organization and culture, the beliefs and
conduct of current leadership must be entirely removed to make room for positive change
(Hofer, 1980). Because institutional philosophy socializes employees and stakeholders to
the entity’s ethics, codes, and norms, it is only by rooting out and removing all remaining
vestiges of the toxic leadership that the poisonous and unethical culture be eradicated
(Sims, 2000). Sims (2000) commented that because there is a natural human desire to
maintain the status quo, change is often extremely difficult for institutions and entities as
individuals subconsciously work to conserve and protect the current institutional ethos.
Because change is painful and difficult to undertake, a culture of unethical and improper
comportment tends to feed on itself and support additional unfortunate conduct (Sims,
2000). Leadership must alter the very mindset and psychological associations of the
organizational culture for any real, permanent change (Schneider et al., 1996). Therefore,
it is imperative that those leaders and stakeholders that demand an ethical turnaround

institute new management and leadership as soon as possible as “successful turnarounds
require the replacement of current top management” (Hofer, 1980, p. 28).
Restructuring the entity.	
  

In addition to an unethical manager, the structure of an entity may lack
appropriate controls and reporting structures to “blow the whistle” on improper activities.
As part of an ethical turnaround, management should provide the support to move
departments, functions, and reporting as necessary to align compliance and responsibility
while providing the policies and practices to support this change. Cases such as Putnam,
Tyco, and Waste Management all exemplified the need to change policy and structure
with regards to reporting unethical or improper actions for a turnaround to be
successfully accomplished (Kavanagh, 2008). This restructuring may include instituting
policies were there were none (internal controls, codifying actions and responsibilities,
etc.), correcting policies that were misapplied, or even eliminating verbal or written
policies that allowed for incorrect practice. New leadership may need to change the
functional structure of the institution to effect change because the Chief Ethics and
Compliance Officer “always needs a direct unfiltered line to the highest governing
authority” (Kavanagh, 2008, p. 26). Management should also allocate the funds and
resources to increase compliance audits, monitoring, internal controls, provide a helpline,
and sufficiently staff the organization (Kavanagh, 2008).
	
  

Removal or change of reward structure.	
  

Another change during a transformation or institutional turnaround is the removal
of the mechanisms that encouraged and rewarded the bad behavior--financial bonuses,
pay schemes, and fringe benefits/perks of management positions (Ackermann, 2005;
Meisler, 2004; Sims, 2000). Individuals in positions where compensation, bonuses, and
personal wealth are closely tied to institutional performance are especially at risk for
unethical behavior to better their personal situations (Ackermann, 2005; Meisler, 2004;
Sims, 2000). These personal financial benefits may serve to encourage aggressive or
unethical behavior at the expense of the entity and its shareholders (Ackermann, 2005;
Meisler, 2004; Sims, 2000). Removing these inducements, like Putman Investments and
Tyco, cuts organizational expenditures and decreases the personal financial rewards for
earnings manipulation; therefore, it is imperative to remove those weaknesses entirely
during an ethical turnabout (Ackermann, 2005; Meisler, 2004; Sims, 2000). While this
shift will not eliminate all incentives for unethical action, it certainly reduces much of the
personal benefit for bad behavior.
	
  

Demoting and firing the “old guard.”	
  

During the ethical turnabout, new leaders must be able and willing to demote and
dismiss employees from the organization if they are known to be unethical (Sims, 2000).
If current employees are disinclined to embrace the new organizational culture and
leadership, managers must remove them (Sims, 2000). This restructure is especially
important for the “old guard” of organizations that have allowed, condoned, or engaged
in unethical behavior under previous management in the past. The ethical turnaround may
necessitate the removal or demotion of all senior management, board of directors, internal

audit staff, even the external auditors if they were complacent in the fraud or unethical
activities as evidenced by the provided cases. As managers and leaders often hire likeminded individuals, unethical leaders of the past may have appointed employees that
were willing to bend or break ethical or organizational standards, but only those
individuals and stakeholders that are willing to embrace the new ethical culture should
remain with the entity (Sims, 2000).
Boyne (2002) initially studied the various differences between private entities and
public organizations to determine if various business concepts could be applied to public
entities. Analyzing 34 different studies, Boyne (2002) concluded that “available evidence
does not provide clear support for the view that public and private management are
fundamentally dissimilar in all important respects” (p. 118). Boyne (2002) argued that
managers of public entities must understand the differences between public and private
entities, but have the opportunity to draw upon the lessons and tools from members of the
private sector and apply them to the public sector. Boyne (2006) also determined that the
academy had not yet developed a model of the turnaround process outside of the private
sector and developed a generic conceptualization of turnarounds for the public sector as
well. Concurring with other researchers, the major stages in decline and recovery
(turnaround) began with the onset of the decline for whatever reason followed by
corrective action to avoid a major turnaround (Boyne, 2006). If the organization failed to
change behaviors and direction, a turnaround becomes necessary, demanding various
strategies depending on the needs of the entity (Boyne, 2006).
Boyne (2004; 2006) broke the various strategies from other researchers into the
more generic strategies of retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization. Boyne (2006)

provided that retrenchment as a turnaround strategy has the major intention to cull parts
of entities that are underperforming, unprofitable, or unproductive. Whether it is to divest
assets and/or business segments, introduce/remove technology, or to remove employees
that do not align with the optimal strategy, each serves the organization in an effort to
heighten efficiency (Boyne, 2004; 2006). In contrast, Boyne (2006) stipulated that
repositioning is an entrepreneurial strategy that involved activities designed to redefine
the organization’s mission and vision. This redefinition is designed to enhance the
entity’s presence in a market or allow it to enter into new areas that can encourage a
turnaround through new advancement, including entering into new markets and engaging
in different competitive enterprises (Boyne, 2006). Boyne (2006) determined that there
was a general disposition of success in repositioning while executing a turnaround. In
addition, Boyne (2006) provided that the reorganization strategy was “a broad description
of any change in the internal management of an organization” (p. 379). Reorganization
was usually executed in conjunction with retrenchment and/or repositioning, but often
included the removal of the organization’s leadership (Boyne, 2004; 2006). Ultimately,
Boyne (2004; 2006) provided that all three general strategies were feasible in public
entities, though reorganization is the most commonly used strategy, yet more study in
public entities would be advantageous to the field.
Turnarounds in higher education.	
  
While there has been extensive literature on corporate turnarounds, comparatively
less exists in higher education. Because higher education has become a competitive
market demanding performance and efficiency in operations as well as finances, the
concepts of turnaround management that were applied to corporations and businesses can

be transitioned to higher education (Paul, 2005). Higher education institutions often
demonstrate a longer path of decline then corporations, but can fail nonetheless (Paul,
2005). Atkinson (2002) provided examples of colleges in the United Kingdom that
necessitated operational, though not ethical, turnarounds because of various failures in
operations, financial management, or both. Atkinson (2002) detailed six distinct colleges
in case studies, applying a strategy of “recognising the crisis; stabilising the crisis by
taking control of all expenditures; analysing what has gone wrong; making management
changes; managing stakeholders; identifying strategic options; planning recovery; and
delivering recovery” (p. 25). These institutions of higher education were suffering from
financial crisis and experienced an additional financial shock, but were not suffering as a
result of ethical issues (Atkinson, 2002). Atkinson (2002) also differentiated between
“recovery” and “turnaround” in that recovery was simply a single stage of an entity-wide
turnaround that is comprehensive and involves the entity as a whole that addresses both
strategic and operational issues. Atkinson (2002) derived this application from Slatter and
Lovett’s (1999) corporate turnaround strategies. Slatter and Lovett (1999) emphasized
that an organization needed to first stabilize from the crisis, demanding proper cash
management, improved financial controls, and reducing costs. As the crisis continued,
Slatter and Lovett (1999) encouraged a change of leadership and increased
communication with stakeholders to inform and rebuild trust, setting the stage for change
throughout the entity, critical process improvements, and financial restructuring.
Organizations may execute a recovery, but may not complete a turnaround if there are not
sufficient changes to correct the direction of the entity’s strategy or operations.

The particular challenge of chronicling the turnarounds in higher education was
clarified by Atkinson (2002) in that there was “no published list of colleges in recovery,
nor one of colleges which had successfully emerged from recovery” (p. 11) at the time of
his research. Of Atkinson’s (2002) initial proposed sample, the majority of the
organizations contacted declined to participate in his study, even with a guarantee of
anonymity. The stigma of failure in higher education is such that entities experiencing a
turnaround or recovery intended to avoid the connection to Paul’s (2005) research. Paul
(2005) provided that organizations and institutions within higher education have
struggled defining both success and failure, making organizational declines and potential
turnarounds harder to define and study.
New York University and Northeastern University were both case studies of
strategic, operational, and financial turnarounds from declining revenues and struggling
performance (Paul, 2005). At New York University (NYU), substantial annual deficits
threatened the organization’s operations, coupled with decreased enrollment and a market
position known for serving the lower-scoring end of the academic market, demanded a
change to survive (Paul, 2005). By reforming its mission and repositioning itself in the
market, NYU executed an operational and financial turnaround that effectively altered the
organizational strategy to adapt to a changed economic climate. Northeastern University,
when faced with a major market decline in enrollment as well as decreasing revenues,
executed an operational and financial turnaround by cutting programs and slashing
operating expenses (retrenchment) (Paul, 2005). In the cases of NYU and Northeastern
University, external market forces acted upon the organizations and the financial results
exacerbated the problems in the entities (Paul, 2005). Once the colleges brought in new

presidents, they used retrenchment, reorganization, and repositioning strategies to
improve organizational performance (Paul, 2005).
Ethical turnarounds.	
  
Turnaround management is not limited to financial, strategic, and operational
turnarounds, but theorists and organizations have adapted its concepts and applications to
ethical turnarounds after organizations and/or management have taken unethical actions
and made unethical decisions. Management and leadership can save an organization from
its past unethical choices only through a change in the organization’s patterns of behavior
and a transformation of ethical perspectives. Entities such as Adelphia Communications,
Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, Siemens International, Waste Management Systems,
WorldCom, and Xerox have all committed a number of serious ethical infractions
resulting in billions of dollars lost, livelihoods destroyed, and markets corrupted. Of these
examples, only those organizations that changed their behavior and moral focus through
an ethical turnaround remained in the market. Puffer and McCarthy (2008) continued
Hofer’s (1980) work, stating that an organization “turning around a company ethically,
financially, and strategically requires a compelling vision to motivate executives and
employees” (p. 305). Turnaround management became the solution for ethical as well as
operational and strategic problems.
Every institution seeking to change its trajectory must address the various
problems identified by the numerous stakeholders, including employees, management,
customers, clients, creditors, regulatory agencies, and stakeholders as a whole. Only with
a clear and coherent vision and an effort to change the perceptions of the entity can it
correct its failures, strategically or ethically (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008). Turnaround

management theory provides that the course adjustment is achieved through new
leadership, potentially hiring a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer (CECO),
restructuring the entity, removing and changing the reward structure, and demoting
and/or firing the “old guard,” all in an effort to restore trust and faith in the organization
(Hoffer, 1980; Kavanagh, 2008; Sims, 2000). Another imperative change during a
transformation or institutional turnaround is to remove the mechanisms that encouraged
and rewarded bad behavior - financial bonuses, pay schemes, and fringe benefits/perks of
management positions (Ackermann, 2005; Meisler, 2004; Sims, 2000). In addition,
during the ethical turnabout, new leadership must be able and willing to demote and/or
dismiss employees from the organization if they are known to be unethical (Sims, 2000).
Turnaround management has provided organizations with the tools, techniques, and
models to change their behaviors with the creative application of these concepts to ethical
infractions, saving many entities from their own mistakes.
	
  

Successful ethical turnarounds in corporations.	
  

There have been dozens of corporate scandals throughout the business and notfor-profit worlds including ACORN, Adelphia Communications, AIG, American
Airlines, Arthur Andersen, Bayer, Enron, Exxon, Fannie Mae, Global Crossing, Putnam
Investments, Siemens AG, Tyco International, Union Carbide, Waste Management
Incorporated, WorldCom, Xerox, and many others. The institutions that were unable to
execute an ethical turnabout could not survive in their present form, forcing
restructurings, mergers, buy-outs, sell-offs, massive lawsuits, and bankruptcies to
survive, or were destroyed outright. However, those institutions that were willing to

change their ethical directions and adapt were able to endure. These examples are
important to the study of turnarounds in higher education because while these large, forprofit corporations are not in the same industries or even markets as higher education,
their successes and failures blaze a trail for colleges and universities to have a basis in
strategic, operational, and financial changes to execute their own turnarounds.
Putnam Investments, a Boston-based multi-billion dollar investment organization
working to manage mutual funds worth over $270 billion, was undermined by a series of
trading scandals in the early 2000s (Ackermann, 2005). Employees executed improper
rebates and unsuitable payments to certain retirement funds and exhibited a lack of ethics
(Arner & Young, 2004). However, the unethical behavior went deeper with flagrant
violations of the firm’s fiduciary duties to manage fund assets that resulted in substantial
losses of clients, revenue, and reputation. A cowboy culture existed that encouraged
abusive market transactions to “sell, sell, sell” (Arner & Young, 2004). A number of
extremely valuable clients quickly removed over $70 billion of their assets, pulling over
25 percent of the organization’s portfolio from Putnam’s control almost overnight (Arner
& Young, 2004). The mindset of obtaining new clients became more important than
efficiently and accurately managing customer funds (Arner & Young, 2004). In addition,
two important fund managers in the organization were found to have bought and sold
assets improperly, negatively affecting their clients and shareholders. The company was
also embroiled in a difficult and complicated battle with the Securities and Exchange
Commission over $138 million in fines and shareholder restitution for wrongs (Arner &
Young, 2004). The result of the unethical and abusive leadership of former CEO Lasser’s
18-year management term was a paranoid and destructive culture that damaged clients

and employees (Arner & Young, 2004). A veritable dictator, Lasser exhibited bullying
“behavior designed to belittle others via humiliation, sarcasm, rudeness, overworking an
employee, [and] threats” (Boddy, 2011, p. 367).
Putnam Investments desperately needed an ethical turnaround to save the nearly
seven-decade-old firm, choosing to hire Charles Haldeman as CEO (Arner & Young,
2004). Haldeman was an investment manager known throughout the industry to be
dedicated to client and stakeholder focus that consistently maintained extremely high
standards (Arner & Young, 2004). The new CEO executed a number of internal changes,
including bringing in a new compliance (ethics) officer as well as other high-level
managers (Ackermann, 2005). Haldeman also introduced significant reforms throughout
the organization, such as creating a code of ethics, cutting bonuses and incentives to
reduce excessive risk-taking, decreasing costs and advertising, and removing over 20
high-ranking individuals from management (Ackermann, 2005; Arner & Young, 2004).
Not only did Haldeman “clean house,” but he also changed the organizational culture to
demand higher standards of behavior by analyzing the trading records of every employee
(Arner & Young, 2004). The new CEO also institutionalized additional policies halting
improper trading while consolidating compliance efforts and responsibility in one office
under the compliance officer (Ackermann, 2005; Arner & Young, 2004). Putnam
Investments saved its future through hiring a leader that transformed the organization
with an ethical turnabout, rebuilt its reputation, and restored employee and stakeholder
trust in their operations.
German corporation Siemens AG has had a number of ethical scandals in its
tumultuous past as a provider of electricity technology, energy technology,

telecommunications, financial solutions, and dozens of other products. However, an
ethical violation committed by the entity occurred over an extended period from 2000
through 2006 (Crawford et al., 2007). The transgression involved bribes paid to
individuals, entities, and governments in at least 15 different countries around the globe,
totaling approximately $1.3 billion (Crawford et al., 2007; Dougherty, 2008a; Dougherty,
2008b; Nielsen, 2009; Prodhan, 2008). These payments made to buyers in several
industries and countries were executed to expedite transactions with government officials
(Nielson, 2009). The company’s actions were not only unethical, but also illegal
according to German law (Nielson, 2009). These bribes made to win business for
Siemens AG were not isolated, hidden payments from the shadows committed by a single
individual or a minority of managers (Dougherty, 2008b). As Siemens AG was a German
company, German prosecutors investigated over 300 individuals throughout the
organization to uncover the depth and breadth of the corruption (Dougherty, 2008b). The
organization brought lawsuits against the disgraced executives guilty of the corruption
and authorization of the bribes, demonstrating “the intent of Siemens's new chief
executive, Peter Loescher, to mount an aggressive cleanup effort” (Dougherty, 2008b). It
took two years of investigations and court battles, but Siemens AG publicly
acknowledged its ethical failings (Gallitz, 2009).
Siemens AG provided an official apology and a promise to correct the misconduct
and trespasses, rooting out the problems of the company to allow the entity to move
forward (Gallitz, 2009). Siemens paid 1.2 billion euros in fines because of its actions.
Siemens first hired a new chief executive well known for his ethical behavior and actions,
Peter Loescher, to execute the turnaround (Gallitz, 2009). Management hired a series of

external compliance advisors and an internal compliance officer, working with an outside
firm to determine the depth of the corruption (Esterl & Crawford, 2007). The
organization’s management also restructured its operations to create a clear responsibility
configuration, increased internal control procedures, and took action against parties found
guilty of misconduct (Gallitz, 2009). In addition, Siemens changed board polices and
board membership to better align with the organization’s new direction (Gallitz, 2009).
The institution also engaged Ernst & Young as the company’s independent auditors, one
of the world’s most reputable accounting firms, emphasizing the organization’s
“commitment to optimal corporate governance” (Gallitz, 2009, para. 4). In addition, other
countries, including the United States, brought charges upon former executives for their
actions in the bribery scandal.
Tyco International was another corporation in the early 2000s found to have
committed a massive accounting fraud. Tyco International manufactures sprinkler
systems, security systems, industrial products, and numerous other goods (Pillmore,
2003). Former CEO, L. Dennis Kozlowski, robbed millions from the organization and
condoned a culture of excess and complacency from upper management and the board of
directors (Pillmore, 2003). Both the former CEO and CFO “allegedly used the company
as an ATM” (Meisler, 2004, p. 28), stealing several hundred million dollars from the
enterprise. By authorizing bonuses paid to themselves, misappropriating funds and assets,
and manipulating stock sales, upper management deliberately stole millions in assets
(Meisler, 2004). To prevent bankruptcy, the organization’s leadership booked losses of
$9.2 billion upon the discovery of the accounting fraud and agreed to a massive ethical
turnaround (Meisler, 2004; Pillmore, 2003).

The turnabout began with bringing in a strong, no nonsense, ethical leader to
clean house, starting with the executive team (Meisler, 2004; Pillmore, 2003). Using his
“passport to ethical leadership” (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008, p. 310) approach, new CEO
Ed Breen immediately changed the structure and culture of the organization by hiring
Eric Pillmore as the lead corporate governance officer that oversaw the turnaround
(Marshall, 2004). Breen and Pillmore removed the 125 individual members of the
headquarters staff, cut expenses, improved operations, and created a new series of
governance and control systems in an effort to prevent future frauds and thefts (Meisler,
2004). The company also adjusted their supervision and severance compensation
packages to remove incentives and benefits for asset manipulation and tightened
restrictions upon stock trading by top management (Meisler, 2004). Management
executed an additional sweeping change by completely replacing the board of directors
that had allowed such activities to occur (Pillmore, 2003). New leadership labored to
change the culture from the top as well as work towards restoring investor confidence and
faith (Pillmore, 2003). Tyco’s ethical turnaround was achieved by changing
administration, converting the ethical mindset from the top of the organization, instituting
new governance procedures in personnel, finance, and strategy, and bringing in ethical
leadership that was willing to fight for integrity.
From 1991 to 1997, Waste Management, Incorporated engaged in a number of
aggressive and overambitious accounting practices that dramatically inflated earnings and
the value of its assets (Bailey, 1998; Greer, 2004; Johnson, 2008; “SEC and WMI,” 1998;
“Waste Management audit,” 1998). The fraud was uncovered during a $19 billion merger
with USA Waste Services, Incorporated in 1998 (Bailey, 1998; Greer, 2004; Johnson,

2008; “SEC and WMI,” 1998; “Waste Management audit,” 1998). The corporation had to
restate five years of earnings, assets, and financial statements in the amount of $3.5
billion in charges (Melcher & McWilliams, 1998). Waste Management executed their
fraud by inflating depreciation schedules to understate expenses and overstate revenues
by approximately $716 million, overvalued waste sites and facilities of $1.3 billion,
overstated goodwill of $536 million, and understated liabilities of $654 million (Melcher
& McWilliams, 1998).
The corporation executed the turnabout beginning with hiring a new CEO, Maury
Myers, known for his turnaround skills, after pressuring the previous senior management
team to resign (Greer, 2004). Myers oversaw the correction of accounting flaws, updated
and rectified payroll errors for 10,000 employees, and instituted new technology and
systems to properly account for activities and funds throughout the organization (Greer,
2004). Myers was able to restore investor and public trust by demonstrating a will and
intent to change organizational direction and followed through to exact a transformation
(Greer, 2004). The company completed this turnaround and restored confidence through
a three-year development plan that demonstrated success through increased share value,
higher net income, and stronger earnings per share as the plan progressed (“Business
Brief,” 2002).
Xerox was also entangled in an accounting scandal from 1997 to 2001 that
resulted in the overstatement of profits by over a billion dollars (“When something,”
2002). Whistleblower James Bingham, the assistant treasurer for the corporation, publicly
revealed the organization’s fraud and unethical behavior (“When something,” 2002).
Xerox committed a number of deliberate abuses to overstate income and falsify financial

statements over five years to inflate profits by approximately $1.5 billion (Thapa &
Brown, 2007). By booking revenue on long-term lease contracts immediately instead of
properly recognizing revenues in the periods in which it was actually earned, Xerox
substantially overstated revenues (Kadlec, Fonda, & Parker, 2002). These accounting
frauds required a restatement of approximately $6.4 billion on five full years of financial
statements (Kadlec et al., 2002). In addition to flagrantly improper and unethical revenue
practices, the corporation also admitted to bribery totaling at least $600,000-700,000 to
government officials in India to increase sales (“When something,” 2002).
Xerox determined an ethical turnaround was possible and promoted Anne
Mulcahy as “the accidental CEO” (Miller, 2004, para. 8). Mulcahy promoted the values
of honesty, resilience, and trust (Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010). Mulcahy chose to work to
recapture the previous culture and values of the organization begun with the founding
father CEO Joe Wilson (Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010). By leveraging the positive, beneficial
character and culture of the organization to stamp out the unethical activities of the few,
Mulcahy revitalized the corporate philosophy (Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010). The turnaround
succeeded because Mulcahy was “straightforward, hardworking, disciplined, patiently
persistent, and extremely loyal to the company. She took the turnaround of Xerox with a
missionary zeal, by walking the talk and taking the whole company along with her”
(Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010, p. 25).
These rather notorious and well-publicized examples of turnarounds in these
powerful corporations provided not only the knowledge that positive change and
turnarounds are possible, but also provided explicit examples of tools, tactics, and
strategies executed during the process of turnaround. What is also of note is that all

turnarounds utilized new leadership that were committed to bringing the organizations
back into the light, solving the strategic, financial, ethical, and operational failings that
caused the crises. In fact, all examples of the successful turnarounds above included a
strong, ethical leader that demanded the same level of morality of the organization as a
whole.
Qualities and role of an ethical leader during a turnaround.	
  
Once the new manager takes on the leadership position, the ethical individual
must communicate and bring attention to the new organizational focus of upright and
honest behavior to effect an actual transformation (Sims, 2000). Honesty is a vital
element of ethical leadership and has been the subject of much research (Avolio, 1999;
Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Den Hartog, House,
Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, & Dorfman, 1999; Howell & Avolio, 1992; Kouzes & Posner,
1993; Posner & Schmidt, 1992). The leader’s honesty and increased negative attention
upon wrongdoing and positive focus on “doing what is right” serves to uphold values,
increases openness throughout the organization, and creates an opportunity for open
communication about past mistakes as well as future direction and correction (Sims,
2000). First, the new leader must be able and willing to control his or her emotional
reactions to the crisis that created the need for the ethical turnaround (Sims, 2000). As it
is likely the new manager’s tenure will begin in the middle of an organizational upheaval,
the leader must also be able to remain rational and in control during the future calamities
and crises that inevitably result during the process of the turnaround (Sims, 2000).
Reactions to problems must be swift, upright, honest, and open, with an adamant refusal
to hide behind the corporate shield of silence (Epstein, 2003; Puffer & McCarthy, 2008;

Sims, 2000). Leaders must possess a willingness to both admit past failings and apologize
for them with the intent of creating and strengthening a culture of trust and honesty
(Epstein, 2003; Puffer & McCarthy, 2008; Sims, 2000). Management must clearly
communicate all relevant information, positive and negative, to the various stakeholders employees, creditors, customers, governmental bodies, and others - consistently relaying
financial data as well as progress in the turnaround (Epstein, 2003). In addition to
conveying the new organizational direction, leaders must actively model and
conscientiously demonstrate the expected behavior, bringing a character of ethical
activity and management that others can admire and emulate (Sims, 2000).
Because “organizations as we know them are the people in them; if people do not
change, there is no organizational change…[and] are effective only to the degree that
these structural changes are associated with changes in the psychology of employees”
(Schneider et al., 1996, p. 7). Leaders must change the hearts, minds, and thinking of the
employees to execute a successful turnaround, usually through the strength and qualities
of the person in charge. It is not enough that the leader, executive, or manager believes
himself or herself to be ethical, but these individuals must possess a reputation for ethical
and moral behavior (Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000).
Existing literature provided that there are individual characteristics that are likely
to manifest within ethical leaders, among them a substantial level of cognitive moral
development, a concern for others, responsibility, and reliability (Bass & Steidlmeier,
1999; Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Treviño, 2006; De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008;
Kalshoven et al., 2011; Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, Butcher, & Milder, 2002). However,
Kalshoven, Den Hartog, and De Hoogh (2011) chose to focus on the “Big Five”

personality traits that most strongly correlate with integrity of conscientiousness,
agreeableness, and emotional stability (p. 350). In addition, Brown et al. (2005) as well as
Treviño, Brown, and Hartman (2003) identified the traits important for ethical leaders of
fairness, power sharing, and role clarification.
Treviño et al. (2000) asserted that the two-pillared ethical leader must be
perceived as both a moral person as well a moral manager. The individual must act
ethically and morally as a leader, as not simply the Chief Executive Officer, but as the
Chief Ethics Officer, demonstrating honesty and integrity in every decision and deed. The
moral person has the traits of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness, always acting with
the behaviors of “doing the right thing,” having an honest concern for people, and
operating with a strong personal morality (Treviño et al., 2000). That same moral person,
when making decisions, must also hold to his or her values, be objective and fair, take
into account a concern for society, and follow ethical rules (Treviño et al., 2000).
Values, ethics, and morals are the guiding force and direction for a management’s
behavior, therefore top management and executive leadership must portray them at every
level of the organization (Treviño et al., 2000). The individual must then clearly convey
that ethical standing, integrity, honesty, and fairness to all employees and interested
stakeholders to be followed. A strongly ethical leader will publicly display principled,
upright, and honest behaviors with veracity in all of his or her interpersonal
communications and interactions with others (Treviño et al., 2000). By modeling and
encouraging upright conduct, the turnaround leader is able to guide and inspire a virtuous
culture for followers and employees (Treviño et al., 2000; Woolf, 1979). It is not enough
that the leader, executive, or manager believes himself or herself to be ethical; these

individuals must possess a reputation for ethical and moral behavior, clearly conveying to
all employees and interested stakeholders their integrity, honesty, and fairness (Treviño et
al., 2000). Because tenets, beliefs, and ethos are the guiding force and directive for an
organization’s behavior, it is imperative that top management and executive leadership
demonstrate them at every level of the institution (Treviño et al., 2000). As a moral
manager, the individual needs to model all of the traits of the honorable person (Treviño
et al., 2000). Leaders also must provide appropriate rewards for positive conduct and the
suitable discipline for negative behavior, constantly and continuously publicizing the
organization’s ethics and values (Treviño et al., 2000).
Erickson (2006) stated, “successful leadership – and the trust of those led –
demands a true partnership between leaders and followers to create a team that advances
our society toward the common good” (p. 63). Fruitful organizational governance ties the
leader’s goal to the benefit of the entity and stakeholders as a whole, as well as to the
employees and other stakeholders (Erickson, 2006). The ethical and transformational
leader chosen to steer the turnaround should also possess a number of personal qualities
to build a relationship with the organization. In addition, he or she must maintain strong
leadership through the period of turmoil to sustain organizational focus and effort through
the process. Charles Christy, the Chief Financial Officer of Coastal South Bancshares,
Incorporated, provided the Six C’s of leadership necessary for leaders to possess:
● Competence — [the] demonstrated proficiency in “hard” technical skills and
“soft” behavioral, influencing, and leadership skills,
● Composure — [the ability to] remain calm under fire,

● Conviction — [the] passion and commitment toward [the leader’s] views or the
views of others,
● Character — [the] consistent demonstration of integrity, honesty, respect, and
trust,
● Care — [demonstrating] concern for the personal and professional well-being of
others, [and]
● Courage — [a] willingness to stand up for [one’s] beliefs, admit mistakes, and
challenge the status quo when necessary in the spirit of “constructive contention.”
(Thomson, 2010, p. 50)
However, a “cultural change or an ethical turnaround for a company is a long and
complicated process that cannot happen overnight, or simply by firing an unethical CEO”
(Sims, 2000, p. 74). Thus, it is vital that stakeholders be patient with the entity and allow
for a time of transition instead of expecting a total transformation overnight. To realize
the transformation fully, leaders need the tools and authority to execute their vision
whether it is hiring, firing, or restructuring the entity to change its ethical trajectory.
Instituting a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer (CECO).	
  
A strong ethical leader devoted to an ethical turnaround will often hire (or
become) a Chief Ethics (and Compliance) Officer (CECO). Two strong examples of
hiring a CECO were with Eric Pillmore at Tyco and ethics team leaders at Siemens AG
that were specifically dedicated to ethics and performance (Kavanagh, 2008). Kavanagh
(2008) provided an excellent description of the Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer as
an individual who:
● Serves as the primary officer;

● Has responsibility for the overall ethics and compliance program;
● Has formal and informal recognition as having authority for a critical function in
the organization;
● Supports the CEO and board in championing corporate values and standards;
● Participates in major company decisions;
● Serves as a member of the executive management team; [and]
● Maintains a singular focus on ethics and compliance. (p. 26)
The CECO should be the final authority of ethical behavior and action,
maintaining sufficient independence from management to be free to raise issues without
fear of retaliation (Kavanagh, 2008; Snell, 2011). To be successful, the Ethics Officer
needs the freedom and support from management to create a new culture and make
recommendations that will be embraced by the institution (Kavanagh, 2008; Snell, 2011).
Aguilar (2010) mentioned that CECOs may hold other positions and titles such as Chief
Risk Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Executive Officer, Head of Human
Resources, Chief Financial Officer, Head of Internal Audit, General Council, and others.
For the CECO to be effective, the individual needs direct contact and access to the board
of directors as the overriding authority of the organization (Aguilar, 2010; Kavanagh,
2008; Snell, 2011). However, the best reporting relationship for the CECO is a direct
connection to the highest authority in the entity, possibly demanding a restructuring of
the institution (Kavanagh, 2008; Snell, 2011).

	
  
The Role of Trust in Organizations	
  
During a speech in Clinton, Illinois, Abraham Lincoln (1854) was believed to
have said that “if you once forfeit the confidence of your fellow citizens, you can never
regain their respect and esteem” (para. 1). As the speech was not transcribed, the
newspapers ascribed the additional comment to Lincoln that “it is true that you may fool
all of the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all of the time;
but you can’t fool all the people all of the time” (Lincoln, 1854, para. 1). While Lincoln
was speaking to the importance of maintaining the trust, faith, and conviction of the
populous in its leaders, his words of wisdom transcend mere politics into all
organizations and social interactions.
There is no single person or entity that has every quality needed to succeed. It is
the necessity of society to work together, if only to engage in mutually agreeable
commerce. Because every individual and organization is naturally and rationally
concerned first and foremost with their own interests and goals, there must be a basic
understanding between the various parties in order for social interaction, communication,
and cooperative behavior to occur (Hosmer, 1995; Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Trust is
necessary for stronger connections and communications in organizations, economies, and
society as a whole because all interpersonal relationships depend on a certain amount of
trust between individuals and groups to function (Denton, 2009; Hirsch, 1978; Kramer &
Tyler, 1996).
Trust is thought of as the general belief that individuals or parties in an exchange
or relationship will follow through with what they say and do, behaving as agreed upon

by all involved (Blau, 1964; Deutsch, 1958; Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). Trust between
individuals is the basic building block of interpersonal relationships and communication
and therefore essential for stable associations (Blau, 1964; Puranam & Vanneste, 2009).
Caldwell, Davis, and Devine (2009) concluded that “trust is ultimately the relinquishing
of one’s personal choice or power in the expectant hope that another party will honor the
elements of the social contract between the parties” (p. 104). For collaboration in an
enterprise, individuals that trust one another are able to work toward mutually defined
goals with improved outcomes.
Even more than regular interpersonal relationships, management and leadership
require substantial trust to administer and guide organizations as an imperative element of
the work environment (Denton, 2009; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Wong & Cummings,
2009). Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) provided that there are three types of
trust in professional relationships – deterrence-based, knowledge-based, and
identification-based trust. The concept of deterrence-based trust centers on the idea that
the individuals involved will come through and complete the tasks they agreed to and will
achieve what they have promised (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Shapiro et al., 1992). In
general, employees, management, and leadership achieve what is required of them, but
mainly because of the threat of punishment or removal (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Shapiro
et al., 1992). Knowledge-based trust is trust formulated by one’s knowledge and
understanding of others – that the individual can trust their interpretation of the others’
personalities and behavior to be able to predict how they will act and behave (Kramer &
Tyler, 1996; Shapiro et al., 1992). In addition, identification-based trust is driven by the
idea of being able to identify with the other person’s feelings, intentions, desires, and

perceptions of the world (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Shapiro et al., 1992). As organizations
are composed of individuals with complex personalities, intentions, and desires,
understanding and empathizing with others allows leadership and employees to work
together better with mutually understood goals.
Kramer and Tyler (1996) then expanded on Shapiro et al.’s (1992) types of trust,
adding calculus-based trust, as well as expanding upon knowledge-based and
identification-based trust. In investigating deterrence-based trust, Kramer and Tyler
(1996) concluded that “the threat of punishment is likely to be a more significant
motivator than the promise of reward” (p. 119). Because the fear of negative
consequences may be stronger than the desire to achieve positive results, Kramer and
Tyler (1996) added calculus-based trust, believing that trust is an “ongoing, marketoriented, economic calculation whose value is derived by determining the outcomes
resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining
or severing it” (p. 120). The idea of calculus-based trust is that the respondents in the
relationship calculate the value and importance of cultivating the connection, not just the
pain of punishment if the association fails. As the relationship grows, individuals
regularly make progress in building the relationship as well as suffer the setbacks of
failures of trust. With knowledge-based trust, Kramer and Tyler (1996) reinforced
Shapiro et al.’s (1992) dimensions of predictability, information, and accurate prediction
of behavior by emphasizing communication and a courtship process to cultivate an
ongoing understanding of the person and their reactions. With identification-based trust,
Kramer and Tyler (1996) highlighted the idea of predicting the needs of the other

individual in the relationship to build trust, as well as predicting their choices and
feelings while empathizing with others to think, feel, and respond like the other person.
Trust is not only necessary for employees to demonstrate a readiness and
inclination to stand up for what is right, but also to voice concerns, make suggestions for
improvement, and to maintain an open, healthy culture (Wong & Cummings, 2009).
Trust is considered to be a “crucial ingredient of organizational effectiveness” (Galford &
Drapeau, 2003, p. 95) because “when employees trust who they work for, they are
happier and more productive. Trust in turn is built on credibility, respect, and fairness”
(Denton, 2009, p. 12). With credibility and trust in management, individuals in an
organization are more able to express their thoughts with less fear of repercussion or
punitive action, lessening uncertainty through communication. As trust is crucial to
positive organizational performance, a lack of trust often increases incidences of ethical
issues and corruption, as well as undercuts all constructive efforts and projects (Cremer,
Tenbrunsel, & Dijke, 2010).
Kramer and Tyler (1996) explored the dynamics of trust at three levels – macro,
meso, and micro, and trust should be investigated at every level within an organization.
At the macro-level, it is important to address the strength or weakness of trust in the
entire organization (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). It is at the institutional level where
researchers can question whether trust has remained at its previous level or declined, as
well as how it can be rebuilt (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). The very nature and organizational
structure of the entity influences how management supervises and treats its employees.
Faunce (1981) discussed the transitions of management in organizations from depending
on the skills of artisans, to extremely routinized technology in the industrial revolution, to

management again depending on the expert efforts of its employees. The needs of
management influenced the level of trust they bestow upon their employees (Faunce,
1981; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; McGregor, 1957). When management relied upon the
unique and complex skills of their artisans, the style was more trusting and open, as the
employees and craftsmen possessed talents that were not readily available. As employees
can be internally motivated per McGregor’s (1957) Theory Y, management must have
more trust in its employees. However, the more mechanized society became with human
beings acting as interchangeable parts, the less trusting management became in the labors
of their employees because of the belief that employees are lazy and must be forced to
work (Faunce, 1981; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; McGregor, 1957). Yet, as the pendulum
swung back towards a knowledge-based economy with specialized skills and less firms
utilizing people for mechanized production, management again adopted a more trusting
and open style (Faunce, 1981; Kramer & Tyler, 1996).
Caldwell and Jeffries (2001) identified seven qualities of managers and entities
that are pertinent to convey and understand organizational trustworthiness. These include
competence, quality assurance, interactional courtesy, procedural fairness, responsibility
to inform, legal compliance, and financial balance (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Without
organizational proficiency in operations as well as quality control to prove its adherence
to its competencies, internal and external stakeholders cannot be assured or trust that the
entity is fulfilling its obligations to its employees, creditors, and stakeholders, calling into
question its purpose (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Procedural fairness demands that all
relevant stakeholders, have the opportunity to participate in the organization with all
matters of impartiality and openness (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). By clearly adhering to

the responsibility to inform, entities provided all the important information and necessary
communications applicable to appropriate stakeholders, upholding their obligation to
notify, as well as conveying honesty and trust to everyone related to the organization
(Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001).
At the meso-level, the dynamics of trust related to the collaborative networks
within and across organizations (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Powell’s (1990) research
indicated four networks of collaboration, all of which create social relationships and
involve trust. These networks involved: membership in a professional community of
some sort, a group bonded together with shared history and experiences, a network
bonded by mutual dependencies, and a network based on place and kinship (Kramer &
Tyler, 1996; Powell, 1990). When members of a collaborative network belong to the
same professional community, it is easy for them to share information, experience, and
skills, creating stronger outcomes in a professional accounting, medical, legal, or other
specialized society. The network with a shared history is often within an organization or
company where mutual experiences such as an especially successful or challenging event
bonded them together. A network of mutual dependencies may be formed based on a
project or simple necessity. The network based on kinship may be developed in close
quarters based on friendship and togetherness. Trust is imperative in these networks as
they can create mutually agreeable outcomes through relationships, gossip, kinship, and
collaboration (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Powell, 1990). Trust is easier to build when
members of the networks are in the same organization as proximity encourages bonding.
As trust is grown and cultivated in these networks, groups of individuals or entities can
create better outcomes than they would have on their own.

At the most basic, micro-level, the study of trust centers on the psychology of the
individual (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). At the individual level, trustworthiness in managers
is contingent on the belief that these individuals and entities are competent, responsible,
and dependable, and able to fulfill their obligations completely without reservation
(Ingenhoff & Sommer, 2010). In addition, Caldwell and Clapham (2003) provided
interpersonal trustworthiness factors that were indispensable for individuals, including
established ability, benevolence, and integrity, demanding first that managers possess the
necessary skills, competencies, and expertise to do their jobs with the utmost ability to
perform. Managers and leaders should have the intention and desire to do the right thing,
to do well without thinking of personal gain, operate with kindness, as well as act with
integrity, upright character, honesty, fairness, and credibility (Caldwell & Clapham,
2003). Another less obvious indicator of trust in managers and leaders is whether the
individual is consistently available, both physically and emotionally, therefore actively
engaged in the organization as well as the concerns of its employees (Denton, 2009).
Employees must also be convinced that the manager or leader has both the capacity and
willingness to keep confidences and maintain privacy to be trusted and is “present,” in
that the manager or leader is focused on the success of the enterprise (Denton, 2009).
Because trust is needed when there is an ambiguous situation or action in the future,
where the results of the decision depend on the actions of others, and where the negative
result may be worse than the positive outcome, the destruction of the relationship of trust
and confidence in leadership is especially damaging (Deutsch, 1960; Kramer & Tyler,
1996).

Destruction of trust and impact on organizations.	
  
Trust is often a tentative and fragile aspect of human interaction that is relatively
easy to break or destroy, intentionally or unintentionally. An unintentional violation of
trust is accidental or inadvertent because one or both parties may not be aware of the
same facets of a relationship, agreement, or decision. Intentional violations of trust are far
more insidious as the betrayal is quite simply a breach of trust or honor in the
expectations of behavior and relationships that can effectively destroy all positive
outcomes from a previous or future relationship (Caldwell et al., 2009). Trust can be
destroyed either through a slow decline that is a gradual erosion or a swift and severe
single incident that “effectively eliminates all trust” (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, p. 125).
Caldwell et al. (2009) mentioned that workplace betrayal is usually voluntary as either
one or both parties decides to violate the agreement or relationship. When one or more
parties violate expectations or covenants that are pivotal to the organization, both parties
are aware of the arrangement and affiliation, and that the betrayal has the potential to
harm one or both parties (Caldwell et al., 2009). The destruction of trust results in
suffering, frustration, and/or sorrow as a previously respected leader or organization
becomes tarnished (Caldwell et al., 2009). The violation upsets the wronged party as well
as destabilizes the relationship, negatively impacting both the cognitive and emotional
balance in the entity (Kramer & Tyler, 1996).
At the personal level, where the trust relationship was once in balance, the
violation creates an immediate state of negative affect and feeling, uncertainty, and
instability between the parties (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). After the violation, each
individual undergoes the cognitive processes to determine the depth of the betrayal,

establish who is responsible for the encroachment, and decide the magnitude of the
negative impact (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). In addition, both parties will also experience
the emotional impacts of the violation and must manage the hurt and anger while
reevaluating the feelings each has for the other (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Kramer and
Tyler (1996) also provided that the response of the violator is to either accept
responsibility of guilt or claim innocence. If the violator claims responsibility, he or she
can ask for forgiveness and attempt to salvage the relationship, become merely
ambivalent about the relationship, or becomes hostile and abandon the relationship
(Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Overall, the outcome of the violation may be a destroyed
relationship, a recalibrated or reconfigured relationship, or a restored relationship.
Kramer and Tyler (1996), in discussing calculus-based, knowledge-based, and
identification-based trust, provided additional violation information. With regards to
calculus-based trust, as the relationship is built and constantly reevaluated, a violation of
trust may result in simply a ‘two steps forward, one step back’ mentality where a
violation results in disappointment and frustration, but not an egregious break (Kramer &
Tyler, 1996). With knowledge-based trust, knowledge and affinity with others develops
over time in lower-risk situations therefore “trust is perceived as violated only when the
person’s actions are perceived as freely chosen” (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, p. 127). If the
action was freely chosen, therefore deliberate, the individual that is betrayed must revise
first his or her perception of the betrayer and the relationship, because even if it is
restored, it will never be the same (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). However, Kramer and Tyler
(1996) provided that in regards to identification-based trust situations, almost any trust
violation is a relationship-transforming event. As identification-based trust is based on

empathizing with and understanding the other person’s identity, violations are a breach of
the social contract of the parties involved, rupturing the relationship (Kramer & Tyler,
1996). It is only through meticulous and time-consuming effort that the connection is
made again, but it will never look the same as it did before the infraction (Kramer &
Tyler, 1996).
At an institutional level, the destruction of trust is profoundly unsettling for the
individuals that have poured their human capital, financial and physical resources, efforts,
careers, reputations, and service into the organization for its benefit (Gillespie & Dietz,
2009). After trust is destroyed either through betrayal or accident, employees no longer
want to devote themselves to the service of an organization or leader that hurt them, and
are not inclined to trust the leaders as the relationships between them are damaged.
Employees may chose to leave the entity, taking the knowledge, training, and
investments in human capital with them, psychologically withdrawing resulting in
counterproductive workplace behaviors, or even engaging in acts of obstruction or
revenge for actual or perceived wrongs (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). The exit of employees
from the organization results in a significant loss of institutional data and worth in their
training, advancement, and outlay of human capital. Employees that no longer trust the
organization or its leadership may engage in production deviance, the intentional failure
to perform a task or job as assigned, resulting in frustration for all parties due to the
insubordination to the organization and its values (Jensen, Opland, & Ryan, 2010).
A deeper and more destructive counterproductive behavior by employees is
outright sabotage that deliberately destroys and/or defaces organizational property,
relationships, and/or value, whether overt or subtle (Jensen et al., 2010). If the

organization or leadership has betrayed an individual for whatever reason, the employee
or manager may also decide to abuse the organization, rationalizing it based on the
perceived failure of the institution or manager to uphold its promises, believing that he or
she is “owed” for the betrayal (Jensen et al., 2010). An additional form of retaliation for
the perceived betrayal or destruction of trust is the calculated lack of focus for the
employee; an active disengagement at work. This committed exclusion is a change in
how the employee expects to spend his or her time at the job as evidenced by slacking,
social loafing, avoiding responsibilities, wasting time on tasks, or executing personal
business on organizational time (Jensen et al., 2010). These counterproductive work
behaviors may result because trust in the institution or management has been broken,
resulting in organizational malcontent, as well as financial losses.
Every organization that has experienced a loss of trust suffers. A for-profit entity
may lose stockholders or stakeholders and the market may abandon it. Stock prices may
fall, customers may leave, and employees may exit. However, the destruction of trust is
potentially more catastrophic for the not-for-profit organization as a whole than forprofits. Because not-for-profit organizations rely upon the generosity of their benefactors
and belief in their mission to survive, they are particularly at risk for damage due to the
destruction of trust (Tolbert, Moore, & Wood, 2010). Because not-for-profits often
depend on donations, charity events, and fundraising activities to generate capital, the
loss of support of their stakeholders is substantial.
Restoring trust during a turnaround.	
  
Trust is necessary for all organizations as trust is a “crucial ingredient of
organizational effectiveness” (Galford & Drapeau, 2003, p. 95). A lack of trust often

increases ethical infractions and corruption as well as undercuts all constructive efforts
and projects (Cremer et al., 2010). At an institutional level, the destruction of trust is
“profoundly unsettling” (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 127). As trust is especially important
during times of crisis, organizational upheaval, or serious challenge, trust must be rebuilt
to continue making decisions (Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2007; Siegrist & Zingg, 2013).
Therefore, the restoration of trust is vital for an organization to move forward. Because
trust has both an emotional and cognitive basis, the destruction of trust will influence
individuals’ actions as well as their relationships (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Regardless of
the fact that usually only one of the parties has violated the trust of the other, the repair is
a mutual, bilateral experience (Kramer & Tyler, 1996).
Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) concluded that there are conditions and
situations where trust cannot be repaired. However, in cases where trust restoration is
possible, organizations will require remarkably different strategies to rebuild trust than
those used to create trust. Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks (2004) determined that
organizations have two distinct responses to trust violations. Institutions can either
apologize for the incident or deny its occurrence (Kim et al., 2004). An apology is a
public acknowledgment of responsibility for the trust violation as well as an expression
of remorse, guilt, and repentance for the damage (Kim et al., 2004). The other response is
to explicitly disavow that the trust violation actually occurred, declaring it false (Kim et
al., 2004). However, the result of the two tactics will have substantially different results
depending on the type and severity of the infraction.
Violations of trust from competence and integrity infractions are important to
immediately correct. Organizations are much more likely to admit competence violations

as they are considered more controllable through training, hiring, firing, or simple error
correction (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). However, integrity violations are quite
problematic, as “a single act of dishonesty will cause trustors to conclude that the trustee
is inherently dishonest” (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009, p. 255). Even a trivial or
inconsequential act can bring the entire character of the entity or individual into question.
Though most ethical and integrity violations are usually perpetrated by a single individual
or small group of individuals colluding in an entity, the potential exists for the entire
organization to blamed for damage (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). When individuals or
organizations work to repair trust, they must:
● Be willing to invest time and energy into the repair process,
● Perceive that the short- and/or long-term benefits to be derived from the
relationship are highly valued – that is, the payoff is “worth” the investment of
additional energy, [and]
● Perceive that the benefits to be derived are preferred relative to options for having
those needs satisfied in an alternative manner. (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, p. 129)
Once both parties have determined that the relationship is worth saving, either at
the individual or organizational level, the parties must engage in reciprocal trust repair.
The first step is to recognize the trust violation has occurred, acknowledging it so both
parties are operating with the same information (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). As a trust
violation might have occurred inadvertently, by mutually recognizing that the damage
was done, the parties can make the choice to move forward. The second step is to
determine what actions caused the destruction of trust and take blame for the action
(Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Because the victim is already aware of the breach, the challenge

is for the perpetrator to own the blame. Once blame is accepted, the third step to “admit
that the event was ‘destructive’ of trust” (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, p. 132) is necessary. If
the guilty party admits the action destroyed trust, he or she demonstrates to the victim(s)
that their experiences and losses matter. This process usually demands full disclosure as
well as a discussion of the events and the cognitive and emotional results of the betrayal
(Kramer & Tyler, 1996). The fourth and final step is for the offender to accept full
responsibility for their actions as well as the consequences of the breach of trust (Kramer
& Tyler, 1996). Whether intentional or not, if the victim believes to have been wronged,
then trust has been broken. During this process, the victim also engages in the same
discussion and works with the perpetrator to find common ground to rebuild trust. The
victim can then allow the offender to begin to repair the trust by offering some element of
forgiveness to the apologetic guilty party.
Apologizing for a mistake is a clear behavioral correction but is often rather
difficult to execute. When making an apology for wrongdoing, the individual or entity is
admitting its failure and making the implicit promise that the violation of trust will not be
repeated (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). Apologizing is the most important step to
reconciliation as it demonstrates an understanding of the perspective and plight of the
victim and a willingness to remedy the damage caused by the offending party (Poppo &
Schepker, 2010). Lewicki and Bunker (1996) also outlined a process that begins with
acknowledging the violation, determining the causes of the violation while admitting
guilt, admitting and agreeing that the act was indeed destructive, and accepting the
responsibility for the consequences of the violation.

The second major response to a breach of trust situation is simply to deny that it
ever occurred and pretend that it never existed (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). This strategy
provides no intent to correct behavior and raises serious subsequent concerns about ethics
and trustworthiness (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). By denying the infraction, the perpetrator
is concealing the original transgression and committing a supplementary trust violation
(Poppo & Schepker, 2010). This strategy likely causes added harm, reputational damage,
and financial loss to the organization because it indicates the full intent of the individual
or organization to further deceive the injured party and possibly the public (Poppo &
Schepker, 2010).
To substantiate organizational trustworthiness, entities should exhibit
competence, quality assurance, interactional courtesy, procedural fairness, responsibility
to inform, legal compliance, and financial balance for both managers and entities
(Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Institutions must maintain a high level of competence to
achieve sufficient results that adhere to the mission and maintain clear standards of
quality to assure that competence is publicly and continually achieved (Caldwell &
Jeffries, 2001). Stakeholders cannot be assured or trust that the entity is fulfilling its
obligations to its employees, creditors, or stakeholders without organizational proficiency
and quality controls (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Procedural fairness demands that all
relevant stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in the organization with all
matters of impartiality and openness (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Adhering to the
responsibility to inform, institutions should provide all relevant information to
appropriate stakeholders (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Entities can rebuild trust by
providing their stakeholders with truthful, accurate, and timely information about

organizational performance and expectations (Denton, 2009). Organizations also must
express confidence and trustworthiness by operating with financial balance to fulfill their
missions and commitments without waste while adhering to all rules, regulations, and
laws governing the organization at the local, state, and federal level (Caldwell & Jeffries,
2001).

	
  
Higher Education	
  
Classification of small, regional, public institutions of higher education.	
  
The United States describes college and universities as educational institutions in
several different ways to provide various classifications for students, parents, and
stakeholders. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Learning (2010) created
the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, the leading system to
organize colleges and universities by various characteristics. The Foundation (2010)
classified educational institutions by the traditional Carnegie Framework, by instructional
program (level of degrees provided), enrollment profile, population size, and setting. For
the purposes of this research, the Carnegie Classification of Size and Setting is relevant
as large organizations often operate substantially differently than smaller, more intimate
entities. Per the Foundation (2010), a “small” school is defined as one that has between
1,000-2,999 full-time equivalent students. The classification breaks “small” into three
other more targeted categories of primarily nonresidential, primarily residential, and
highly residential, but that additional classification is not relevant to this study (Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Learning, 2010).

The Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) (2013) is the body that
manages the accreditation agencies across the United States. These accreditation agencies
are regional bodies that have broken the country into separate geographic blocks to
manage degree-granting institutions of higher education, public and private (Council for
Higher Education Accreditation, 2013). The following organizations manage the different
regions of all degree-granting institutions:
● Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools Middle States Commission on
Higher Education (MSCHE)
● New England Association of Schools and Colleges Commission on Institutions of
Higher Education (NEASC-CIHE)
● North Central Association of Colleges and Schools: The Higher Learning
Commission (NCA-HLC)
● Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACS)
● Western Association of Schools and Colleges Accrediting Commission for
Community and Junior Colleges (WASC-ACCJC)
● Western Association of Schools and Colleges Accrediting Commission for Senior
Colleges and Universities (WASC-ACSCU)
An institution of higher education also defines itself by its method of funding. A
private college or university is exclusively funded by student remissions, the entity’s
endowment, and donations. As private institutions do not receive public funding from the
state government, the direct authority over the private entity is the regional and/or
professional accrediting agency. On the other hand, a public college or university is
funded in part by public dollars, therefore by state government appropriations. As a

result, in-state resident students usually pay cheaper tuition rates. However, because these
institutions are accountable to the state government and the public, there is often a state
agency, board, or office to which the entity is held accountable.
Risk factors for organizational malfeasance.	
  
All organizations are at risk for organizational malfeasance, but certain
institutional factors create a potential culture for fraud, all of which may be present in
higher education. There are “organizational dysfunctions that point toward fraud or at
least provide opportunities for it to flourish” (Conway, 2004, p. 129), among them issues
such as a
● habit of noncompliance with regulatory or governmental bodies; [an]
● absence of checks and balances, or an enforcement of checks and balances; [a]
● culture that forbids bad news or dissension;
● haphazard or limited investigations of suspected wrongdoing;
● unrealistic goals, targets, or expectations; [a]
● lack of respect or concern for internal controls; [a]
● lack of physical safeguards of assets;
● understaffing;
● great pressure from stakeholders, auditors, or boards of directors;
● compensation overly tied to performance; [or there is]
● inexperienced and/or ineffective oversight by board. (Conway, 2004, p. 129130)
These organizational dysfunctions do not create abuses or excuses malfeasance, rather
they are examples of the symptoms of the underlying disease of a problematic culture for

which management is both responsible and accountable, as well as for any decisions
regarding or relating to ethics, behavior, and performance (Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011).
Colleges and universities, whether for-profit or not-for-profit, can easily fall prey to these
issues, even though their existence is usually considered to be for a higher purpose in
society.
In looking at a number of the organizational dysfunctions that create a culture and
opportunity for problems in educational institutions, these entities have additional
required elements for compliance with regulatory and governmental bodies. Because
most educational institutions are exempt from federal and state income taxes by their
purpose, not only is their income and spending scrutinized by their supporters, but by the
governmental bodies that exempt them from taxes (Tolbert et al., 2010). Educational
institutions may have an organizational culture that may want to avoid bad news or
dissension as the individuals involved are perceived to be unsupportive of the
organization’s mission and detract from the public’s support of the entity. Without public
support, donations and funding are not forthcoming and may create potentially unrealistic
goals. There is no question that “when an organization is accused of fraudulent practices,
the claim can strike at the very heart of an organization’s image” (Caldiero, Taylor, &
Ungureanu, 2009, p. 219). For the college or university that relies on the support,
goodwill, and generosity of its members and other stakeholders, as well as an image of
meaningful mission and support to the public, the damage from its behaviors may be
substantial.

Problems in higher education.	
  
While business lapses and ethical turnarounds are discussed at length in the media
and are the study of academia, researchers often “lack empirical data on ethical lapses
occurring in universities” (Kelley & Chang, 2007, p. 407). These lapses range from
improper records, grade inflation, manipulated enrollment, fraud, and more. For example,
East Arkansas Community College repeatedly falsified records and defrauded their
stakeholders and state citizens (Lieb, 1998). The “disturbing pattern of padded class
enrollments, altered computer records, grade inflation and ghost classes” (Lieb, Wright,
& Jefferson, 1998, para. 10) substantially inflated enrollment with the intent of obtaining
additional funding and grants from the state government. Certain students were allowed
to register for classes for free or for payment of $1 simply to over report enrollment by
approximately 26% (Lieb et al., 1998). In addition, Arkansas State Representative
Flanagin and his ex-wife, a former dean, were also involved in the fraud, enrolling their
children in college courses, the youngest age 13, to pad class enrollments (Lieb, 1998;
Lieb et al., 1998). As evidence of the organization’s ethical turnabout, the trustees of the
college voted not to renew the president’s contract after it expired, and the former
President Dr. George McCormick resigned with $150,000 contract buyout with
nondisclosure agreement (“News Brief,” 1999; Wright, 1998). In addition, Jauwiece
McGuire, the ex-wife of Flanagin, was demoted from her position of Dean of Humanities
and Fine Arts due to her role in fraud (Lieb, 1998; Lieb et al., 1998; “News Brief,” 1999;
Wright, 1998).

Problems at the small, regional, public university in the upper Midwest.	
  

The small, regional, public institution of higher education under study recently
encountered a series of organizational difficulties that negatively influenced its
reputation. An audit of its special, short-term international programs determined that the
majority of special programs failed traditional degree standards (The Associated Press,
2012; Donovan, 2012a; Donovan, 2012b). The “slipshod international program without
controls and oversights” (Donovan, 2012a, para. 3) allowed 743 students from overseas,
the majority from China, to receive degrees from an improper international program
(Donovan, 2012b). More than 500 of these students were awarded degrees that lacked the
documentation to prove they had actually earned the degrees and the organization became
known as a degree mill for Chinese students.
The 2011-2012 academic year included the termination and subsequent lawsuit of
the former president for enrollment inflation, a compliance and policy audit (improper
degrees, human resources, and internal controls), and a financial audit that revealed a
number of problems across the university (Finneman, 2012). The organization and its
members were accused of enrollment inflation/fraud, improper awarding of degrees
without documentation, misuse of public funds, and inappropriate scholarship allocations.
The fallout from these actions culminated in a damaged reputation, substantial employee
turnover, a decrease in student enrollment, a loss of donors and revenue, and the choice
of the former dean to take his own life.

	
  
Conclusions: Need for the Study	
  
The challenges and difficulties at the specific university in question were weighty.
The organization has been used at academic conferences as a negative example of what

other educational institutions should not do (C. Belcher, personal communication, July 1,
2013). The small, regional, public institution and its management determined that the
organization needed a course correction and began to change its behavior. The entity’s
accreditation was at risk, the student body plummeted, and the academic and local
communities vilified the university and its management. As the example of the small,
regional public university provides, once the damage to an organization is done, the
consequences may be catastrophic to all stakeholders – employees, students, donors, and
the rest of the community.
As demonstrated in the literature review, the vast majority of research and
established theory regarding turnaround management and trust is firmly situated in the
business and corporate realm. Because ethical issues and the need for turnarounds are not
limited to the corporate world but bleeds into governments, educational institutions, and
not-for-profit organizations, the Academy and its body of knowledge has an application
gap. With a number of examples in the corporate world, the academic community can
follow its lead, but with the delicate balance of additional, potential stakeholders of the
public, government, donors, and others, the stakes for a successful turnaround are perhaps
even higher. As there has been little to no use of these topics to the area of higher
education, the research titled “The Management of a Turnaround after an Ethical Breach
in a Public Institution of Higher Education” applies the differing yet related theories of
turnaround management and the restoration of trust to a small, public institution of higher
education. Making an in-depth foray into a specific entity within higher education, this
research investigates the theory that institutions of higher education can be restored
through an ethical turnaround (Hofer, 1980; Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010; Puffer & McCarthy,

2008). By applying these areas of research to this university, the Academy, as well as the
profession, can use the hard-learned lessons to solve other crises in colleges and
universities to turnaround and recover before it is too late.

	
  
Chapter 3: Method	
  
Research Design and Questions	
  
In general, qualitative research seeks to explore and understand an issue or
concept while quantitative research is designed to test a theory, hypothesis, or statement,
and mixed methods utilizes both qualitative and quantitative elements (Creswell, 2009).
Ultimately, the research should drive the methodology and the most appropriate method
is truly dependent upon the intent of the research. The intention of this research was to
answer the following question:
Did current university faculty, staff, and administrative members perceive that the
organizational entity and its leadership have demonstrated a process/path illustrative of a
turnaround as measured by responses to Beeri’s (2009) Turnaround Management
Strategies in Local Authorities?
● H1. A positive correlation existed between a perception of turnaround
in reorganization activities and all faculty, staff, and administrative
employees.
● H2. A positive correlation existed between a perception of stronger
financial controls and faculty, staff, and administrative employees.
● H3. A positive correlation existed between a perception of extending
new marketing efforts to new consumers and faculty, staff, and
administrative employees.

● H4. A positive correlation existed between a perception of improving
the local authority’s internal and external image and all faculty, staff,
and administrative employees.
● H5. There was a moderate correlation between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholder trust in the local authority and those employees
considered mostly staff or mostly faculty.
● H6. There was a moderate correlation between a perception of
reshaping and improving the organizational culture and climate and
faculty and staff employees.
● H7. There was a positive correlation between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the level of
participation in extracurricular activities on campus.
● H8. There was a positive correlation between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the number of
hours per week employees spend on campus executing their specific
job duties.
● H9. There was a positive correlation between a perception of
redefining the core mission and all faculty, staff, and administrative
employees.
● H10. There was a positive correlation between defining a common
vision of the local authority and the levels of management.
In addition, the instrument also included a number of demographic questions (see
Appendix C: Survey Instruments). The instrument was delivered electronically via

SurveyMonkey.com from the researcher’s personal e-mail and respondents were
informed as to the expected length of time required to complete it: approximately 15-30
minutes. The interval Likert-type survey responses were analyzed using various statistics.
The responses were tested using the Chi-square inferential statistic to assess whether the
frequency of the distribution of responses fit a specific pattern of whether a majority of
respondents perceived if retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization activities
occurred. In addition, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient was utilized to determine
whether or not specific correlations existed. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was
used to compare groups of respondents as divided by demographic data available.

	
  
Respondents and Site	
  
The research site of the small, regional, public institution was chosen due to its
period of substantial organizational change and potential for turnaround after its internal
difficulties, as well as the researcher’s access to the population, records, and data related
to the site. As there have been comparatively few, if any, highly publicized examples of
ethical turnarounds in higher education, this research provided an analysis of how
respondents perceive the organizational turnaround. In addition, because this site
involved a number of complex issues that have been publicized in the local, state, and
national media, there were a number of sources of information for supporting
documentation.
Because this study focused on a specific organization, adequate permission was
sought from the university under study via request through the Institutional Review
Board. As this research was primary research for a dissertation, the proper permissions

were also obtained from the George Fox University Institutional Review Board. In
addition, the Vice President of Academic Affairs at the university under study reviewed
the research and found it to have merit. The identities and positions of all respondents
were obscured to all parties, including the primary researcher, via SurveyMonkey.com to
maintain confidentiality and anonymity. Responses collected via SurveyMonkey.com
were kept completely confidential and anonymous, even to the researcher. Not only did
the researcher not know the respondent’s IP address, but there was no way to identify
respondents individually, as every potentially identifiable demographic question provided
the opportunity to answer “I prefer not to answer.” The data accessed from
SurveyMonkey.com included only the numerical responses available. In addition, only
the researcher was able to access the numerical survey information and the responses
were not individually identifiable. The data and drafts were stored in an offsite, secure
location. Because the issues at the organization were so personal and poignant to the
respondents, there was a need to protect confidentiality to encourage accurate responses,
but even utilizing a confidential survey, there were potential problems with full
disclosure. The researcher also worked to make sure the research was not disruptive to
normal workplace activities by requesting and obtaining permission from the
organization’s leadership.
As of the time the research was collected (September 2014), the university
employed roughly 250 individuals in administrative, faculty (part and full-time – annual
contract, tenured, tenure-track, and adjunct), and staff positions. Per Israel (2009), a
population of approximately 250 demands 154 responses for a 5% confidence level.
These calculations were derived from Cochran’s (1963) sampling equations. As the

sample population in this research included all currently employed individuals at the
university in faculty, staff, and administrative positions, all individuals that were
employed at the time when the surveys were announced were potential sources of data.
Because of the nature of the major research question, asking whether current faculty,
staff, and members of administration (who may or may not be considered “managers”)
perceived that the entity and leadership had demonstrated a process/path illustrative of a
turnaround, this research did not investigate the perspectives of those individuals that had
exited the organization. Therefore, this issue certainly limited the responses to individuals
that may be location-bound, could not find an alternative position elsewhere, or those that
might be especially dedicated to improving the organization, skewing the data. While
there has been substantial turnover at the university since the 2011-2012 academic year
and forward, as the study aimed to ascertain turnaround as understood by current
employees, the opinions of the faculty, staff, and administrative members that were
presently at the university were investigated. While respondents may not have been
employed at the university during the 2011-2012 academic year or before, this study was
a snapshot in time to determine if the entity was on a path towards a turnaround
according to current employees. As achieving the proper response rate was challenging,
see “Procedures” below, modeled after Dillman, Smyth, and Christian’s (2009) tailored
design method.

	
  
Measures	
  
The measure (instrument) utilized for this research was the Turnaround
Management Strategies in Local Authorities (Beeri, 2009). The instrument was vetted by

prior research and proper permissions were obtained from the original author (see
Appendix C). The measure utilized a Likert-like scale and its validity was tested by the
individual researcher that created it (See “Instrument Reliability and Validity” below).
In addition, demographic questions such as gender, age, tenure at the university,
department, position, and other relevant questions were asked in the survey, but were not
required to be completed in order to use the data. Therefore, if the respondents answered
the survey in its entirety but entered “I prefer not to answer” to the various demographic
questions, their responses were not excluded from the data. By providing the choice of “I
prefer not to answer” to every demographic question, it was possible to protect
respondents’ responses, confidentiality, and identities, even from the researcher, through
SurveyMonkey.com. While this was as a weakness in that full demographic information
might not be available for every respondent, this loss was acceptable to protect the
respondents from risk and potential harm. Because the research was executed through an
anonymous survey instrument via SurveyMonkey.com, the researcher received only
numerical results with no identifying personal information, and affirmed that fact to the
respondents in the request for participation letter and follow-up emails.

	
  
Procedure	
  
Because this research was undertaken at the researcher’s place of employment,
the researcher approached the university’s management to request permission to conduct
the study and the University’s Institutional Review Board. Once the proper permissions
were obtained, the SurveyMonkey.com web link that combined the demographic
questions and instrument was distributed to faculty, staff, and administrative members via

the researcher’s personal email address. The invitation to participate in the survey was
distributed to faculty, staff, and administration via an email explaining the rationale of the
research, procedures, and process (see Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent and
Communications). In addition, the invitation included the web address to access the
survey. The emailed letter detailed the purpose of the survey and its importance, as well
as provided a statement of thanks and contact information for the researcher for
debriefing (see Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent and Communications). In
addition, the letter also provided an invitation to receive an appreciation gift (Dillman,
Smyth, & Christian, 2009). The appreciation gift was the option for all participants to
receive a $15 gift card to either the university bookstore or Amazon.com. Once the initial
invitational letters were sent to the university faculty, staff, and administration via the
researcher’s personal email address, follow-up e-mails were sent weekly for four weeks
to encourage additional responses (see Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent and
Communications and Communications). Due to the state open records laws in which the
site is located, the researcher emailed the survey link, letter, and follow-up
communications from a personal email address using email addresses for participants
obtained from the university’s website.

	
  
Data Collection and Analysis	
  
Once the responses were collected via SurveyMonkey.com, various statistical
methods were used to assess the results to determine potential relationships within the
data – regression and correlation, among others. Based on the wealth of information that
was collected utilizing the instrument and demographic data, the mean was taken to find

the measure of central tendency of the various instruments. The responses were analyzed
using a number of different statistics in several phases to ascertain the various
relationships and facets of the survey results, including determining the central tendency
of the Likert-type scales, analyzing associations using Pearson’s Coefficient,
relationships through regression and correlation, as well as exploring differences using Ttests and ANOVAs. Utilizing the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient, the research
determined any relevant associations, and ANOVA and multiple regression searched for
relevant relationships between trust, turnarounds, and ethical leadership. The level of data
provided on the survey instrument through SurveyMonkey.com also influenced what type
of statistics were significant and the researcher determined the specifics once the
available results were compiled.

	
  
Instrument Reliability and Validity	
  
The instrument was combined with demographic questions in the same link to
allow for a more seamless process of completion for respondents in a single instance. The
surveys were executed through SurveyMonkey.com, a reliable service commonly used to
execute quantitative research. Because the data was secured via login/password available
only to the researcher, the responses were protected to assure confidentiality. Because the
instrument was previously created by other researchers and remained unmodified, the
researcher was able to rely upon the validity and reliability, as established by other
academics, without pilot testing (Creswell, 2009). Zikmund (1994) provided that the
reliability of instruments is classified as “the measuring instrument’s ability to provide
consistent results in repeated uses” (p. 293). Creswell (2009) defined an instrument’s

validity as being able to “draw meaningful and useful inferences from scores on the
instruments” (p. 149). Traditionally, Cronbach’s Alpha measures consistency and
reliability and the academy provides that values greater than 0.70 are considered
sufficient (Nunnally & Berstein, 1994; Salkind, 2003).
The Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities survey used a fivepoint Likert-scale to ask if organizations executed various strategies in retrenchment,
repositioning, and reorganization, and to what extent management utilized these
strategies as perceived by respondents (employees) (Beeri, 2009). Beeri (2009) used
Exploratory Factor Analysis to assess the new scale, establishing factorability through the
Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) test. The KMO yielded 0.810, greater than the
recommended 0.60, with sufficient statistical significance (p < 0.001) (Beeri, 2009).
Beeri (2009) also assessed the instrument using the Spearman-Brown Correlation,
yielding 0.88 with reasonable correlations from 0.45 to 0.87. In addition, the instrument
yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.89 overall with specific elements ranging from
0.54 and 0.87, “reveal[ing] moderate to high consistency among respondents’ scores so
the scale is plausible and coherent” (Beeri, 2009, p. 134). These tests support Beeri’s
(2009) results of reliability and validity.

Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale (Beeri, 2009)	
  

Correlation matrix for TMSLA factors (Cronbach’s alpha in parentheses).
Factor No.

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Reorganization at the
institutional level

4.08

0.71

(0.870
)

2. Retrenchment of
services

2.58

0.89

0.015

(0.740)

3. Repositioning as
reaching out

3.35

0.79

0.541

0.018

(0.820)

4. Reorganization as
extent of centralization

2.90

0.63

0.099

0.196

0.385

(0.620)

5. Repositioning as
innovative services

3.64

0.73

0.544

0.231

0.673

0.356

(0.860)

6. Retrenchment of
expenditures

2.70

0.61

0.047

0.353

0.057

0.047

0.283

(0.560)

7. Repositioning as
renewing relationship

3.22

0.58

0.626

0.210

0.685

0.257

0.599

0.157

(0.540)

8. Reorganization at the
personnel level

4.00

0.89

0.239

0.192

0.155

0.294

0.204

0.180

0.189

8

(0.690)

N = 83–85.
p < 0.01. One item was reversed for the Cronbach’s alpha procedure. p < 0.05.

	
  
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations	
  
As this research was undertaken in a single small, regional, public university, the
researcher made the initial assumption that the respondents would understand the
questions asked, as well as provide honest and accurate responses. While this research
was strictly anonymous, the researcher also assumes that respondents believed that it was
anonymous and would answer questions truthfully, valuing the intent and its purpose.
The first delimitation of this research was the intentional narrowing of the scope
of the population to those currently employed at the single university. As these issues

were unique to the organization at a specific time, the setting and time of the study were
narrowly focused in both categories. While the researcher worked to gather as much data
as possible through publicized documentation and survey results, the final outcome of the
organization’s turnaround will likely take a number of years beyond the study to
complete. Therefore, this study was a snapshot of a moment in time at the institution.
The limitations of this study included general weaknesses in the survey
methodology. Though the researcher has taken care to use established instruments that
are found to be reliable and valid, findings may not be generalizable outside of the chosen
population. As the surveys were substantial in nature, requiring approximately 15-30
minutes to complete, there is a risk of survey fatigue. To mitigate this risk and encourage
the most important questions on the instruments were answered, the demographic
questions were placed after the major instrument. Low response rates and incomplete
responses are also inherent weaknesses of the survey methodology. The researcher
attempted to mitigate this limitation by garnering public support from the organization’s
Office of Academic Affairs to encourage participation (see “Procedure” below).
Another limitation of this research is the fact that participants were those
individuals currently employed at the university, likely skewing the research data. As a
number of individuals left the university between the time of the ethical breach and the
time of this research, the responses were skewed as to the opinions and perceptions of
those currently employed. Because of the nature of the major research question, asking
whether current faculty, staff, and members of administration (who may or may not be
considered “managers”) perceived that the entity and leadership had demonstrated a
process/path illustrative of a turnaround, this research did not investigate the perspectives

of those individuals that left the organization. Therefore, this issue certainly limited the
responses to individuals that may be location-bound, could not find an alternative
position elsewhere, or those that might be especially dedicated to improving the
organization. In addition, members of the university that arrived since the breach may not
view the turnaround in the same light as those employees that have been at the institution
for a longer period, however, due to the potential ethical risks involved, employment
length at the university was not investigated.
The potential ethical risk of discomfort to the respondents also existed. To
mitigate, the researcher received approvals from both the George Fox University and
organizational Institutional Research Boards. In addition, because the issues at the entity
were so personal and poignant to the respondents, there was the potential for both
discomfort and inconvenience to the respondents. The survey instrument was designed to
look at the improvements at the university, but could have brought up unpleasant
memories of the university’s downturn as well as created feelings of organizational
pressure, biasing the responses. Because the past issues may have resulted in feelings of
uncertainty about the future, it was necessary to protect respondents’ identities and
confidentiality. The respondents were also given an ‘out’ if they do not want to complete
the survey, protecting the respondents. In addition, certain questions such as “when did
you start working for the university,” “are you tenured,” and various other potentially
identifiable demographic questions were not asked as they were prohibited by the
organization’s Institutional Research Board (A. Stark, personal communication).
In addition, there existed an inherent risk of researcher bias as the researcher is
employed at the organization under study (see Role of the Researcher below). Because of

the imperative need to mitigate and guard against researcher bias, the researcher chose to
engage in a quantitative study with established instruments. The identities and positions
of all respondents were obscured to all users, including the primary researcher, and the
data were provided in a statistical/numerical form. There were no personal connections or
assessments with the respondents. In addition, all results were assessed and vetted by the
Chair of the researcher’s dissertation committee, the committee, and an external reviewer.
Given that the study focused on a single population, bounded by unique
experiences, generalization may not be appropriate. Instead, it is up to the reader of the
research to determine how much or which elements of this study are generalizable to
other situations. The specific market and issues were unique to the organization at that
point in time, though the potential exists for other universities and colleges in the future
to find themselves in similar situations. While the existing research substantiates and
supports the theories of ethical turnarounds and organizational course change, the
concepts may not be applicable to all institutions of higher education. Therefore, the
results may not be replicable in other cases or to the populations of other educational
institutions.

	
  
Role of the Researcher	
  
The role of the researcher was a challenging element of this research, creating
strategic, ethical, and personal issues. It is important to note that the researcher in study
was not only involved in the research, but was employed by the organization during the
research. As an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the organization under study, the
researcher began her employment with the organization in the fall of 2009, two academic

years prior to the 2011-2012 academic year when many of the issues came to light. The
researcher was reasonably acquainted with the issues that inspired the organizational
change; however, the challenge was to mitigate researcher bias (see “Limitations and
Delimitations” above). This mitigation was completed by utilizing the researcher’s
committee, Chair, and external individuals as reviewers.

	
  
Chapter 4: Results	
  

	
  
Overview of the Study	
  
The purpose of this research was a quantitative study to investigate if current
university faculty, staff, and administrative members perceived that the organizational
entity and its leadership have demonstrated a process/path illustrative of a turnaround as
measured by responses to the Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities
(Beeri, 2009). This study was executed through an online survey submitted via university
email from September 1-19, 2014. In addition, this survey was executed to determine if
various other relationships existed.
Chapter 4 describes the data and results of the online survey as well as the later
collection and analyses of the variables proposed in Chapter 3 to answer the research
question and hypotheses. Chapter 4 begins with a discussion regarding missing data, a
descriptive examination of the statistics, and continues with an analysis of each of the
hypotheses proposed. Because reviewing both the hypotheses and the research question
aids in understanding the statistical results, the results are grouped as specific inquiries
around the hypotheses with graphics and visual support. This analysis and supporting
information substantiated the discussion provided in the following chapter.
The survey was opened on September 1, 2014. From September 1 to September
19, the researcher sent a series of emails to the faculty, staff, and administrative members

of the university under study (see Appendix A: Respondent Solicitation for this
information). During this time frame, reminder emails were sent to participants weekly
until the required number of responses were achieved. Of the 249 employees listed on the
phone directory on the university’s website, 163 responded to the survey within the time
frame. However, not all respondents answered every question of the survey, and
“skipped” questions ranged from 1-18 respondents per question. Removing “I prefer not
to answer” and “Not Applicable” from the data provided ‘n’ values ranging from 98-151.
The reasons the data was incomplete and/or missing may be because of survey fatigue as
more questions were skipped towards the end. In addition, based upon the frequency of
responses (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 93.1% of respondents
(135 of 145 valid responses) agreed that the university the events were a major violation
of trust. As a result, individuals may have chosen not to respond due to a lack of trust in
the survey, concern for confidentiality, or lack of anonymity if the researcher was able to
determine individual responses.
Table 1	
  
How Major was the Violation of Trust
How major was the violation of trust?
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid
1
4
2.4
2.8
2.8
2
3
1.8
2.1
4.8
3
3
1.8
2.1
6.9
4
28
17.1
19.3
26.2
5
107
65.2
73.8
100.0
Total
145
88.4
100.0
Missing 0
18
11.0
System
1
.6
Total
19
11.6
Total
164
100.0

Description of Statistical Tests Used	
  
Two major statistical tests were used to analyze the data and test the hypotheses.
The following is a brief description of the tests.
Descriptive statistics and frequencies.	
  
Descriptive statistics are important in data analysis to understand the foundation
of all other statistics. This analysis includes finding the measure of central tendency,
therefore the mean, or average of the data set (Newton & Rudestam, 1999). The
following analysis is also heavily reliant upon determining the frequency of responses,
therefore determining how many participants provided a specific response to a question
(Newton & Rudestam, 1999). In addition, descriptive statistics are also dependent on
standard deviation, which is calculated by squaring the variance of the population to
determine the normal spread of the data (Newton & Rudestam, 1999).

	
  
Findings	
  
There are several formats that represent the quantitative results of the survey
study.
Participant/Sample information.	
  
Of the 249 employees at the small, public, regional university, 163 faculty, staff,
and administrative employees responded to the survey. These replies resulting in a very
high response rate, far above the more common 10-15%. This response rate of just over
65% is likely due to a combination of factors, including strong backing from university
employees, upper administrative support, and the thank you gift of the $15 gift certificate
for willing participants. This extraordinary response rate indicates a particular interest

and support in the research from the population overall. The demographic information of
those 163 participants is as follows.
Gender. The majority of respondents to the survey were women. As the
population is roughly 57% woman (142 of 249 total employees) and 43% men (107 of
249 employees), this is not unexpected. Overall, 32 individuals did not answer this
demographic question (14 – I prefer not to answer and 18 – skipped), 19.6% of the
participants (32 of 163 total responses).
Table 2	
  
Percentage of Respondents by Gender
What is your gender?
Answer Options

Response Percent

Response Count

Male
Female
I prefer not to answer

36.6%
53.8%
9.7%
answered question
skipped question

53
78
14
145
18

Age. Of the 163 participants, 32 individuals either preferred not to answer or
skipped the question, roughly 19.6% of respondents. No data was known prior to the
research regarding the ages of the population, only that there was a wide span from the
youngest members of the organization to the oldest.	
  

Table 3	
  
Percentage of Respondents by Age
What is your age?
Answer Options

Response Percent

Response Count

Younger than 20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
older than 60
I prefer not to answer

0.0%
10.8%
18.9%
20.3%
27.0%
11.5%
11.5%
answered question
skipped question

0
16
28
30
40
17
17
148
15

	
  

Education. The university’s phone directory posted on its website (reference
redacted here to protect the anonymity of the site) reflected that approximately 17.7% of
the university were referred to as “doctor” in their public listing, indicating that those
individuals with terminal degrees responded to the survey at a higher rate than other
education groups as 37 individuals responded that classified themselves as having a
terminal degree, yet 44 were listed as “doctor” in the public directory. Other educational
information regarding the entire population was unknown, but as the population in
question was a university, it can be inferred that the population was reasonably well
educated. In addition, a total of 28 respondents of the 163 chose not to provide
information about the level of their education as 13 respondents preferred not to answer
and 15 skipped the question entirely.	
  

Table 4	
  
Percentage of Respondents by Level of Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Answer Options

Response Percent

Response Count

Some high school
High school graduate or equivalent
Some college
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Terminal/Doctoral degree
I prefer not to answer

0.7%
1.4%
9.5%
22.3%
32.4%
25.0%
8.8%
answered question
skipped question

1
2
14
33
48
37
13
148
15

Position at the university. As some members of the university under study
fulfilled multiple rolls within the organization, participants were instructed to identify
their position as closely as possible with their main function at the university. Those
individuals that identified themselves as completely or mostly administrative were those
individuals that consider themselves to be members of university administration as upperlevel individuals that are responsible for managing the university, at least in part.
Participants that identified as half administrative and half faculty are usually department
chairs that carry a half time teaching load and half time management load. Completely or
mostly faculty respondents are those individuals that are mostly teaching, while staff
members are those that are largely supporting the function of the university in every other
capacity besides teaching. While there are some faculty members that have release time
on their contracts and staff members that also teach one or two classes as an adjunct,
respondents self-selected the option as to how they spend most of their time at the

university completing their duties. Another important factor to note is that participants
were not asked if they were tenured or not. This question was discussed with members of
the Institutional Research Board in the university under study before the IRB permissions
were sought. Due to the requirement to protect the university employees with all possible
confidentiality and anonymity, the Institutional Review Board chair rejected allowing the
research to include questions on tenure.
Table 5
Percentage of Respondents by Position at the University
Which of the following best describes your position?
Answer Options

Response Percent

Response Count

Completely/Mostly Administrative
Half Administrative/Half Faculty
Completely/Mostly Faculty
Completely/Mostly Staff
I prefer not to answer

16.1%
8.7%
36.2%
30.9%
8.1%
answered question
skipped question

24
13
54
46
12
149
14

Department at the university. The university under study is separated into various
functional units. As some employees worked in multiple departments or under several
roles, the employee was asked to identify with the department/area in which he or she
works with the most. Academically, the university is split into two colleges – the College
of Arts and Sciences (CAS) (65 employees) and the College of Education, Business, and
Applied Sciences (CEBAS) (64 employees). The areas of music, language, literature,
natural sciences, mathematics, computer science, fine arts, performing arts, and the social
sciences are all housed within CAS. The 40 of 65 employees from the College of Arts
and Sciences provides a 61.5% response rate. Business, education, agriculture, health,

and nursing are within CABAS. Thirty-three of 64 employees in the College of
Education, Business, and Applied Sciences responded, providing a 51.5% response rate.
(A. Stark, personal knowledge)
Finance and Administration, as managed by the Vice President of Finance and
Administration, handles business affairs, human resources, information technology, and
facility operations and had 49 employees at the time the survey was completed
(custodians, power plant, groundskeepers, etc.). As only 10 of the 49 employees in the
Finance and Administration division responded, this area had the lowest response rate of
20.4%. The division of Student Development governs campus programming, residential
life, security, student health services, and career development (7 employees). Student
Development had a response rate of 57.1% with 4 of 7 employees completing the survey.
Enrollment Services and Communications is in charge of student enrollment, via
admissions, financial aid, communications, and international programs with 16
employees. The 7 of 16 employees from the Enrollment Services and Communications
division provided a response rate of 43.75%. The administrative departments under the
Vice President of Academic Affairs include the library, student academic success
programs, institutional research, distance education, academic records, and the honors
leadership program (28 employees). Eleven of 28 employees in Academic Affairs
responded to the survey, providing a response rate of 39.3%. Athletics report directly to
the president of the university and includes all coaches and trainers of all sports as well as
the sports marking director (7 employees). Four of 7 employees in Athletics responded to
the survey, providing a 57.1% response rate. Other positions that report directly to the
president included the director and staff of the university’s center for entrepreneurship

and innovation as well the university’s digital library program (13 employees). Of the 13
employees that report to the president or are under the president, 12 responded, providing
the highest response rate of 92.3%. In addition, of the roughly 163 participants, 27.6% of
respondents did not provide information on this question as calculated by adding those
individuals that preferred not to answer (31 individuals) or skipped the question (14
individuals), perhaps out of concern for anonymity. Based on this information, it is
possible that a departmental bias existed, especially as a very high response rate was from
individuals under the president, but far less from the area of Finance and Administration.
In addition, CAS had a substantially higher response rate than CEBAS, even though the
number of employees was quite similar. (A. Stark, personal knowledge)
Table 6	
  
Percentage of Respondents by University Departments
Which of the following best describes your department?
Answer Options

Response
Percent
26.8%

College of Arts and Sciences (Dean or under Dean of CAS)
College of Education, Business, and Applied Sciences (Dean
22.1%
or under Dean of CEBAS)
Finance and Administration (VP or under Vice President of
6.7%
Finance & Admin)
Student Development (VP or under Vice President of
2.7%
Student Development)
Enrollment Services and Communications (ED or under
Executive Director of Enrollment Services and
4.7%
Communications)
Position within Academic Affairs (VPAA or under VPAA)
7.4%
Athletics (Director or under Director of Intercollegiate
2.7%
Athletics)
Other position (President or other positions that report
8.1%
directly to the President)
I prefer not to answer
20.8%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
40
33
10
4
7
11
4
12
31
149
14

Managerial role at the university. Participants were asked about their roles in
university management to understand how the different layers of responsibility
influenced their perspectives and perceptions of the process of organizational turnaround.
Of the 163 responses, a total of 37 individuals chose not to provide information regarding
their managerial roles at the university (23 – I prefer not to answer and 14 – skipped),
therefore 22.7% of total responses.	
  
Table 7	
  
Percentage of Respondents by Managerial Role
Which of the following best describes your managerial role at the university?
Answer Options
Upper or middle management (Ex.
Dean/Director or above)
Junior management (Ex. Assist
Director/Department Chair, etc.)
Do not manage other employees (not
including work study students)
I prefer not to answer

Response Percent

Response Count

6.7%

10

14.1%

21

63.8%

95

15.4%
answered question
skipped question

23
149
14

	
  

On campus events attended at the university. This question was asked to
determine how active participants were on campus in extracurricular events such as
sporting events, plays, theater, concerts, symposiums, and all other events on campus that
support the campus community. Overall, 24 of the 163 respondents decided not to
respond to this question, roughly 14.7% of the overall sample (10 – I prefer not to
answer, 14 – skipped).	
  
Table 8	
  
Percentage of Respondents by Level of Participation in Extracurricular Activities

How do you describe your level of participation in extracurricular activities on
campus? On average, I attend an average of ______ on campus events ex. sporting
events, celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc. per MONTH:
Answer Options

Response Percent

Response Count

More than 5 per month
Average of 5 per month
Average of 4 per month
Average of 3 per month
Average of 2 per month
Average of 1 per month
Average of less than 1 per month
I prefer not to answer

14.1%
4.0%
5.4%
12.8%
24.8%
18.1%
14.1%
6.7%
answered question
skipped question

21
6
8
19
37
27
21
10
149
14

	
  

Hours/Week doing job at the university on campus. The population at the
university under study has undergone major changes since the initial public breach of
ethics (A. Stark, personal knowledge). There has been substantial turnover and
employees are working quite hard covering multiple duties and sometimes even positions
(A. Stark, personal knowledge). Anecdotally, the population has been working very hard.
The respondents’ responses agree with the researcher’s personal experience as 56.4% of
participants indicated that they worked more than 40 hours per week on campus. As 11%
of respondents chose not to answer (3 – I prefer not to answer, 15 – skipped), this
question had the highest response rate of the demographic questions.	
  

Table 9	
  
Percentage of Respondents by Number of Hours Worked on Campus
How do you describe the number of hours per week you spend ON CAMPUS
executing your specific job duties? An average of:
Response
Response
Answer Options
Percent
Count
More than 50 hours per week during the traditional
18.2%
27
school year.
46-50 hours per week during the traditional school year.
14.2%
21
41-45 hours per week during the traditional school year.
29.7%
44
36-40 hours per week during the traditional school year.
13.5%
20
31-35 hours per week during the traditional school year.
4.7%
7
26-30 hours per week during the traditional school year.
7.4%
11
21-25 hours per week during the traditional school year.
2.7%
4
16-20 hours per week during the traditional school year.
4.1%
6
11-15 hours per week during the traditional school year.
0.7%
1
10 hours or less per week during the traditional school
2.7%
4
year.
I prefer not to answer
2.0%
3
answered question
148
skipped question
15
Hours/Week doing job at the university off campus. As provided above, the
campus community of the university under study is working diligently to execute their
duties. The respondents provided that 59.5% of participants are working 15 hours per
week or less off campus completing their obligations. However, 24 of the 163
respondents (14.7%) chose not to answer this question (9 – I prefer not to answer, 15 –
skipped).	
  

Table 10	
  
Percentage of Respondents by Hours Worked Off Campus
How do you describe the number of hours per week you spend OFF CAMPUS
executing your specific job duties? An average of:
Response
Response
Answer Options
Percent
Count
More than 50 hours per week during the traditional school
0.7%
1
year.
46-50 hours per week during the traditional school year.
0.7%
1
41-45 hours per week during the traditional school year.
0.7%
1
36-40 hours per week during the traditional school year.
1.4%
2
31-35 hours per week during the traditional school year.
2.0%
3
26-30 hours per week during the traditional school year.
3.4%
5
21-25 hours per week during the traditional school year.
7.4%
11
16-20 hours per week during the traditional school year.
12.2%
18
11-15 hours per week during the traditional school year.
18.9%
28
10 hours or less per week during the traditional school
46.6%
69
year.
I prefer not to answer
6.1%
9
answered question
148
skipped question
15

Descriptive statistics.	
  
Table 11	
  
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Retrenchment Activities
Answer
Options
Contracted
[reduced] ac
tivities and
services
Eliminated
particular
services
Decreased
service
expenditures
Partially/
temporarily
exited from
specific
services
Liquidated
[sold] assets
in order to
raise capital
Reduced/
suspended
capital
expenditures
Closed down
public
organizations
Created
stronger
financial
controls
Decreased
financial
support to
other
organizations

Neutral

Some
what

To a
Very
Large
Extent

N/A

Rating
Average

Response
Count

27

25

71

23

10

3.53

161

8

26

29

64

22

11

3.44

160

3

13

28

67

34

14

3.80

159

10

14

33

62

24

12

3.53

155

47

7

54

5

2

45

2.20

160

13

10

40

58

20

19

3.44

160

29

19

54

15

2

40

2.51

159

2

10

23

54

56

11

4.05

156

7

12

51

38

14

37

3.33

159

Hardly
at All

Very
Little

5

answered question
skipped question

162
1

Table 12	
  
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Repositioning Activities

Answer
Options
Established
new
services
Entered into
joint
activities/
co-operated
2020
w/other
agencies
[or
organizations]
Extended
activities &
scope of
services
Changed the
priorities of
traditional
activities
Rented/sold/
mortgaged
assets
Extended
availability
of services
Extended
marketing
efforts to
new
consumers
Increased
service
expenditure

Hardly
at All

Very
Little

Neutra
l

Som
e
what

To a
Very
Large
Exten
t

28

41

21

50

6

5

2.76

151

20

38

25

46

6

13

2.85

148

30

39

23

46

6

5

2.72

149

12

13

29

67

23

5

3.53

149

31

16

46

5

1

52

2.28

151

28

39

37

31

6

8

2.63

149

7

13

11

56

61

4

4.02

152

22

27

53

21

7

17

2.72

147

N/
A

Rating
Averag
e

Respons
e Count

Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Repositioning Activities (continued)

Answer
Options
Modernized
capacity of
services
with
equipment
utilizing
new
technologies
Began to
provide
services
internally
that were
previously
purchased
Loaned
money/
asked for
subvention
for
reorganization
purposes
Privatized
services
Increased
average
price of
services/
levying
money
Redefined
core
missions
Ensured high
quality of
services

Hardl
y at
All

Very
Littl
e

Neutra
l

Som
e
what

11

19

26

64

8

13

50

29

10

25

To a
Very
Large
Exten
t

N/
A

Rating
Averag
e

Respons
e Count

23

5

3.48

148

48

6

24

3.25

149

52

4

3

53

2.41

151

16

54

14

3

38

2.59

150

10

13

49

41

3

33

3.12

149

12

13

21

67

22

12

3.55

147

10

11

24

61

39

5

3.74

150

Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Repositioning Activities (continued)

Answer
Options
Improved the
internal &
external
image
Introduced
new ways
of
implement
-tation
Rebuilt
stakeholders trust in
the local
authority

Hardly
at All

Very
Littl
e

Neutra
l

Som
e
what

10

12

15

63

7

9

24

16

13

19

To a
Very
Large
Exten
t

N/A

Rating
Averag
e

Respons
e Count

49

2

3.87

151

78

25

7

3.73

150

65

33

5

3.59

151

answered question
skipped question

153
10

Table 13
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Reorganization Activities
Answer
Options
Replaced the
chief
executive
officer
Changed the
internal
local
authority
structure
Replaced
senior and
middle
managers
Took
centralization steps
Took
decentralization steps
Increased time
and efforts
in
researching
consumers’
needs
Increased time
and efforts
in
becoming a
learning
organization
Made changes
in human
resources
management style

Hardl
y at
All

Very
Littl
e

Neutra
l

Some
what

To a
Very
Large
Extent

N/
A

Rating
Averag
e

Response
Count

1

0

11

11

115

13

4.73

151

2

5

12

55

73

3

4.31

150

3

4

12

37

90

2

4.42

148

6

8

38

47

36

10

3.73

145

21

25

57

18

9

17

2.76

147

12

19

29

62

23

4

3.45

149

8

14

27

65

30

5

3.66

149

37

27

29

33

18

6

2.78

150

Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Reorganization Activities (continued)
To a
Hardl
Very
Answer
Very
Some
Rating
Respons
y at
Neutral
Large
N/A
Options
Little
what
Average e Count
All
Exten
t
Reshaped &
improved
the
organiza17
29
20
53
27
3
3.3
149
tional
culture
and
climate
Invested in
staff
skills
training
Defined a
common
vision of
the local
authority
Diagnosed
the local
authority
strengths
and
weaknesses
Formulated
an
organizational
working
plan
Fought the
denial
and
resistance
of
employees

11

32

35

53

16

1

3.21

148

12

15

29

51

40

3

3.63

150

15

18

20

59

36

1

3.56

149

14

19

19

60

31

6

3.52

149

12

15

50

38

21

12

3.3

148

answered question
skipped question

151
12

Table 14	
  
Descriptive Statistics of Turnaround Activity Responses
n
Contracted [reduced] activities and
services
Eliminated particular services
Decreased Service Expenditures
Partially/temporarily exited from specific
services
Liquidated [sold] assets in order to raise
capital
Reduced/suspended capital expenditures
Closed down public organizations
Created stronger financial controls
Decreased financial support to other
organizations
Established new services
Entered into joint activities/co-operated
with other agencies [or organizations]
Extended activities and scope of services
Changed the priorities of traditional
activities
Rented/sold/mortgaged assets
Extended availability of services
Extended marketing efforts (reaching out)
to new consumers
Increased service expenditure
Modernized capacity of services with
equipment utilizing new technologies
Began to provide services/internal services
that were previously purchased

MiniRange mum

MaxiStd.
mum Mean Dev.

151

4

1

5

3.53

1.057

149
144

4
4

1
1

5
5

3.44
3.80

1.105
.972

142

4

1

5

3.55

1.082

115

4

1

5

2.20

1.086

141
119
145

4
4
4

1
1
1

5
5
5

3.44
2.51
4.05

1.111
1.049
.974

122

4

1

5

3.33

1.000

146

4

1

5

2.76

1.228

135

4

1

5

2.85

1.175

144

4

1

5

2.72

1.233

144

4

1

5

3.53

1.122

99
141

4
4

1
1

5
5

2.28
2.63

1.000
1.155

148

4

1

5

4.02

1.128

130

4

1

5

2.72

1.093

143

4

1

5

3.48

1.144

125

4

1

5

3.25

.939

Descriptive Statistics of Turnaround Activity Responses (continued)

Loaned money/asked for
subvention [aid or support] for
reorganization purposes
Privatized Services
Increased average price of
services/levying money
Redefined core missions
Ensured high quality of services
Improved the local authority’s
internal and external image
Introduced new ways of
implementation
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in the
local authority
Replaced the chief executive
officer
Changed the internal local authority
structure
Replaced senior and middle
managers
Took centralization steps
Took decentralization steps
Increased time and efforts in
researching consumers’ needs
Increased time and efforts in
becoming a learning
organization
Made changes in human resources
management style
Reshaped and improved the
organizational culture and
climate
Invested in staff skills training
Defined a common vision of the

n

Rang
e

Minimum

Maximum

Mea
n

Std.
Dev.

98

4

1

5

2.41

1.054

4

1

5

2.59

1.053

4

1

5

3.12

0.952

4

1

5

3.55

1.144

4

1

5

3.74

1.141

4

1

5

3.87

1.16

4

1

5

3.73

0.985

4

1

5

3.59

1.241

4

1

5

4.73

0.668

4

1

5

4.31

0.865

4

1

5

4.42

0.908

4

1

5

3.73

1.059

4

1

5

2.76

1.098

4

1

5

3.45

1.154

14
4

4

1

5

3.66

1.085

14
4

4

1

5

2.78

1.381

14
6

4

1

5

3.3

1.299

4

1

5

3.21

1.13

4

1

5

3.63

1.218

11
2
11
6
13
5
14
5
14
9
14
3
14
6
13
8
14
7
14
6
13
5
13
0
14
5

14
7
14

local authority
Diagnosed the local authority
strengths and weaknesses
Formulated an organizational
working plan

7
14
8
14
3

4

1

5

3.56

1.263

4

1

5

3.52

1.244

Descriptive Statistics of Turnaround Activity Responses (continued)

How major was the violation of
trust
Rating the "success" of the
turnaround to date
Valid n (listwise)

n
14
5
14
8

Rang
e

Minimum

Maximum

Mea
n

Std.
Dev.

4

1

5

4.59

0.862

4

1

5

4

1.1

98

Pearson’s correlation coefficient.	
  
Correlation is an important type of statistical analysis that focuses upon the
strength and/or direction of a relationship between two variables (Newton & Rudestam,
1999). As a result, the analysis explains whether two variables are related, how strongly,
and even how the variables are connected. The relationship is reported as a correlation
coefficient somewhere between 0.0 and 1.0 for positive correlations and 0.0 to -1.0 for
negative correlations (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). For the purpose of this research, the
analysis used Dancey and Reidy’s (2004) categorization about the strength of the
correlation. Therefore a correlation coefficient of 1.0 is considered a perfect correlation,
therefore an exact relationship between the variables (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). Dancey
and Reidy (2004) defined a strong correlation as a relationship of 0.7 to 0.9, which can
also be listed as 70-99%. A moderate correlation is from 0.4 to 0.6, providing the strength
of the relationship of 40-69% (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). A weak relationship or weak
correlation is calculated as 0.1 to 0.3, therefore roughly 10-39% (Dancey & Reidy, 2004).
If the correlation coefficient is roughly 0 or less then 0.1, there is no relationship between
the variables (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). A negative relationship utilizes the same
correlation coefficients, but has negative values (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). Therefore, if a

negative correlation exists, when one variable increases, the other decreases – the
relationship moves in opposite directions. The significance is determined by whether the
population correlation coefficient is different from the calculated correlation coefficient.
For a correlation to be considered statistically significant, it must be at least 0.05 or
smaller (Newton & Rudestam, 1999).
Hypothesis 1 – Accepted.	
  
Hypothesis 1 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of
turnaround in reorganization activities and all faculty, staff, and administrative
employees. This hypothesis served to test the assumption that Reorganization Activities
had a mutual relationship and connection with the faculty, staff, and administration’s
perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date at the university in question. These
activities included: replaced the chief executive officer, changed the internal local
authority structure, replaced senior and middle managers, took centralization steps, took
decentralization steps, increased time and efforts in researching consumers’ needs,
increased time and efforts in becoming a learning organization, made changes in human
resources management style, reshaped and improved the organizational culture and
climate, invested in staff skills training, defined a common vision of the local authority,
diagnosed the local authority strengths and weaknesses, formulated an organizational
working plan, and fought the denial and resistance of employees (Beeri, 2009). The full
correlation matrix (See Appendix F: Additional Statistical Tables and Matrices)
illustrates the relationships between the individual activities and the perception of the
“success” of the turnaround. Several of the different activities showed statistically

significant correlations to each other. Items with statistically strong correlation, therefore
0.7-0.9 or better per Dancey and Reidy (2004) included:
Table 15	
  
Hypothesis 1: Strong Correlations
Defined a
common
vision of
the local
authority
Defined a common
vision of the
local authority

Diagnosed the local
authority
strengths and
weaknesses
Formulated an
organizational
working plan

Pearson
Correlation
Sig.(2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.(2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig.(2tailed)
n

Diagnosed the
local authority
strengths &
weaknesses

Formulated an
organizational
working plan

.774**

.739**

.000

.000

146

143

.774**

.799**

.000

.000

146

143

.739**

.799**

.000

.000

143

143

Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Activities with statistically significant moderate correlation with strengths of the
correlation ranging from 0.4-0.6 per Dancey and Reidy (2004) included:

Table 16	
  
Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations
Changed
the internal
local
authority
structure

Replaced
senior and
middle
managers

Took
centralization
steps

.467**

.559**

.278**

.000

.000

.002

136

136

125

.467**

.658**

.409**

.000

.000

.000

136

144

134

Replaced
the chief
executive
officer
Replaced the
chief
executive
officer
Changed the
internal
local
authority
structure
Replaced
senior and
middle
managers
Took
centralization steps

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
n

.559**

.658**

.462**

.000

.000

.000

136

144

133

.278**

.409**

.462**

.002

.000

.000

125
134
Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

133

Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued)

Changed the
internal local
authority
structure
Replaced
senior and
middle
managers
Took
centralizatio
n steps

Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n

Increased
time and
efforts in
researchin
g
consumers
’ needs

Increased
time and
efforts in
becoming a
learning
organizatio
n

Made
changes in
human
resources
managemen
t style

Reshaped and
improved the
organizationa
l culture and
climate

.333**

.285**

.258**

.224**

.000

.001

.002

.007

144

143

143

143

.308**

.237**

.208*

.186*

.000

.005

.013

.026

142

141

141

143

.201*

.220*

.252**

.020

.011

.004

134

133

131

Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued)

Invest
-ed in
staff
skills
training
Changed
the
internal
local
authority
structure
Replaced
senior
and
middle
managers
Took
centralization
steps

Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n

Defined
a
common
Diagnosed
vision
the local
of the
authority
local
strengths
authoriand
ty
weaknesses

Formulated
an
organization
-al working
plan

Rating
the
"success"
of the
turnaround to
date

.274**

.343**

.238**

.210*

.252**

.001

.000

.004

.012

.002

145

146

146

142

145

.200*

.301**

.243**

.229**

.282**

.017

.000

.003

.006

.001

143

145

145

141

144

.210*

.243**

.221*

.015

.005

.011

134

135

133

Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued)
Changed the
internal local
authori
-ty
structu
-re
Took
decentralization
steps
Increased
time and
efforts
in
researching
consumers’
needs
Increased
time &
efforts
in becoming a
learning
organiza
-tion
Made
changes
in HR
mgmt
style

Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n

Replaced
senior
and
middle
manage
-rs

Took
centralizatio
n
steps

Took
decentra
-lization
steps

Increased time
and
efforts
research
-ing
consumers’
needs

Increased
time and
efforts in
becomeng a
learning
organizati
-on

.364**

.252**

.000

.004

129

128

.333**

.308**

.201*

.364**

.631**

.000

.000

.020

.000

.000

144

142

134

129

143

.285**

.237**

.220*

.252**

.631**

.001

.005

.011

.004

.000

143

141

133

128

143

.258**

.208*

*

.284**

.422**

.440**

.002

.013

.004

.001

.000

.000

143
141
131
127
Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

140

139

Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n

Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n

.252*

Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued)
Resha
-ped
&
impro
-ved
the
organ
izational
culture &
climate

Made changes
in human
resources
management
style
Took
Pearson
decentra- Correlatio
.284**
lization n
steps
Sig. (2.001
tailed)
n
127
Increased
Pearson
time and Correlatio
efforts in n
research- Sig. (2ing
tailed)
consum- n
ers’ needs
Increased
Pearson
time and Correlatio
efforts in n
becoming Sig. (2a learning tailed)
organiza- n
tion
Made
Pearson
changes in Correlatio
human
n
resources Sig. (2manage- tailed)
ment style n

Invest
-ed in
staff
skills
training

Defin
-ed a
comm
-on
vision
of the
local
authority

Diagnos
-ed the
local
authority
strength
-s and
weaknesses

Formula
-ted an
organiza
-tional
working
plan

.365**

.340**

.255**

.215*

.000

.000

.003

.015

129

130

130

128

.422**

.576**

.516**

.623**

.646**

.622**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

140

143

143

144

145

141

.440**

.612**

.554**

.648**

.610**

.580**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

139

142

142

143

144

140

.536**

.506**

.387**

.314**

.340**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

140

141

142

143

139

Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Rating
the
"success"
of
the
turnaround to
date
.21
2*
.01
6
12
8
.55
4**
.00
0
14
3
.45
2**
.00
0
14
2
.30
0**
.00
0
14
2

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued)

Chang
-ed
the
internal
local
author
-ity
structure

Replaced
senior
and
middl
e
manag
-ers

Took
centr
-alizatio
n
steps

Took decentralization
steps

Reshaped
Pearson
.365*
and
Correlatio .224** .186*
*
improve- n
ed the
Sig. (2.007
.026
.000
organi- tailed)
zational n
culture
143
143
129
and
climate
Invested in Pearson
staff skills Correlatio .274** .200* .210*
training n
Sig. (2.001
.017
.015
tailed)
n
145
143
134
Defined a
Pearson
.243* .340*
**
**
common Correlatio .343
.301
*
*
vision of n
the local Sig. (2.000
.000
.005 .000
authority tailed)
n
146
145
135
130
Diagnosed Pearson
.255*
the local Correlatio .238** .243**
*
authority n
strengths Sig. (2.004
.003
.003
and weak- tailed)
nesses
n
146
145
130
Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Increa
-sed
time
&
effortts in
resear
-ching
consumers’
needs

Increas
-ed
time
and
efforts
in
becom
-ing a
learning
organization

Made
changes in
human
resources
manage
-ment
style

.576**

.612**

.536**

.000

.000

.000

143

142

140

.516**

.554**

.506**

.000

.000

.000

143

142

141

.623**

.648**

.387**

.000

.000

.000

144

143

142

.646**

.610**

.314**

.000

.000

.000

145

144

143

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued)
Resha
-ped
&
impro
-ved
org
culture &
climate
Reshaped
&
improved the
org
culture
/ climate
Invested
in staff
skills
training

Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n

Invest
-ed in
staff
skills
training

Defined a
comm
-on
vision
of the
local
author
-ity

Diagn
-osed
the
local
author
-ity
streng
-ths
and
weaknesses

Formu
-lated
an
organizational
working
plan

**

**

**

**

.613

.607

.599

Fought
the
denial
and
resistance of
employ
-ees

Rating
the
"success"
of
the
turnaround to
date
.531*

.581

*

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

143

144

145

141

144

.613**

.509**

.483**

.490**

.181*

.000

.000

.000

.000

.037

.000

141

133

145

143
145
145
Defined a
comm
.607** .509**
.774**
vision
of the
.000
.000
.000
local
author144
145
146
ity
Diagnose Pearson
d local Correlatio .599** .483** .774**
author- n
ity
Sig. (2.000
.000
.000
streng- tailed)
ths/
n
weak145
145
146
nesses
Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

.739**

.381*
*

.493*
*

.000

.000

143

145

.799**

.533*
*

.000

.000

143

146

Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued)

Changed
the
intern
-al
local
author
-ity
structure

Replac
-ed
senior
and
middle
manag
-ers

Too
k
centr
alization
steps

Increa
-sed
Increas time
-ed
and
time
efforts Made
and
in
changefforts becom
es in
in
-ing a human
Took resear- learni- resourdeceching
ng
ces
ntraliza consu- orga- manage
-tion
mers’
ni-ment
steps
needs zation
style

Formulat- Pearson
ed an
Correlatio .210* .229**
.215*
organi- n
zatioSig. (2.012
.006
.015
nal
tailed)
worki- n
142
141
128
ng plan
Fought
Pearson
the
Correlatio
denial
n
and
Sig. (2resisttailed)
ance of n
employ
-ees
Rating
Pearson
the
Correlatio .252** .282** .221* .212*
"sucn
cess"
Sig. (2.002
.001
.011
.016
of the
tailed)
turnn
around
145
144
133
128
to date
Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

.622**

.580**

.340**

.000

.000

.000

141

140

139

.237**
.006
133
.554**

.452**

.300**

.000

.000

.000

143

142

142

Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued)
Defin- Diagno
ed a
-sed the
comm
local
-on
authorvision
ity’s
of the strength
local
-s and
author weak-ity
nesses

Reshaped
Invest
and
-ed in
improved the staff
organizaskills
tional culture trainand climate
ing
Pearson
Correlatio .581** .490**
n
Sig. (2.000
.000
tailed)
n
141
141
Pearson
Correlatio
n
Sig. (2tailed)
n

Fought
the
Formulat denial
-ed and
and
organiza resistt-ional
ance of
working employ
plan
-ees

Formulated an
.739**
.799**
organizational
.000
.000
working
plan
143
143
Fought the
denial
and
resistance of
employees
Rating the Pearson
"sucCorrelatio .531** .381** .493**
.533**
cess" of n
the turn- Sig. (2.000
.000
.000
.000
around tailed)
to date n
144
145
145
146
Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Rating
the
"succe
-ss" of
the
turnaround to
date
.495
**

.000
142

.495**
.000
142

The correlations between the various activities and rating the “success” of the perception
of the turnaround to date were weakly (therefore 0.1-0.3) to moderately (therefore 0.40.6) correlated with statistically significant correlations ranging from 21.2% to 55.4%
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004).

Table 17	
  
Hypothesis 1: Correlations Between Activities and Success of the Turnaround

The majority of the reorganization activities were positively correlated with rating the
perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date.
Hypothesis 2 – Accepted.	
  
Hypothesis 2 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of
stronger financial controls and faculty, staff, and administrative employees, therefore that
the members of the university as a whole saw an increase in financial controls across the
university. Though there was no published data before regarding how many financial
controls existed within the university, the perception of an increase was studied. In
examining the relationship between creating stronger financial controls and faculty, staff,
and administration, based upon the frequency of responses (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,”
and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 75.8% of respondents (110 of 145 valid responses) agreed that
the university had created stronger financial controls, indicating a strong relationship
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 4.05 and a standard deviation of .974, the effect
size is 0.97674 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size.

Table 18	
  
Created Stronger Financial Controls
Frequency Percent
Valid
1
2
1.2
2
10
6.1
3
23
14.0
4
54
32.9
5
56
34.1
Total
145
88.4
Missing 0
18
11.0
System
1
.6
Total
19
11.6
Total
164
100.0

Valid Percent
1.4
6.9
15.9
37.2
38.6
100.0

Cumulative Percent
1.4
8.3
24.1
61.4
100.0

Table 19	
  
Hypothesis 2: Descriptive Statistics
n
Created stronger
financial controls
Describe your position
at [the university]
Valid n (listwise)

Minimum Maximum Mean

Std. Dev.

145

1

5

4.05

.974

149

1

5

3.06

1.170

137

Table 20	
  
Hypothesis 2: Correlations

Created stronger
financial controls
Describe your position
at [the university]

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n

Created stronger Describe your position
financial controls
at [the university]
1
-.207*
.015
145
137
-.207*
1
.015
137
149

Note.
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Created stronger financial

controls” and the “Describe your position at [the university]” were statistically significant
at the 0.05 level. While there was a slight negative correlation, this is likely because of
how the data was coded in SPSS. Individuals that identified as completely or mostly
administrative were coded as “1,” individuals that identified as half administrative and
half faculty were coded as “2,” individuals that identified as completely or mostly faculty
were coded as “3,” and individuals that identified as completely or mostly staff were
coded as “4.” This negative correlation indicates that while 75.8% of respondents (110 of
145 valid responses) agreed that the university had created stronger financial controls,
this was noticed more by those individuals that were either part of administration or
closer to administration, higher on the organizational hierarchy.
Hypothesis 3 – Accepted.	
  
Hypothesis 3 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of
extending new marketing efforts to new consumers and faculty, staff, and administrative
employees. By examining the frequency of the responses of members of university
faculty, staff, and administration (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”),
79.0% of respondents (117 of 148 valid responses) agreed that the university had
extended or increased marketing efforts to new consumers, indicating a strong
relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 4.02 and a standard deviation of
1.128, the effect size is 0.92949 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large”
effect size.
Table 21	
  
Extended Marketing Efforts (Reaching Out) to New Consumers
Valid

1

Frequency Percent
7
4.3

Valid Percent
4.7

Cumulative Percent
4.7

2
3
4
5
Total
Missing 0
System
Total
Total

13
11
56
61
148
15
1
16
164

7.9
6.7
34.1
37.2
90.2
9.1
.6
9.8
100.0

8.8
7.4
37.8
41.2
100.0

13.5
20.9
58.8
100.0

Table 22	
  
Hypothesis 3: Descriptive Statistics
n
Minimum Maximum
Describe your position
149
1
5
at [the university]
Extended marketing
efforts (reaching out)
148
1
5
to new consumers
Valid n (listwise)
144

Mean

Std. Dev.

3.06

1.170

4.02

1.128

Table 23 	
  
Hypothesis 3: Correlations	
  
Describe your
position at [the
university]

Extended marketing
efforts (reaching out) to
new consumers

Describe your position
at [the university]

Pearson
1
-.065
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.437
n
149
144
Extended marketing
Pearson
-.065
1
efforts (reaching out) Correlation
to new consumers
Sig. (2-tailed)
.437
n
144
148
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Extended marketing
efforts (reaching out) to new customers” and the “Describe your position at [the
university]” was not statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation

of 6.5%, due to the lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered
valid.
Hypothesis 4 – Accepted.	
  
Hypothesis 4 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of
improving the local authority’s internal and external image and all faculty, staff, and
administrative employees. By examining the frequency of the responses of members of
university faculty, staff, and administration (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is
“somewhat”), 75.2% of respondents (112 of 149 valid responses) agreed that the
university had improved the university’s internal and external image, indicating a strong
relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.87 and a standard deviation of
1.160 the effect size is 0.92070 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large”
effect size.

Table 24	
  
Improved the Local Authority’s Internal and External Image
Frequency Percent
Valid
1
10
6.1
2
12
7.3
3
15
9.1
4
63
38.4
5
49
29.9
Total
149
90.9
Missing 0
14
8.5
System
1
.6
Total
15
9.1
Total
164
100.0

Valid Percent
6.7
8.1
10.1
42.3
32.9
100.0

Cumulative Percent
6.7
14.8
24.8
67.1
100.0

Table 25	
  
Hypothesis 4: Descriptive Statistics
n
Minimum Maximum
Describe your position
149
1
5
at [the university]
Improved the local
authority’s internal
149
1
5
and external image
Valid n (listwise)
148

Mean

Std. Dev.

3.06

1.170

3.87

1.160

Table 26	
  
Hypothesis 4: Correlations
Describe your
position at [the
university]

Improved the local
authority’s internal and
external image

Describe your position at Pearson
1
-.143
[the university]
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.084
n
149
148
Improved the local
Pearson
-.143
1
authority’s internal and Correlation
external image
Sig. (2-tailed)
.084
n
148
149
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Improved the local

authority’s internal and external image” and the “Describe your position at [the
university]” was not statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation
of 14.3%, due to the lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered
valid.
Hypothesis 5 – Accepted & Accepted.	
  
Hypothesis 5 stated that a moderate correlation between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholder trust in the local authority and those employees considered mostly
staff or mostly faculty existed. By examining the frequency of the responses of members
of the university that identified their positions as completely/mostly faculty, (‘5’ is “to a
very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 75.9% of respondents (41 of 54 valid
responses) agreed that the university had rebuilt stakeholder trust, indicating a strong
relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.59 and a standard deviation of
1.281 the effect size is 0.89277 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large”
effect size.
Table 27	
  
Rebuilt Stakeholders Trust in the Local Authority – Faculty
Valid 1
2
3
4
5
Total

Frequency Percent
8
14.8
3
5.6
2
3.7
31
57.4
10
18.5
54
100.0

Valid Percent
14.8
5.6
3.7
57.4
18.5
100.0

Cumulative Percent
14.8
20.4
24.1
81.5
100.0

By examining the frequency of the responses of members of the university that identified
their positions as completely/mostly staff, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is
“somewhat”), 62.2% of respondents (28 of 45 valid responses) agreed that the university
had rebuilt stakeholder trust, indicating a moderate relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004).

With a mean of 3.62 and a standard deviation of 1.284 the effect size is 0.89385
(rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size.
Table 28	
  
Rebuilt Stakeholders Trust in the Local Authority – Staff
Valid

1
2
3
4
5
Total
Missing 0
Total

Frequency Percent
5
10.9
3
6.5
9
19.6
15
32.6
13
28.3
45
97.8
1
2.2
46
100.0

Valid Percent
11.1
6.7
20.0
33.3
28.9
100.0

Cumulative Percent
11.1
17.8
37.8
71.1
100.0

Table 29	
  
Hypothesis 5: Descriptive Statistics
n
Describe your position
at [the university]
Rebuilt stakeholders
trust in the local
authority
Valid n (listwise)

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std. Dev.

149

1

5

3.06

1.170

146

1

5

3.59

1.241

144

Table 30	
  
Hypothesis 5: Correlations

Describe your position
at [the university]
Rebuilt stakeholders
trust in the local
authority

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n

Describe
your position
at [the
university]

Rebuilt stakeholders
trust in the local
authority

1

-.181*

149

.030
144

-.181*

1

.030
144

146

Note.
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Rebuilt stakeholders trust
in the local authority” and the “Describe your position at [the university]” were
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. While there was a slight negative correlation, this
result is likely because of how the data was coded in SPSS. Individuals that identified as
completely or mostly administrative were coded as “1,” individuals that identified as half
administrative and half faculty were coded as “2,” individuals that identified as
completely or mostly faculty were coded as “3,” and individuals that identified as
completely or mostly staff were coded as “4.” This negative correlation indicates that
while 69.7% of respondents (69 of 99 valid responses) agreed that the university had
rebuilt stakeholders trust in the local authority, this was noticed more by those individuals
that were either part of administration or closer to administration, higher on the
organizational hierarchy.

Hypothesis 6 – Accepted & Accepted.	
  
Hypothesis 6 stated that a moderate correlation existed between a perception of
reshaping and improving the organizational culture and climate and faculty and staff
employees. By examining the frequency of the responses of members of the university
that identified their positions as completely/mostly faculty, (‘5’ is “to a very large
extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 51.9% of respondents (28 of 54 valid responses) agreed
that the university had reshaped and improved the organizational culture and climate,
indicating a moderate relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.22 and a
standard deviation of 1.327, the effect size is 0.86397 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this
suggests a “large” effect size.
Table 31	
  
Reshaped and Improved the Organizational Culture and Climate – Faculty
Valid 1
2
3
4
5
Total

Frequency Percent
6
11.1
14
25.9
6
11.1
18
33.3
10
18.5
54
100.0

Valid Percent
11.1
25.9
11.1
33.3
18.5
100.0

Cumulative Percent
11.1
37.0
48.1
81.5
100.0

By examining the frequency of the responses of members of the university that identified
their positions as completely/mostly staff, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is
“somewhat”), 52.4% of respondents (22 of 42 valid responses) agreed that the university
had reshaped and improved the organizational culture and climate, indicating a moderate
relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.26 and a standard deviation of
1.251, the effect size is 0.87891 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large”
effect size.

Table 32	
  
Reshaped and Improved the Organizational Culture and Climate – Staff
Valid

1
2
3
4
5
Total
Missing 0
Total

Frequency Percent
5
10.9
7
15.2
8
17.4
16
34.8
6
13.0
42
91.3
4
8.7
46
100.0

Valid Percent
11.9
16.7
19.0
38.1
14.3
100.0

Cumulative Percent
11.9
28.6
47.6
85.7
100.0

Table 33	
  
Hypothesis 6: Descriptive Statistics
n
Describe your position
at [the university]
Reshaped and improved
the organizational
culture and climate
Valid n (listwise)

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std. Dev.

149

1

5

3.06

1.170

146

1

5

3.30

1.299

145

Table 34	
  
Hypothesis 6: Correlations
Describe your
position at [the
university]
1

Describe your position Pearson Correlation
at [the university] Sig. (2-tailed)
n
149
Reshaped & improved Pearson Correlation
-.216**
the organizational Sig. (2-tailed)
.009
culture & climate
n
145
Note.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Reshaped & improved
organizational culture
& climate
-.216**
.009
145
1
146

The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Reshaped and improved
the organizational culture and climate” and the “Describe your position at [the

university]” were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While there was a negative
correlation, this is likely because of how the data was coded in SPSS. Individuals that
identified as completely or mostly administrative were coded as “1,” individuals that
identified as half administrative and half faculty were coded as “2,” individuals that
identified as completely or mostly faculty were coded as “3,” and individuals that
identified as completely or mostly staff were coded as “4.” This negative correlation
indicates that while 52.08% of respondents (50 of 96 valid responses) agreed that the
university had reshaped and improved the organizational culture and climate, this was
noticed more by those individuals that were either part of administration or closer to
administration, higher on the organizational hierarchy.
Hypothesis 7 – Rejected.	
  
Hypothesis 7 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the level of participation in
extracurricular activities on campus.
Table 35	
  
Hypothesis 7: Descriptive Statistics
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in
the local authority
Level of participation in
extracurriculars on
campus
Valid n (listwise)

n

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Dev.

146

1

5

3.59

1.241

149

1

8

4.74

2.067

144

Table 36	
  
Hypothesis 7: Correlations
Rebuilt
Level of participation
stakeholders trust in extracurriculars on
in the local
campus

authority
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in Pearson
the local authority
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n
Level of participation in
Pearson
extracurriculars on
Correlation
campus
Sig. (2-tailed)
n

1

-.110

146

.190
144

-.110

1

.190
144

149

The statistical calculations of correlation between “Rebuild stakeholders trust in the local
authority” and the “Level of participation in extracurricular activities on campus” was not
statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation of 11%, due to the
lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid.
In an effort to determine if appropriate statistical significance could be achieved,
the data was again calculated by regrouping extracurricular activities to match the
response scale (1-5) of rebuilding stakeholder trust. Using a maximum of 5 for all values
of extracurricular activities, therefore grouping the responses of attending an average of
2, 1, or less than 1 extracurricular activities into one set of responses, the data
calculations were as follows.

Table 37	
  
Hypothesis 7: Descriptive Statistics

Rebuilt stakeholders
trust in the local
authority
Level of participation in
extracurriculars on
campus
Valid n (listwise)

n

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std.
Dev.

146

1

5

3.59

1.241

149

1

5

4.08

1.459

144

Table 38	
  
Hypothesis 7: Correlations
Rebuilt stakeholders Level of participation
trust in local
in extracurriculars on
authority
campus
Rebuilt stakeholders
Pearson
trust in local authority Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
n
Level of participation in Pearson
extracurriculars on
Correlation
campus
Sig. (2tailed)
n

1

-.095
.255

146

144

-.095

1

.255
144

149

The statistical calculations of correlation between “Rebuild stakeholders trust in the local
authority” and the “Level of participation in extracurricular activities on campus”
regrouped were also not statistically significant. While there was a slight negative
correlation of 9.5%, due to the lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not
considered valid.
Hypothesis 8 – Rejected.

Hypothesis 8 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the number of hours per week
employees spend on campus executing their specific job duties.
Table 39	
  
Hypothesis 8: Descriptive Statistics

n

Valid
Missing

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Percentile 10
s
20
25
30
40
50
60
70
75
80
90

Rebuilt stakeholders trust in the
local authority
146
18
3.59
4.00
1.241
1
5
1.00
2.40
3.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
5.00
5.00

Hours a week on campus
executing job
148
16
3.65
3.00
2.407
1
11
1.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
5.20
7.10

Table 40	
  
Rebuilt Stakeholders Trust in the Local Authority
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 1
16
9.8
11.0
11.0
2
13
7.9
8.9
19.9
3
19
11.6
13.0
32.9
4
65
39.6
44.5
77.4
5
33
20.1
22.6
100.0
Total
146
89.0
100.0
Missing 0
17
10.4
System
1
.6
Total
18
11.0
Total
164
100.0
Table 41	
  
Hours a Week on Campus Executing Job
Valid

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Total
Missing 0
System
Total
Total

Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
27
16.5
18.2
18.2
21
12.8
14.2
32.4
44
26.8
29.7
62.2
20
12.2
13.5
75.7
7
4.3
4.7
80.4
11
6.7
7.4
87.8
4
2.4
2.7
90.5
6
3.7
4.1
94.6
1
.6
.7
95.3
4
2.4
2.7
98.0
3
1.8
2.0
100.0
148
90.2
100.0
15
9.1
1
.6
16
9.8
164
100.0

Table 42	
  
Hypothesis 8: Correlations

Rebuilt stakeholders trust Pearson
in the local authority
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n
Hours a week on campus Pearson
executing job
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n

Rebuilt stakeholders
trust in the local
authority

Hours a week on
campus executing
job

1

-.092

146

.277
143

-.092

1

.277
143

148

The statistical calculations of correlation between “Rebuild stakeholders trust in the local
authority” and the “Hours worked per week on campus executing job” was not
statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation of 9.2%, due to the
lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid.
Hypothesis 9 – Accepted.	
  
Hypothesis 9 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of
redefining the core mission and all faculty, staff, and administrative employees. By
examining the frequency of the responses of members of the university, (‘5’ is “to a very
large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 65.9% of respondents (89 of 135 valid responses)
agreed that the university had redefined core missions, indicating a moderate relationship
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.55 and a standard deviation of 1.144, the
effect size is 0.90996 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size.

Table 43	
  
Redefined Core Missions
Frequency Percent
Valid
1
12
7.3
2
13
7.9
3
21
12.8
4
67
40.9
5
22
13.4
Total
135
82.3
Missing 0
28
17.1
System
1
.6
Total
29
17.7
Total
164
100.0

Valid Percent
8.9
9.6
15.6
49.6
16.3
100.0

Cumulative Percent
8.9
18.5
34.1
83.7
100.0

Table 44	
  
Hypothesis 9: Descriptive Statistics
n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Describe your position at [the university] 149
1
5
3.06
1.170
Redefined core missions
135
1
5
3.55
1.144
Valid n (listwise)
134
Table 45	
  
Hypothesis 9: Correlations

Describe your position at
[the university]
Redefined core missions

Describe your position
at [the university]

Redefined core
missions

1

-.204*

149

.018
134

-.204*

1

.018
134

135

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n

Note.
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Redefined core missions”

and the “Describe your position at [the university]” were statistically significant at the
0.05 level. While there was a negative correlation, this is likely because of how the data
was coded in SPSS. Individuals that identified as completely or mostly administrative
were coded as “1,” individuals that identified as half administrative and half faculty were
coded as “2,” individuals that identified as completely or mostly faculty were coded as
“3,” and individuals that identified as completely or mostly staff were coded as “4.” This
negative correlation indicates that while 65.9% of respondents (89 of 135 valid
responses) agreed that the university had redefined core missions, this was noticed more
by those individuals that were either part of administration or closer to administration,
higher on the organizational hierarchy.
Hypothesis 10 – Accepted, Accepted, & Accepted.	
  
Hypothesis 10 stated that a positive correlation existed between defining a
common vision of the local authority and the levels of management. By examining the
frequency of the responses of members of the university that defined themselves as
upper/middle management, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 80%
of respondents (8 of 10 valid responses) agreed that the university had defined a common
vision of the local authority, indicating a strong relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004).
With a mean of 4.20 and a standard deviation of .789, the effect size is 0.96647
(rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size.

Table 46	
  
Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority – Upper Management

Valid

3
4
5
Total

Percent
20.0
40.0
40.0
100.0

Valid
Percent
20.0
40.0
40.0
100.0

n

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std.
Dev.

10

1

4

1.60

1.265

10

3

5

4.20

.789

Frequency
2
4
4
10

Cumulative
Percent
20.0
60.0
100.0

Table 47	
  
Hypothesis 10: Descriptive Statistics

Describe your position at [the
university]
Defined a common vision of the
local authority
Valid n (listwise)

10

Table 48	
  
Hypothesis 10: Correlations
Describe your position at Redefined core
[the university]
missions
Describe your position at
[the university]
Redefined core missions

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n

1

.195

10

.590
10

.195

1

.590
10

10

The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Redefined core missions”
and the “Describe your position at [the university] (upper management only)” was not

statistically significant. While there was a positive correlation of 59%, due to the lack of
sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid.
Hypothesis 10 stated that a positive correlation existed between defining a
common vision of the local authority and the levels of management. By examining the
frequency of the responses of members of the university that defined themselves as junior
management, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 66.6% of
respondents (14 of 21 valid responses) agreed that the university had defined a common
vision of the local authority, indicating a strong relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004).
With a mean of 3.57 and a standard deviation of 1.469 the effect size is 0.86431
(rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size.
Table 49	
  
Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority – Junior Management
Valid 1
2
3
4
5
Total

Frequency Percent
3
14.3
3
14.3
1
4.8
7
33.3
7
33.3
21
100.0

Valid Percent
14.3
14.3
4.8
33.3
33.3
100.0

Cumulative Percent
14.3
28.6
33.3
66.7
100.0

Table 50	
  
Hypothesis 10: Descriptive Statistics
n
Describe your position at
[the university]
Defined a common vision
of the local authority
Valid n (listwise)
Table 51	
  
Hypothesis 10: Correlations

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std. Dev.

21

1

4

2.67

1.197

21

1

5

3.57

1.469

21

Describe your position
at [the university]
Redefined core
missions

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n

Describe your
position at [the
university]

Redefined core
missions

1

.152

21

.548
18

.152

1

.548
18

18

The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Redefined core missions”
and the “Describe your position at [the university] (junior management only)” was not
statistically significant. While there was a positive correlation of 54.8%, due to the lack
of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid.
Hypothesis 10 stated that a positive correlation existed between defining a
common vision of the local authority and the levels of management. By examining the
frequency of the responses of members of the university that defined themselves as
individuals that do not manage other employees, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is
“somewhat”), 60.7% of respondents (56 of 92 valid responses) agreed that the university
had defined a common vision of the local authority, indicating a moderate relationship
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.64 and a standard deviation of 1.163, the
effect size is 0.91129 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size.
Table 52	
  
Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority – Non-Managing
Valid

1
2
3

Frequency
6
9
21

Percent
6.3
9.5
22.1

Valid Percent
6.5
9.8
22.8

Cumulative Percent
6.5
16.3
39.1

4
5
Total
Missing 0
Total

32
24
92
3
95

33.7
25.3
96.8
3.2
100.0

34.8
26.1
100.0

73.9
100.0

Table 53	
  
Hypothesis 10: Descriptive Statistics

Describe your position at [the university]
Defined a common vision of the local
authority
Valid n (listwise)

n Minimum Maximum Mean
95
1
4
3.07

Std.
Dev
.866

92

1.163

1

5

3.64

92

Table 54	
  
Hypothesis 10: Correlations

Describe your position at
[the university]
Redefined core missions

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n

Describe your position at
[the university]

Redefined core
missions

1

-.132

95

.226
86

-.132

1

.226
86

86

The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Redefined core missions”
and the “Describe your position at [the university] (non-managing employees only)” was
not statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation of 13.2%, due to
the lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid.
Table 55	
  
Hypotheses Summary

Hypotheses
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Reorganization Activities + Perception by all
employees
Stronger Financial Controls + Perception by all
employees
New Marketing Efforts + Perception by all employees
Improving Internal & External Image + Perception by
all employees
Rebuilding Stakeholder Trust + Mostly Faculty /
Mostly Staff
Reshaping & Improving Organization Climate +
Mostly Faculty / Mostly Staff
Rebuilding Stakeholder Trust + On Campus
Activities Participation
Rebuilding Stakeholder Trust + Hours/Week Spent on
Campus
Redefining Core Mission + Perception by all
employees
Common Vision of the Local Authority + Levels of
Management

Accepted / Rejected
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted
Accepted & Accepted
Accepted & Accepted
Rejected
Rejected
Accepted
Accepted, Accepted,
& Accepted

General analysis.	
  
In addition to the statistical results of the hypotheses provided above, there are
some supplementary results. Overall, respondents to the survey (faculty, staff, and
members of administration) rated the overall “success” of the turnaround to date with
80.4% of respondents (119 of 148 valid responses) agreeing that the university either “4 –
somewhat” or “5 – to a very large extent” had successfully begun the turnaround to date,
indicating a strong result (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 4.00 and a standard
deviation of 1.100, the effect size is 0.93199 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a
“large” effect size.
Table 56	
  
Rating the "Success" of the Turnaround to Date

Frequency Percent
Valid
1
6
3.7
2
15
9.1
3
8
4.9
4
63
38.4
5
56
34.1
Total
148
90.2
Missing 0
15
9.1
System
1
.6
Total
16
9.8
Total
164
100.0

Valid Percent
4.1
10.1
5.4
42.6
37.8
100.0

Cumulative Percent
4.1
14.2
19.6
62.2
100.0

It is also possible to test the assumption that Retrenchment Activities had a
mutual relationship and connection with the faculty, staff, and administration’s
perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date at the university in question. These
activities included: contracted activities and services scope, eliminated particular
services, decreased service expenditure, partially/temporarily exited from specific
services, liquidated assets in order to raise capital, reduced/suspended capital
expenditures, closed down public organizations, created stronger financial controls, and
decreased financial support to other organizations (Beeri, 2009).
The correlations between the various activities and rating the “success” of the perception
of the turnaround to date were weakly (therefore 0.1-0.3), negatively correlated with
statistically significant correlations ranging from -16.6% to -26.1% (Dancey & Reidy,
2004).
Table 57	
  
Success of the Turnaround to Date and Retrenchment Activities: Correlations

The reorganization activities that were statistically significant were negatively correlated
with rating the perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date, indicating that these
activities did not have a positive relationship with the perception of success. The data
indicates that these activities did not support the perception of the success of the
turnaround and possibly may even have detracted from the perception of success.
It is also possible to test the assumption that Repositioning Activities had a
mutual relationship and connection with the faculty, staff, and administration’s
perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date at the university in question. These
activities included: established new services, entered into joint activities/co-operated with
other agencies, extended activities and scope of services, changed the priorities of
traditional activities, rented/sold/mortgaged assets, extended availability of services,
extended marketing efforts (reaching out) to new consumers, increased service
expenditures, modernized capacity of services with equipment utilizing new
technologies, began to provide services/internal services that were previously purchased,
loaned money/asked for subvention for reorganization purposes, privatized services,
increased average price of services/levying money, redefined core missions, ensured high

quality of services, improved the local authority’s internal and external image, introduced
new ways of implementation, rebuilt stakeholders trust in the local authority (Beeri,
2009). The correlations between the various activities and rating the “success” of the
perception of the turnaround to date were weakly (therefore 0.1-0.3) to moderately
(therefore 0.4-0.6) correlated with statistically significant correlations ranging from
20.6% to 61.9% (Dancey & Reidy, 2004).
Table 58	
  
Success of the Turnaround to Date and Repositioning Activities: Correlations

The repositioning activities that were statistically significant were positively correlated
with rating the perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date, indicating that these
activities had a positive relationship with the perception of success. Specifically,
establishing new services, entering into joint activities/co-operated with other agencies,
extending activities and scope of services, extending availability of services, extending
marketing efforts (reaching out) to new consumers, increasing service expenditures,
modernizing capacity of services with equipment utilizing new technologies, beginning
to provide services/internal services that were previously purchased, redefining core
missions, ensuring high quality of services, improving the local authority’s internal and

external image, introducing new ways of implementation, and rebuilding stakeholders
trust in the local authority were positively correlated with the perception of success
(Beeri, 2009). The activity with the highest correlation was “rebuilt stakeholders trust in
the local authority.” This result is a logical extension of the fact that 93.1% of
respondents (135 of 145 valid responses” agreed (“4 – somewhat” or “5 – to a very large
extent”) that the events prior to the turnaround were a major violation of trust (see above
for data table).

	
  
	
  
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations	
  

In the 2011-2012 academic year, a small, regional, public university in the upper
Midwest under study experienced an organizational trauma after an ethical breech,
demanding change. After an external audit was completed, it was determined that the
special, short-term international programs were granting degrees that failed appropriate
degree standards (The Associated Press, 2012; Donovan, 2012a; Donovan, 2012b). Over
740 degrees were awarded to students within the program and more than 500 of those
degrees lacked sufficient documentation to prove that the students actually earned the
degree, earning the university the moniker as a degree mill for Chinese students. In
addition, the former president was terminated for enrollment inflation and countersued,
and the university had a stern compliance, policy, and financial audit, all of which
revealed a number of problems across the university (Finneman, 2012). With enrollment
fraud, improper awarding of degrees, inappropriate handling of public funds, and
incorrect scholarship allocations, the university’s reputation was damaged, employees left
the organization in droves, enrollment plummeted, donors and revenue were lost, and the
former dean took his own life. The university, its management, and the state authority
governing it chose to execute a turnaround to change the organization’s course and save
it. It is that turnaround that this research studied.

As such, this research looked to apply the field of turnaround management to
higher education in the case of a small, regional public institution in the upper Midwest
that had experienced significant organizational upheaval and ethical issues. Overall, the
results were mixed, demonstrating opinions and perceptions of success and failure in the
turnaround. Members of the university, nearly unequivocally, expressed that the issues
that the university faced were highly traumatic and were a major violation of trust.
Faculty, staff, and members of the administration felt betrayed and abused by the former
administration due to the unethical actions as well as their concealment. An unexpected
result of the research was the relatively positive perception of the progress and path of the
turnaround to date with over 80% of the respondents replying that the turnaround was
either somewhat successful or to a very large extent successful. The university leaders
and the state system decided that the organization was worth saving, though its operating
and strategic health demanded change (Hofer, 1980).
Contributions to the academe.	
  
While there has been significant research on turnarounds in the body of
knowledge, this study also provided some interesting additions to the academe. This
research confirmed some “common sense” thoughts regarding the opinions and
perspectives of individuals experiencing a turnaround as well as the impact of violations
of trust on an organization. In addition, it revealed the importance of a common vision
within an organization in transition during a turnaround as well as the need for a strongly
longitudinal approach.
In regards to turnarounds, the common, conventional wisdom would indicate that
the more active and involved individuals were in their organization, the more likely they

would be committed to a turnaround and trust an entity’s progress. Therefore, the
assumption in this research was that the more involved the individual on campus, the
more contact they would have with the university and therefore be more inclined to trust
the organization, management, and the turnaround. However, anecdotally, the research
has shown this convention wisdom might not to be true. The academe should take notice
of the potentially negative impact of individuals being “too” involved in the organization
to trust the turnaround, organization, and management. This involvement can possibly
extend to spending too many hours at the organization above and beyond their job duties
and being so immersed in the system that they become jaded or suspicious of the change.
The more time respondents spent on campus, even doing their job, the less their trust in
the local authority was rebuilt. An anecdotal supposition could be that these individuals
trusted the organization less because of their larger amount of time spent on campus, the
opposite result of expectations and something that should be taken into account when
studying trust as well as executing a turnaround. If employees that are more active and
involved in the organization are the least trusting, the academe should assess why they
are less trusting as well as the communications processes that enabled the situation.
The destruction of trust that can occur in an organization due to scandals is
significant, perhaps even egregious. When a violation of trust is considered “major,”
rebuilding trust in the organization and its management with its employees is vital.
Because trust is so necessary for organizational function and communication, the
destruction of it, especially when it is considered to be an intentional violation by
individuals internal to the organization, is far more insidious (Caldwell et al., 2009;
Denton, 2009; Hirsch, 1978; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Wong & Cummings, 2009). A

difference in faculty and staff opinion in higher education was an interesting compliment
to the academe research because of the difference in relationships driven by the types of
employees within the organization. As faculty are often traditionally more adversarial
with college and university management than staff, the differing opinions of the faculty
and staff are worth further study. A difference in opinion from the different areas of
employees within the organization might indicate a shift in how management understands
the world of academia and bears additional analysis.
Another contribution to the body of knowledge involves how the levels of
management perceived the common vision defined by the university. The common
wisdom of the higher the level of management, the more likely the individuals were to
agree with the vision from upper management was confirmed. However, the disparity in
responses to the various levels of management and responsibility indicated that while
upper and middle management might believe there is a common vision, that information
and concept may not be translated across the university as a whole. Whether it was a lack
of communication or a lack of understanding of the vision, the university as a whole did
not share it. While a majority of respondents did perceive a common vision, there is no
assurances that members of the university understood the same “common vision.” The
difference in communication is another area of research and confirms the necessity for
clear, congruent, and aligned communication across an entire organization with a concise
message shared with both internal and external stakeholders that is consistent at every
level of management and function.
One of the major contributions to the academe was the demonstrated need for
longitudinal studies regarding all facets of a turnaround. While a number of different

facts and perspectives were found at the time of the research, much was uncertain
regarding the longevity and “staying power” of the changes. As a result, a key factor
demonstrated in this research as well as across the body of knowledge was the need for
studies to take place in an organization completing a turnaround over time. For true
assessment of a turnaround as well as the financial, strategic, and operating health of an
entity, longitudinal evaluation and measurement are imperative.
Contributions to the profession.	
  
This research, while providing valuable insight to the specific university under
study, provided insights and encouragement to other institutions of higher education that
need to execute a turnaround to survive and/or thrive. As mentioned above, turnarounds
are not unique to the business or corporate world, but are often necessitated in every
industry. Higher education is no different, therefore the following section provides
broader generalizations of what was learned in the university to apply to other colleges
and universities to complete a turnaround.
Supporting the findings of previous researchers, an overarching conclusion is that
reorganization activities generally supported the success of a turnaround, perhaps in part
because these activities are so visual and public. Changing the president (CEO), the
internal reporting structure, replacing lower and middle managers, and
centralizing/decentralizing decisions as well as university functions are a clear series of
actions that send a message to stakeholders of change (Hofer, 1980; Sims, 2000). While
these items may not provide strong correlations with the success of the turnaround, they
provide very clear and publicized first steps even though the true turnaround cannot be
measured merely by changing the individuals in charge. Instead, Schneider et al. (1996)

provided that leadership must change the mindset of the organizational culture for real,
permanent change. Therefore, the research results support the suppositions that just hiring
and firing upper, middle, and lower management and reorganizing decision makers are
insufficient to alter the hearts and minds of organizational stakeholders, even though the
“old guard” is largely demoted or leaves the organization (Sims, 2000). Higher education,
when faced with the need to execute a turnaround, should complete various
reorganization activities to publically and clearly remove all parties and vestiges of prior
management to pave the way for other turnaround activities as soon as possible. Because
a turnaround is more than a single task, but is instead a series of changes and alterations
made to change the organization’s direction, these steps are the critical beginning that
provides the opening to trust in the transition as well as those spearheading it.
Higher education should then follow up the initial reorganization activities by
formulating an organizational working plan, defining a common vision, and diagnosing
the organization’s strengths and weaknesses, all activities designed to align the
perspectives and focus of a population towards a common goal. As the strongest
correlations between reorganization activities and rating the success of the turnaround in
this research included researching the needs of consumers, becoming a learning
organization, reshaping and improving the culture, defining a common vision, diagnosing
organizational strengths and weaknesses, and formulating a working plan, universities
and colleges in need of a turnaround demand a hard look at their true mission, character,
and goals. By reevaluating the organization’s identity, these activities indicate to the
profession at large that when a university’s management decides to turn the organization
around and alter its trajectory, much of the university community can embrace the desire

to change and believed in “coming together” to solve the entity’s problems. As a result,
faculty, staff, and members of administration can open their minds to working together
with the goal of revitalizing the entity through a common vision and direction, at least at
the time. Institutions of higher education need to move from operating in “crisis mode” to
create a vision of change for a better culture focusing on growing student bodies by not
cutting corners, building strong programs, and aligning the university’s actions with its
mission. The common vision and organizational culture improvement must become a
permanent shift. Higher education can fully engage in turning its institutions around
when they create a cultural change that embraces a single intention that celebrates ethics
and integrity, both publicized and lived by the members of the organization.
When an organization within higher education has financial troubles, it is
especially important that faith and confidence be restored in the university’s finances
because the funds come not only from customers, but from the public at large either
through tax dollars or donations. The message of honesty, integrity, and proper controls
protecting not only the assets but the net value of a college or university must be
understood by the faculty, staff, and members of administration within the organization.
As Slatter and Lovett (1999) emphasized, an entity needs to stabilize from its crisis, have
proper cash management, strong financial controls, and cut costs to go forward in a
turnaround. As a result, the actions of tightening financial controls such as hiring a new
Vice President of Finance/Chief Financial Officer, changing policies, and reorganizing
the financial division can be noticed by the vast majority of employees and support the
turnaround in process.

In higher education as an industry, scandals and organizational strife often results
in decreased student enrollment. To revitalize the university or college and continue
operations, it is important that the institution recruit new customers in the form of
increased enrollment of new students to reverse a net enrollment decrease. If the faculty,
staff, and members of administration have the perception that the university extended its
marketing efforts to new potential consumers throughout the community with various
productive campaigns, the turnaround is more likely to be successful. Yet those
additional marketing efforts will need to be analyzed over time for ongoing trends in any
organization after a turnaround.
After any scandal or trouble, especially in higher education, the potential exists
for tarnished reputation. As such, any turnaround demands that the organization improve
its reputation and image, both internally and externally. Internally, it is important to
restore some of the faith and character of the university with its internal stakeholders –
faculty, staff, and administrative employees. Externally, the community, university
system, region, potential students, and donors have likely lost faith in the college or
university. Because of this fallout, improving the reputation of the institution of higher
education is directly tied to its success in recruiting students as well as supporters of the
organization throughout the university community both at the individual and
organizational level. Therefore, the profession would be wise to look to restore the
internal and external image of the entity, not only to restore trust, but to revitalize their
enrollment, decrease turnover of employees, and recapture lost revenue from donors and
students. The profession should analyze the most appropriate venues and opportunities to
provide a clear, consistent message of change – admitting the organization’s failings as

well as executing and completing exacting steps of correction. It is also important to
assess whether these changes in reputation and trust are viewed as short or long-term
changes to assess the strength of the turnaround over time.
Supporting the overall intention of turning the entity in a new direction after a
series of scandals, the organizational culture must shift away from its dark past. Puffer
and McCarthy (2008) provided that “turning around a company ethically, financially, and
strategically [first] requires a compelling vision to motivate executives and employees”
(p. 305). A culture shift from the previous patterns of behavior driven by the “old guard”
and slipshod controls demands an improved culture with a higher level of trust and
honesty embraced by leadership (Epstein, 2003; Puffer & McCarthy, 2008; Sims, 2000).
For real change in higher education after a turnaround, there must be a reshaping and
improving of the organizational culture and climate. When completing this turnaround,
the college or university must stamp out the previous culture with all force and create a
new, positive, changed culture with openness, trust, honesty, and integrity. This
reformation is supported by removing the “old guard” in its entirety, increasing the
marketing efforts to new consumers, changing the vision and culture, but also increasing
transparency of organizational decisions within the college or university and the
community at large.
Contributions to the university under study.	
  
Overall, roughly 80% of respondents indicated that the university had either
“somewhat” or “to a very large extent” had successfully begun the turnaround to date.
The university did undertake some of the turnaround activities provided in the literature,
though not all. The previous CEO (university president) was removed and a new

president installed with the intention of rooting out the previous administration’s
management style and organizational climate (Hofer, 1980; Sims, 2000). While there
were weak correlations regarding centralization and decentralization activities with the
success of the turnaround, there was significant restructuring of the organization in
regards to moving departments, authority, and function to different areas. Therefore,
while respondents did not perceive these activities as major influences to the turnaround,
they still supported the overall organizational change (Kavanagh, 2008). The survey
instrument did not ask respondents about changing the reward structure or instituting a
Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, and there was no anecdotal evidence that the
university undertook these steps (Ackermann, 2005; Kavanagh, 2008; Meisler, 2004;
Sims, 2000).
The negative correlations of the retrenchment activities that were statistically
significant (contracted activities and services scope, eliminated particular services,
decreased service expenditure, partially/temporarily exited from specific services,
liquidated assets in order to raise capital, reduced/suspended capital expenditures, closed
down public organizations, created stronger financial controls, and decreased financial
support to other organizations) also provided interesting results. The fact that
retrenchment activities were negatively correlated, though weakly, to the perception of
success indicated that respondents perceived retrenchment activities as actually hurting
the turnaround. Perhaps respondents viewed the retrenchment activities as “pulling back”
and hurting the university’s forward progress.
A number of the repositioning activities showed positive, though weak to
moderate, correlations with the turnaround. These activities included establishing new

services, entering into joint activities/co-operated with other agencies, extending
activities and scope of services, extending availability of services, extending marketing
efforts (reaching out) to new consumers, increasing service expenditures, modernizing
capacity of services with equipment utilizing new technologies, beginning to provide
services/internal services that were previously purchased, redefining core missions,
ensuring high quality of services, improving the local authority’s internal and external
image, introducing new ways of implementation, and rebuilding stakeholders trust in the
local authority. These results indicated that growing the university’s reputation as well as
footprint in the community positively influenced the perception of the turnaround. These
activities generally coincided with forward progress as the organization was aligning its
mission, vision, and operations to create a higher-quality product of education that is
becoming a well-thought of and valued member of the community.
This study revealed a number of recommendations for the university and its
management to make adjustments to continue turning around the organization. The
mission of the organization is explicitly stated and published, but the organization needs
an improved understanding and communication of the organization’s vision, strategic
direction, and goals of management. While the organization as of late has initiated or
revamped a few programs and directions as understood by the participants in this
research, the vision and direction needs to be not only understood by the university
community at large, but embraced. In addition, as the university moves out of operating
as if still in a crisis, the overall culture needs to be strengthened and embraced by the
entire university community and shared with the external community across the state and
region. As much of the “old guard” has left the university, the current management

should take care to distance itself from past mistakes positively by creating an overall
aligned direction with clear strategic and operational goals that are published and
clarified to remove all opacity. Once the university goals and direction are distributed
within the internal university community, every department (academic and operational)
should provide individual strategic and operational goals for their functional units as well
as measurable outcomes.
To continue the process of rebuilding trust and faith in the organization,
management should also demonstrate their competence and the competence of the
university, ensure quality, increase procedural fairness, strengthen communication, and
focus on disseminating information about the improved legal and financial compliance of
the entity (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Institutional stakeholders must not only perceive,
but believe in the competence of management without questioning the integrity and
honesty of their motives to improve trust (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Denton (2009)
provided that organizations can rebuild and improve trust by delivering truthful, accurate,
and timely information. Because the university and its management needs to express both
confidence and trustworthiness to its internal and external stakeholders, it is
recommended that management increase communications across the university with as
personal and involved focus as possible.
As respondents viewed a number of repositioning activities as positively
correlated with the success of the turnaround to date, the university should increase those
activities. Examples would include establishing new services or programs, perhaps by
encouraging new methods of delivering courses and programs that appealed to larger
markets of students. By increasing technology available to students and programs as well

as encouraging new program development while reinforcing the core mission and
refining the organization’s vision, introducing new methods of implementation of
operations as well as programs could increase student enrollment. These new programs
and services should be heavily marketed to new, potential customers, while capitalizing
on the specific needs of the booming regional economy as well as the market of military
veterans moving to the area to work in the local economy.
It is also important to note that at the time of this research, the university’s
affiliated organization, the university alumni foundation, was undergoing its own
operational, strategic, and financial crisis. While this entity was legally separated from
the university under study, its actions influenced the opinions and trust of the internal and
external community in the university. The university will need to use the techniques,
communication improvements, and repositioning activities as listed above to protect the
university from the actions of the foundation while fulfilling its mission as the public
again loses faith in the entity.

	
  
Recommendations for Future Research

	
  

Specific research might include a method or design for longitudinal research at
this university, assessing the same factors at a later date to determine the progress of the
turnaround over time. As the question in this research was whether the university’s
faculty, staff, and members of administration perceived a process/path illustrative of a
turnaround, there is no easy answer. At this point in time, members perceived a beginning
of turnaround, but the responses indicated that more work and time are likely needed to
determine the turnaround’s long-term success or failure. Through a longitudinal study

after the above recommendations have been instituted, it may be possible to more fully
understand the progress of a turnaround in a public institution of higher education.
Turnaround management has been applied to business organizations for several
decades, but as previously mentioned, very little formal work has been completed in the
area of higher education. As such, the instrument used in this research was not a perfect
fit. A number of respondents provided anecdotal comments stating that the instrument
had questions that were not applicable to the university’s situation, some of questions
were more applicable to business or government, and that some of the questions were
overly complicated. While these were anecdotal comments that could not be quantified or
widely assessed, they did raise the issue that the specific issues in institutions of higher
education might be best served with an instrument uniquely designed for colleges and
universities. Future research should focus upon creating and/or adapting an instrument to
survey retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization activities specific to educational
entities and their stakeholders.

	
  
Limitations	
  
This dissertation’s major limitations centered upon the survey methodology,
combined with the fact that the respondents to the survey were self-selected and may
have been those individuals that may have been especially interested in the research
and/or the turnaround. While the established instrument was found to be reliable and
valid, the findings are largely generalizable, but not entirely. In addition, survey fatigue
was suspected as the number of valid responses per question began to decrease as the
survey progressed.

Another limitation was that because only currently employed individuals at the
university were surveyed, many of the individuals that were directly influenced, engaged
in, and/or hurt by previous management and the university’s actions had already exited
the university and therefore were not available for research. Because the survey went out
to every currently employed individual at the institution, no matter the length of their
employment, the responses were skewed as the opinions and perceptions of the
individuals studied were those that were either emotionally committed to changing the
university or were “stuck” without the sufficient desire/ability to leave. Because the
research questioned how current employees perceived the turnaround, no former
employees were surveyed, resulting in a skewed data pool. In addition, the employees
that were not with the university at the time of the ethical breach or during the early
stages of the turnaround and were hired later may not have the information or experience
in the entity to fully assess the turnaround because of their shorter employment.
Ultimately, these limitations indicate potentially skewed data and responses.
As the risk of discomfort was possible for the respondents due to the emotional
trauma from the experience of the breach and turnaround, this risk likely limited the
amount and types of responses. Respondents were also operating with a concern of
anonymity as suspected by the decreased number of responses to demographic questions.
Though this risk was substantially mitigated by vetting and approval from both the
George Fox Institutional Review Board as well as the university’s Institutional Review
Board, the concern about anonymity and/or confidentiality may have also biased or
limited the responses. In addition, because of the need to protect the anonymity and
confidentiality of employees, the organization’s Institutional Research Board disallowed

a number of potential demographic questions, including questions regarding whether or
not employees were tenured, when they were hired, how long they had been at the
university, etc. This restraint was discovered in discussions with the Chair of the
Institutional Review Board before official submission. (A. Stark, personal
communication, May 2, 2014).
Given that the study focused on a single population, bounded by unique
experiences, generalization may not be consistently appropriate. This limitation provides
that it is up to the reader of the research to determine how much or which elements of this
study are generalizable to other situations. The specific market and issues were unique to
the organization at that point in time, though the potential exists for other universities and
colleges in the future to find themselves in similar situations or circumstances with
comparable consequences. While the existing research substantiates and supports the
theories of ethical turnarounds and organizational course change, the concepts may not be
applicable to all institutions of higher education. Therefore, the results may not be
replicable in other cases or to the populations of other educational institutions.

	
  
Conclusions	
  
The final interpretation of the results of this research, in light of the research
problem, indicates partial success in the turnaround. Overall, these results demonstrate
that the university has begun the process and path of a turnaround, at least as perceived
by many of the employees at the university in question. However, this does not mean that
the process of the turnaround is completed and far more work is needed, as evidenced by
the number of respondents that did not see positive change in various areas. As this

university has been used by others as a warning against bad behavior and held up as an
example of what not to do, the academic community can use the results from this
example and research to make course corrections and improvements in their own
organizations, using this entity’s hard-earned wisdom.
Ultimately, the university began its turnaround in its effort to regain its honor,
integrity, and ethics. In an attempt to reverse the trend that “he who has forfeited his
honor can lose nothing more” (Syrus, as cited in Lyman, 1856, p. 31), turning around an
organization to restore the broken faith in the entity is extremely challenging. Yet the
organization “cannot be always torn in two. [It] will have to be one and whole, for many
years. [It has] so much to enjoy, and to be, and to do” (Tolkien, 1965, p. 382). The steps
that the university has taken have started it on the road to recovery, but can serve both the
academy and the profession by being an example of both failure and positive change as a
phoenix rising from the ashes of its own malaise. This research bridged the gap between
the corporate world of turnaround management to higher education, though not without
its challenges. More research is required both at the university in question as well as
others to continue studying turnarounds in higher education to encourage the
improvement and transition of colleges and universities through problems to stable
futures.
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Appendix A: Respondent Solicitation	
  
The following letters were sent soliciting the participation of subjects in the research
study.
Initial E-mail to Inform of Survey	
  
Good afternoon, [insert name here]!
As you may know, I have been diligently working on my dissertation these past months.
The time has come for me to actually execute the research. Per approvals from the
campus Institutional Review Board (see attached), I have been given the go-ahead to
survey all of you for my research. Whether you have been at [the university] one day or
thirty years – YOUR input is important!
The procedure is detailed in a personal invitation in this email. Please click the following
link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/S8BRGLS to complete the survey and claim your
optional thank you gift. I very much value your assistance and support in this research
project. Also detailed in the link is all information regarding anonymity and
confidentiality – you are completely anonymous and all information is entirely
confidential.
Thank you for your consideration and assistance in this matter. I greatly appreciate your
support and aid in completing this research. Your contribution of roughly 15 minutes is
most appreciated! If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to shoot me an email
or track me down – I will be happy to answer any questions or explain the purposes of the
research in more detail.
Thank you!
Kindest regards,
Ashley
Ashley B. Stark, Doctoral Candidate
George Fox University
Newberg, OR
Week 1 Follow-Up E-mail (after Initial Invitation)	
  
Good afternoon!
By now, all of you should have received your personal invitation to participate in the
research for my dissertation. I just wanted to follow up with you all and request your
assistance in completing this research. I can personally attest from the data I have
received so far that the strictest protocols of confidentiality and anonymity are being
achieved. This is why I am sending ALL of you this message again! Unless I have

received your printout about the thank you gift, I have no idea who has completed my
survey and who has not! : )
I have not yet achieved the critical mass of respondents in this survey, so I respectfully
request your continued patience with me to complete this survey. Also, please take note
on at the end of the survey as to the thank you gift of $15 to the university bookstore or
Amazon gift card – your choice!
Here is the link to the survey: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/S8BRGLS just in case. If
you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at any time. Thank you again
for your support and willingness to participate in my dissertation research. Please feel
free to ask any questions – I am happy to help!
Thank you!
Sincerest regards,
Ashley
Ashley B. Stark, Doctoral Candidate
George Fox University
Newberg, OR
Week 2 Follow-Up E-mail (after Initial Invitation)	
  
Good afternoon!
I am sure that you all are getting a bit sick of my emails regarding my dissertation
research. However, I come to beg your indulgence just a bit longer as I have not yet
received the sufficient sample population to complete my research. I need a mere 12
more! So if you thought you did not matter to the survey – YOU DO MATTER! Here is
the link, just in case you need it: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/S8BRGLS
If you have already done the survey, please disregard this email, with my thanks. Thank
you all again for your willingness to support my research. Once I reach critical mass in
my sample size, I will send everyone their thank you gifts of $15 to the university
bookstore or Amazon.com gift certificates.
Thank you!
Sincerest regards,
Ashley
Ashley B. Stark, Doctoral Candidate
George Fox University
Newberg, OR
Week 3 Follow-Up E-mail (after Initial Invitation)	
  
Good evening, [the university]!

I just wanted to send you all a little update regarding my survey. I have reached sufficient
sample size and am ready to proceed on the next step towards completing my
dissertation. This would not have been possible without all of you!!! I will be sending the
thank you gifts requested in the survey this week and next.
Thank you to everyone who participated in my research – each and every one of you are
appreciated.
Kindest regards,
Ashley

Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent and Communications	
  
The Statement of Informed Consent	
  
The Statement of Informed Consent was provided in the initial web page of the survey for
respondents. Participants read the following and progressed through the survey after
clicking the “I accept” button.
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. Please click the following link:
________________________ to participate. By participating in this research, you are
engaging in a healthy exploration about understanding how a university can move
forward after an ethical issue. At the end of the survey, you will have the option to input
your name or fill out a paper form to receive a thank you gift of either a $15 university
bookstore or Amazon.com gift card.
Purpose of the Study:
The purpose of this study is to examine the perspectives of university employees about
the turnaround at the university.
What will be done:
You will complete a survey, requiring approximately 15-30 minutes to complete. The
survey includes some demographic questions to describe the general population under
study.
Benefits of this Study:
You will be contributing to the understanding about the changes at the university to
determine whether the organization and its leadership demonstrated a process/path of an
ethical turnaround.
Risks or discomforts:
There are some potential discomforts in taking part in this study. Because it brings up
issues of trust, belief and confidence in management, and memories of the university’s
difficulties, you may be uncomfortable answering questions. If you feel in any way
uncomfortable with a question, you are free to skip that question or withdraw from the
study altogether.
Confidentiality:
Your responses will be kept completely confidential and anonymous. The researcher
will NOT know your IP address when you respond to the Internet survey. There will be
NO WAY to identify you individually, as every potentially identifiable demographic
question provides the opportunity to answer “I prefer not to answer.” The researcher is
utilizing SurveyMonkey.com BECAUSE it prevents the researcher from acquiring ANY
individually identifiable information. Only the researcher will be able to access the
numerical survey data via a report from SurveyMonkey.com and there will be NO WAY
to determine who provided the various responses. The data will be stored in an offsite,
secure location with no association to the university. There is NO WAY to determine

who responds to any questions or even identify whether a single individual responded to
the survey as it was sent out through this paper invitation. The data will NOT be turned
over to the university administration and no one (save the researcher) at the university
will have access to the data. Even if you submit your name for the thank you gift, your
name CANNOT be matched with your responses.
Contact information:
If you have concerns or questions about this study, please contact Ashley B. Stark
(ashley.b.stark@gmail.com or astark10@georgefox.edu) or Dr. Paul Shelton
(pshelton@georgefox.edu), Committee Chairperson.
By beginning the survey, you acknowledge that you have read this information and agree
to participate in this research, with the knowledge that you are free to withdraw your
participation at any time without penalty.
OPTION to Receive a Thank You Gift:
As this experience will require taking some of your time, you have the OPTION to
submit your name for a thank you gift. The researcher will be providing a thank you gift
of a $15 university bookstore or Amazon.com gift certificate to every participant. To
maintain the STRICTEST confidentiality and anonymity in the research, if you are
interested in entering in receiving the gift after you have completed the electronic
(online) survey via SurveyMonkey.com, please fill out the following information on the
link OR on paper and return it to the researcher via campus mail, certifying that you
completed the online survey.
Please note: There is NO WAY for the researcher to connect the electronic responses to
any paper submission. There is no personally identifiable information requested on the
survey, and all data is submitted to the researcher via electronic reports.
Send to: Ashley Stark, May Hall 308
Name:
________________________________________________________________________
I completed the survey – please send me a $15 gift card:
1) AMAZON.com or
2) University bookstore

________
________

Preferred E-mail Address (to send the electronic certificate to):
___________________________

Appendix C: Survey Instruments	
  
Demographic Questions	
  
1) What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
c. “I prefer not to answer”
2) What is your age?
a. Younger than 20
b. 21-30
c. 31-40
d. 41-50
e. 51-60
f. older than 60
g. “I prefer not to answer”
3) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
a. Some high school
b. High school graduate or equivalent
c. Some college
d. Bachelor’s degree
e. Master’s degree
f. Doctoral degree
g. “I prefer not to answer”
4) Which of the following best describes your position here?
a. Completely/Mostly Administrative
b. Half Administrative/Half Faculty
c. Completely/Mostly Faculty
d. Completely/Mostly Staff
e. “I prefer not to answer”
5) Which of the following best describes your department in the organization?
a. College of Arts and Sciences (Dean or under Dean of CAS)
b. College of Education, Business, and Applied Sciences (Dean or under
Dean of CEBAS)
c. Finance and Administration (VP or under Vice President of Finance &
Admin)
d. Student Development (VP or under Vice President of Student
Development)
e. Enrollment Services and Communications (ED or under Executive
Director of Enrollment Services and Communications)
f. Position within Academic Affairs (VPAA or under VPAA)

g. Athletics (Director or under Director of Intercollegiate Athletics)
h. Other position (President or other positions that report directly to the
President)
i. “I prefer not to answer”
6) Which of the following best describes your managerial role at the university?
a. Upper or middle management (Ex. Dean/Director or above)
b. Junior management (Ex. Assist Director/Department Chair, etc.)
c. Do not manage other DSU employees (not including work study students)
d. “I prefer not to answer”
7) How do you describe your level of participation in extracurricular activities on
campus?
a. I attend an average of more than five on campus extracurricular activities
(sporting events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month.
b. I attend an average of five on campus extracurricular activities (sporting
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month.
c. I attend an average of four on campus extracurricular activities (sporting
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month.
d. I attend an average of three on campus extracurricular activities (sporting
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month.
e. I attend an average of two on campus extracurricular activities (sporting
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month.
f. I attend an average of one on campus extracurricular activities (sporting
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month.
g. I attend an average of less than one on campus extracurricular activities
(sporting events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month.
h. “I prefer not to answer”
8) How do you describe the number of hours per week you spend on campus
executing your specific job duties?
a. An average of more than 50 hours per week during the traditional school
year.
b. An average of 46-50 hours per week during the traditional school year.
c. An average of 41-45 hours per week during the traditional school year.
d. An average of 36-40 hours per week during the traditional school year.
e. An average of 31-35 hours per week during the traditional school year.
f. An average of 26-30 hours per week during the traditional school year.
g. An average of 21-25 hours per week during the traditional school year.
h. An average of 16-20 hours per week during the traditional school year.
i. An average of 11-15 hours per week during the traditional school year.
j. An average of 10 hours or less per week during the traditional school year.
k. “I prefer not to answer”
9) How do you describe the number of hours per week you spend off campus
executing your specific job duties?

a. An average of more than 50 hours per week during the traditional school
year.
b. An average of 46-50 hours per week during the traditional school year.
c. An average of 41-45 hours per week during the traditional school year.
d. An average of 36-40 hours per week during the traditional school year.
e. An average of 31-35 hours per week during the traditional school year.
f. An average of 26-30 hours per week during the traditional school year.
g. An average of 21-25 hours per week during the traditional school year.
h. An average of 16-20 hours per week during the traditional school year.
i. An average of 11-15 hours per week during the traditional school year.
j. An average of 10 hours or less per week during the traditional school year.
k. “I prefer not to answer”
10) In terms of the problems that the university has faced, on a scale of 1-5, (1Hardly; 2-Very Little; 3-Neutral; 4-Somewhat; 5-To a Very Large Extent), how
“major” would you define the violation of trust/difficulties that the university due
to the issues brought to light in the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 academic years?,
also “I prefer not to answer.”
11) Overall, how would you rate the “success” of the process/path of the turnaround
to date? (1-Hardly; 2-Very Little; 3-Neutral; 4-Somewhat; 5-To a Very Large
Extent), also “I prefer not to answer.”

Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale (Beeri, 2009)	
  
Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale

Retrenchment: Over the past
four years, the local authority:
Contracted activities and services
scope
Eliminated particular services
Decreased service expenditure
Partially/temporarily exited from
specific services
Liquidated assets in order to raise
capital
Reduced/suspended capital
expenditures
Closed down public organizations
Created stronger financial control
Decreased financial support to
other organizations

Repositioning: Over the past
four years, the local authority:
Established new services
Entered into joint activities/cooperated with other agencies
Extended activities and scope of
services
Changed the priorities of
traditional activities
Rented/sold/mortgaged assets
Extended availability of services
Extended marketing efforts
(reaching out) to new consumers
Increased service expenditure

Hardly
at All

Hardly
at All

Very
Little

Very
Little

Neutral

Neutral

Somewha
t

To a
Very
Large
Extent

Somewha
t

To a
Very
Large
Extent

Modernized capacity of services
with equipment utilizing new
technologies
Began to provide services/internal
services that were previously
purchased
Loaned money/asked for
subvention for reorganization
purposes
Privatized services
Increased average price of
services/levying money
Redefined core missions
Ensured high quality of services
Improved the local authority’s
internal and external image
Introduced new ways of
implementation
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in the
local authority

Reorganization: Over the past
four years, the local authority:
Replaced the chief executive
officer
Changed the internal local
authority structure
Replaced senior and middle
managers
Took centralization steps
Took decentralization steps
Increased time and efforts in
researching consumers’ needs
Increased time and efforts in
becoming a learning organization
Made changes in human resources
management style
Reshaped and improved the
organizational culture and climate
Invested in staff skills training

Hardly
at All

Very
Little

Neutral

Somewha
t

To a
Very
Large
Extent

Defined a common vision of the
local authority
Diagnosed the local authority
strengths and weaknesses
Formulated an organizational
working plan
Fought the denial and resistance of
employees

Permission to Use the Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale	
  
Dear Dr. Beeri ~
My name is Ashley Stark and I am presently a doctoral candidate at George Fox
University in Newberg, Oregon, in the United States. I am presently working on my
dissertation proposal for research titled "The Management of Ethical Turnarounds in a
Public Institution of Higher Education," under the direction of my committee chaired by
Dr. Paul Shelton.
As you know, the field of management has built a wealth of literature on turnaround
management as well as the effect unethical actions have upon organizations. In addition,
academics and practitioners have developed a substantial body of research on ethical
leadership. However, there has been less study on the application of these topics to
ethical turnarounds specifically in small, regional, public institutions of higher education.
It is important that an institution of higher education that has been affected by an ethical
failure of any sort execute a turnaround to restore trust and faith in the organization,
internally and externally.
That being said, I, like you, have had trouble finding an appropriate instrument to
measure turnarounds in organizations outside of the corporate setting. Coming across
your instrument, I was ecstatic as it is highly applicable to my population of a small,
regional, public (state) university. Therefore I am writing you to request permission to
utilize your Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale in my study.
I would like your permission to reproduce and use your survey instrument in my research
study, under the following conditions:
1) I will use this survey only for my research study and will not sell it or use it with any
compensated or curriculum development activities.
2) I will include the copyright statement on all copies (including electronic) of the
instrument.
If these are acceptable terms and conditions, please indicate so by signing a copy of this
letter and returning it to me either through postal mail, fax, or e-mail:
Ashley B. Stark
PO Box 1634
Dickinson, ND 58601 USA
Fax: (701) 483-2537 (Attn: Ashley Stark)
Email: astark10@georgefox.edu or ashley.stark@dickinsonstate.edu
Thank you for your consideration!
Sincerest regards,
Ashley B. Stark

Doctoral Candidate
__________________________________________________________________
Dear Ashley B. Stark
Doctoral Candidate
These terms and conditions are acceptable. Please feel free to use any materials I
published. For your convenience, I attached some of my relevant works. Good luck with
your research. I'd be happy to read your dissertation and I'd be happy to consider
cooperation in future publications.

_________________________________________27.1.2014______
Signature
Date

Appendix D: Instrument Reliability and Validity	
  
Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale (Beeri, 2009)	
  

Factor No.

Correlation matrix for TMSLA factors (Cronbach’s alpha in parentheses).
Mea
n
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6

1. Reorganization
at the institutional
level

4.08

0.71

(0.870
)

2. Retrenchment of
services

2.58

0.89

0.015

(0.740
)

3. Repositioning as
reaching out

3.35

0.79

0.541

0.018

(0.820
)

4. Reorganization
as extent of
centralization

2.90

0.63

0.099

0.196

0.385

(0.620
)

5. Repositioning as
innovative services

3.64

0.73

0.544

0.231

0.673

0.356

(0.860
)

6. Retrenchment of
expenditures

2.70

0.61

0.047

0.353

0.057

0.047

0.283

(0.560)

7. Repositioning as
renewing
relationship

3.22

0.58

0.626

0.210

0.685

0.257

0.599

0.157

(0.540)

8. Reorganization
at the personnel
level

4.00

0.89

0.239

0.192

0.155

0.294

0.204

0.180

0.189

N = 83–85.
p < 0.01. One item was reversed for the Cronbach’s alpha procedure. p < 0.05.

7

8

(0.690)

Appendix E: Institutional Review Board Approvals	
  

HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW COMMITTEE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS INITIAL REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
[Note: Dissertation, or other formal research proposal, need not be submitted with
this form. However, relevant section(s) may need to be attached in some cases, in
addition to filling out this form completely, but only when it is not possible to
answer these questions adequately in this format. Do not submit a proposal in lieu of
filling out this form. In addition, review carefully the full text of the Human
Subjects Research Committee Policies and Procedures on page 4 of the Research
Manual.]
Date submitted: May 5, 2014
__________________

Date received:

Title of Proposed Research:
The Management of a Turnaround after an Ethical Breach in a Public Institution of
Higher Education
_________________________________________________________________
Principal Researcher(s):
Ashley
Stark_______________________________________________________________
Degree Program _Doctorate of Business Administration – Concentration in
Management__
Rank/Academic Standing: Doctoral
Candidate____________________________________
Other Responsible Parties (if a student, include faculty sponsor; list other involved parties
and their role):
Paul Shelton, Ph.D., MBA, Doctoral Committee Chair
______________________________
(**Please include identifying information on page 6 also.)

(1) Characteristics of Subjects (including age range, status, how obtained, etc):
The approximately 250 subjects are faculty members, staff members, and members of
administration at Dickinson State University. They range in age from approximately 20
to mid-70s. Including both men and women, varying in age, department, position, job,
and level of responsibility, these subjects all work for Dickinson State University in
either a full-time or part-time capacity. This is a convenience sample at Dickinson State
University accessed after the research will obtain proper permissions from DSU’s
Institutional Review Board.

GEORGE FOX UNIVERSITY
HSRC INITIAL REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Page 2
(2) Describe any risks to the subjects (physical, psychological, social, economic, or
discomfort/ inconvenience):
Because the issues at Dickinson State were so personal and poignant to the participants,
there is the potential for both discomfort and inconvenience to the participants. The
survey instrument is designed to look at the improvements at Dickinson State, but might
bring up memories of the downturn of the university. Because the past issues resulted in
feelings of uncertainty, it will be necessary to protect participants’ identities and
confidentiality, as well as giving participants an ‘out’ if they do not want to complete the
survey. In addition, this survey is estimated to require 15-30 minutes and will be sent to
work e-mail addresses.
(3) Are the risks to subjects minimized (a) by using procedures which are consistent with
sound research design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk, and (b)
whenever appropriate, by using procedures already being performed on the subjects for
diagnostic or treatment purposes?
Degree of risk:

1
low

2

3

4

5

6

7
high

It is the express purpose of the design of this research to specifically mitigate against
risks as much as possible. First, adequate permissions to proceed will be obtained from
Dickinson State University’s Institutional Review Board. Second, because the research
will be executed through an anonymous survey instrument through SurveyMonkey.com,
the researcher will receive only numerical results with no identifying personal
information, affirming that fact to the participants. Requesting permissions from
Dickinson State will demonstrate institutional support. Protecting participants’ responses,
confidentiality, and identities, even from the researcher through SurveyMonkey.com,
while achieving management support to complete the instrument will mitigate the risks to
subjects.
(4) Briefly describe the objectives, methods and procedures used:
This research will utilize a non-experimental survey designed from one instrument –
Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities (Beeri, 2009). The objectives of
the research is to determine if Dickinson State University and its leadership demonstrated
a process/path of an ethical turnaround after a period of serious crisis.
The research site of Dickinson State University was chosen due to its period of
substantial organizational change and potential for turnaround after its internal
difficulties, as well as the researcher’s access to the population, records, and data related
to the site. There have been comparatively few publicized examples of ethical
turnarounds in higher education, therefore this research will provide an analysis of how
participants perceive the organizational turnaround. In addition, because this site involves

a number of complex issues that have been publicized in the local, state, and national
media, there are a number of data sources.
Because this study will be of a specific organization, adequate permission will also be
sought from Dickinson State University via request via its Institutional Review Board.
The identities and positions of all participants will be obscured to all users including the
primary researcher through statistical sampling via SurveyMonkey.com to maintain
confidentiality and anonymity.
Because this research will be undertaken at the researcher’s place of employment, the
researcher will approach Dickinson State University’s management to request permission
to conduct the study and work with the University’s Institutional Review Board. Once the
proper permissions are achieved, the SurveyMonkey.com platform that combines the
demographic questions and instrument will be distributed via the researcher’s personal
email to faculty and staff members (email addresses obtained from public record). The email will detail the purpose of the survey and its importance, as well as provide a
statement of thanks and contact information for the researcher for debriefing. Once the
initial emails are sent to the Dickinson State University faculty and staff, follow-up emails will be sent weekly for three to four weeks to encourage additional responses.
Participants will be offered a thank you gift of a bookstore or Amazon.com gift card.
Once the data is collected via SurveyMonkey.com, various statistical methods will be
used to assess the results to determine potential relationships within the data – regression
and correlation, among others.

GEORGE FOX UNIVERSITY
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(5) Briefly describe any instruments used in the study (attach a copy of each).
The survey will use a survey designed from the Turnaround Management Strategies in
Local Authorities instrument. This instrument has been vetted by prior researchers. The
survey uses a five-point Likert-scale to ask if organizations executed various strategies in
retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization, and to what extent management utilized
these strategies as perceived by participants (employees).
See Appendix for Survey Instruments.
(6) How does the research plan make adequate provision for monitoring the data
collected so as to insure the safety, privacy and confidentiality of subjects?
Responses collected via SurveyMonkey.com will be kept completely confidential. Not
only will the researcher not know the participant’s IP address, but there will be no way to
identify subjects individually, as every potentially identifiable demographic question
provides the opportunity to answer “I prefer not to answer.” The data will be accessed
from SurveyMonkey.com with only the numerical responses available. In addition, only
the researcher will be able to access the numerical survey data and will not be
individually identifiable. The data will be stored in an offsite, secure location.
(7) Briefly describe the benefits that may be reasonably expected from the proposed
study, both to the subject and to the advancement of scientific knowledge – are the risks
to subjects reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits?
The purpose of this study is to examine the perspectives of Dickinson State University
(DSU) employees about the turnaround at DSU, leadership, and trust. Participants will be
contributing to the understanding about the changes at Dickinson State University to
determine whether DSU and its leadership demonstrated a process/path of an ethical
turnaround. The results of this study will be used for scholarly purposes in education and
business to assist other organizations in their organizational turnarounds, adding to the
body of knowledge in the field.

GEORGE FOX UNIVERSITY
HSRC INITIAL REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Page 4
(8) Where some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue
influence (such as children, persons with acute or severe physical or mental illness, or
persons who are economically or educationally disadvantaged), what appropriate
additional safeguards are included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these
individuals?
This issue is not applicable. None of the participants fall into the categories of vulnerable
populations.
(9) Does the research place participants "at risk"? _yes – to a minor degree________ If
so, describe the procedures employed for obtaining informed consent (in every case,
attach copy of informed consent form; if none, explain).
As this research will be undertaken using SurveyMonkey.com at the will of participants, the methodology
will allow willing participants to submit answers anonymously, but unwilling participants will simply not
engage in the study. To ensure informed consent, the attached statement will be provided on the face of the
instrument in SurveyMonkey.com as well as the original e-mail request to take the survey.
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